Dossiê Temático Nº06/2009. Inteligência. Bolsistas Responsáveis: Luciana Ghiggi Sílvia Sebben. Porto Alegre, Setembro/2009 NERINT 1

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1 Dossiê Temático Nº06/2009 Inteligência Bolsistas Responsáveis: Luciana Ghiggi Sílvia Sebben Porto Alegre, Setembro/2009 NERINT 1

2 Sumário A Documentos Acadêmicos... 3 Inteligência e Políticas Públicas: dinâmicas operacionais e condições de legitimação... 3 The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice B Clipping de Notícias C Clipping de Notícias (Colômbia) D Leituras Recomendadas E Anexos TABELA: Casos Nacionais separação organizacional do sistema de inteligência, regime político, gastos públicos (% PIB) e PIB GRÁFICO: Distribuição de regimes políticos entre os 35 casos nacionais GRÁFICO: Separação Organizacional X Regime Político GRÁFICO: Separação Organizacional X Gastos Públicos (% PIB) NERINT 2

3 A DOCUMENTOS ACADÊMICOS 1. Inteligência e Políticas Públicas: dinâmicas operacionais e condições de legitimação Fonte: CEPIK, Marco (2002). Inteligência e Políticas Públicas: dinâmicas operacionais e condições de legitimação. Security and Defense Studies Review, Nº 2, vol. 2. Esse artigo apresenta sumariamente as dinâmicas operacionais e o contexto político dos serviços de inteligência no Estado contemporâneo. Essas agências governamentais também são conhecidas como serviços secretos ou serviços de informação. Uma pesquisa em outra área qualquer de Políticas Públicas educação, saúde, defesa, transporte ou eletrificação rural não exigiria tão prontamente uma introdução explicando a natureza do objeto. Nesse caso, porém, será inevitável começar com alguns esclarecimentos sobre o uso restrito que se deve fazer do termo inteligência enquanto um tipo de conflito informacional. Esse uso restrito é necessário por duas razões. Em primeiro lugar, porque a relevância dos fluxos informacionais gerados na e pela atividade de inteligência varia na proporção inversa da quantidade de áreas que se pretende abarcar com recursos escassos. Em segundo lugar, porque os riscos para a democracia - gerados por um uso indiscriminado dos recursos de inteligência em áreas de políticas públicas não diretamente relacionadas com defesa, política externa e segurança crescem na proporção direta em que se dilui a consciência sobre a natureza conflitiva dessa atividade e se passa a tratar inteligência como qualquer insumo informacional relevante para qualquer processo de tomada de decisão. Nesse momento em que o tema da reforma e do papel a ser desempenhado pelos serviços de inteligência na democracia está posto em diversos países da América Latina e do Caribe, parece oportuno fixar algumas balizas teóricas que permitam uma decisão realista e ao mesmo tempo progressista sobre o que fazer com esse aspecto do poder de Estado. Nesse sentido, esse artigo procura oferecer uma síntese do estado atual dos chamados estudos de inteligência para os gestores civis dos assuntos de defesa e de segurança, de modo a explicitar as tensões, possibilidades e limites dessa atividade em termos teóricos, que sejam úteis para as decisões que tais gestores terão que tomar sobre as áreas de especialização, os padrões de desempenho esperados, os recursos a serem alocados e os mecanismos institucionais de controle a serem desenvolvidos para a nova inteligência latino-americana. O artigo encontra-se dividido em cinco seções. Na primeira parte contrasto as duas definições mais comuns de inteligência encontradas na literatura (a restritiva e a ampla), e faço uma defesa do uso restrito do termo porque estou convencido de que só uma consciência aguda dos potenciais conflitivos dessa ferramenta de poder nos permite garantir simultaneamente que ela seja relevante analiticamente para os processos governamentais de tomada de decisão e que ela esteja sob controle dos cidadãos, nos limites postos pelo funcionamento das poliarquias institucionalizadas. Nas duas seções seguintes procuro apresentar as características operacionais das atividades de coleta e de análise de inteligência nos termos desenvolvidos por Michael Herman (1996 e 2001), de longe o autor que mais contribuiu até agora para a tarefa ainda não realizada pela comunidade científica de produzir uma teoria da inteligência. Na quarta seção discuto muito brevemente os riscos inevitáveis para a democracia, bem como indico alguns dos mecanismos institucionais utilizados nas poliarquias para minimizar tais riscos. Finalmente, na última seção caracterizo as razões que levam os governantes a construirem serviços de inteligência, destacando que essas utilidades esperadas são menos dramáticas e mais rotineiras do que a mística criada em torno do tema durante a Guerra Fria, pois essa (des)dramatização é necessária para os cidadãos e os governantes decidirem o que eles querem da atividade de inteligência no século XXI. NERINT 3

4 1 - O que é inteligência? Há dois usos principais do termo inteligência fora do âmbito das ciências cognitivas. Uma definição ampla diz que inteligência é toda informação coletada, organizada ou analisada para atender a demanda de um tomador de decisões 1.A sofisticação tecnológica crescente dos sistemas de informação que apóiam a tomada de decisões tornou corrente o uso do termo inteligência para designar essa função de suporte, seja na rotina dos governos, no meio empresarial ou mesmo em organizações sociais. Nesta acepção, inteligência é o mesmo que conhecimento ou informação 2. Certamente é possível teorizar sobre a natureza da informação e sobre o impacto dos fluxos totais de informação na economia, no estado e na vida social de modo geral 3.Porém, a inteligência de que trata esse trabalho refere-se a conjuntos mais delimitados de fluxos informacionais estruturados. Nesse caso, uma definição mais restrita diz que inteligência é a coleta de informações sem o consentimento, a cooperação ou mesmo o conhecimento por 1 SIMS, Jennifer (1995). What is Intelligence? Information for Decision Makers. In: GODSON, Roy; SCHMITT, G. & MAY, E. [eds.] (1995). U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform. New York, Brassey s, Página Cada uma dessas áreas gera seu próprio corpo de literatura especializada. Para um balanço das várias abordagens sobre informações e processos de tomada de decisão governamental, ver a parte 3 ( Decision Analysis ) do livro de PARSONS, D. Wayne. (1995). Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. London, Elgar, Páginas Sobre o uso rotineiro de especialistas, bancos de dados e sistemas de informação nos diversos ramos da administração pública (como na saúde, fiscalização tributária, previdência social, licenciamento de veículos, coleta de lixo, censos demográficos etc.), ver: BARKER, Anthony & PETERS, B. Guy. [eds.]. (1992). The Politics of Expert Advice: Creating, Using and Manipulating Scientific Knowledge for Public Policy. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, Sobre a chamada inteligência de negócios da área empresarial, ver principalmente: KAHANER, Larry. (1996). Competitive Intelligence: From Black Ops to Boardrooms. New York-NY, Simon and Schuster, Dois livros do começo da década de 1990 estabeleceram as bases do que é agora uma prática relativamente comum na área empresarial: COMBS, Richard E. and MOORHEAD, John D. The Competitive Intelligence Handbook. London: The Scarecrow Press, E também: CRONIN, Blaise & DAVENPORT, Elisabeth. Elements of Information Management. London, The Scarecrow Press, Não apenas a terminologia, mas muitas das técnicas e mesmo dos recursos humanos na área de inteligência empresarial são oriundos do governo, especialmente nos Estados Unidos. Para uma noção sobre como operam essas empresas, ver a página da Open Sources Solutions Inc. ( Sobre o conceito de inteligência social, ver: DAVIDSON, R. (1988). "Social Intelligence and the Origins of the Welfare State". In: DAVIDSON, R. and WHITE, P. [eds.]. (1988). Information and Government: Studies in the Dynamics of Policy-Making. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, Páginas Ver também DURANT, A. (1991). Intelligence: Issues in a Word or in a Field?. In: Social Intelligence, volume 1 # 3 (1991). 3 Ver, por exemplo, a literatura cada vez mais central sobre a teoria econômica da informação e os textos sobre economias baseadas no conhecimento. Em particular, destaca-se o trabalho seminal de: ARROW, Kenneth. J. (1984). The Economics of Information. [Volume IV of Collected Papers]. London, Harvard University Press, Uma síntese útil das proposições de Arrow sobre a informação como um bem econômico de tipo especial pode ser encontrada em: ALBUQUERQUE, Eduardo M. (1996). Aquém do Ótimo: Kenneth Arrow, o Mercado e a Alocação de Recursos para a Pesquisa e a Invenção. In: ALBUQUERQUE, Eduardo M. (1996). Invenções, Mutações: O progresso científico-tecnológico em Habermas, Offe e Arrow. Belo Horizonte, UNA, [Páginas ]. Na fronteira entre economia e sociologia da informação, ver: DEDIJER, S. & JÉQUIER, N. [editors]. (1987). Intelligence for Economic Development: an Inquiry into the Role of the knowledge Industry. Oxford, Berg, E também a nova edição de: VARLEJS, J. [editor]. (1995). The Economics of Information in the 1990's. London, McFarland, O trabalho sociológico mais importante sobre as causas estruturais e culturais do mau uso da informação nas organizações ainda é: WILENSKY, Harold. (1967). Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry. New York: Basic Books, Na área de Ciência Política também é crescente o número de análises e modelos centrados no problema da informação. Ver, por exemplo: MILNER, Helen V. (1997). Interests, Institutions andinformation: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton-NJ, Princeton University Press, E também: KREHBIEL, Keith. (1991). Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor-MI, The University of Michigan Press, l992. NERINT 4

5 parte dos alvos da ação 4.Nesta acepção, inteligência é o mesmo que segredo ou informação secreta. Mantive ao longo da pesquisa uma forte ancoragem na definição restrita de inteligência, aplicando-a ao estudo dos serviços governamentais que atuam nessa área. Ignorar a definição restrita implicaria perder de vista o que torna afinal essa atividade problemática. No mundo real, porém, as atividades dos serviços de inteligência são mais amplas do que a mera espionagem e mais restritas do que o provimento de informações sobre todos os temas relevantes para a decisão governamental. 2 - Ciclo da inteligência: As causas dessa expansão do trabalho dos serviço secretos para além da espionagem clássica residem, ao menos em parte, nas características tecnológicas e na forma institucional como a atividade de inteligência contemporânea opera. Ou seja, como um processo seqüencial separado organizacionalmente entre um estágio de coleta, especializado segundo as fontes e meios utilizados para a obtenção das informações (single-sources collection), seguido de um estágio de análise das informações obtidas a partir das diversas fontes singulares e de outros fluxos não estruturados (all-sources analysis). Uma vez produzidas as análises, elas são disseminadas para os diversos usuários finais, responsáveis pela tomada de decisões e pelo planejamento e execução de políticas. Obviamente, esse é apenas um modelo simplificado e não corresponde exatamente a nenhum sistema de inteligência realmente existente 5. Adicionalmente, a breve consideração dos processos inerentes a cada estágio poderá ser útil para introduzir o tema. Os meios de coleta e as fontes típicas de informação definem disciplinas bastante especializadas em inteligência. A mais tradicional desses fontes de informação é a humana. A disciplina de humint (human intelligence) inclui tanto o terreno da espionagem propriamente dita quanto uma variedade de fontes não clandestinas, tais como a interrogação de prisioneiros de guerra, entrevistas de viajantes ocasionais, relatórios diplomáticos ou de adidos militares, contatos comerciais etc. A segunda disciplina mais antiga de coleta de informações é conhecida como inteligência de sinais ou sigint (signals intelligence), envolvendo a interceptação, decodificação, tradução e análise das comunicações por uma terceira parte além do emissor e do pretenso receptor. Além do acesso direto ao conteúdo das mensagens, seja ele cifrado/codificado ou não, essa área inclui também a interceptação de diferentes tipos de sinais eletrônicos não comunicacionais emitidos por aparelhos civis e militares (radares, transmissores etc.). Mais recente e com importância crescente nas últimas décadas é a chamada inteligência de imagens ou imint (imagery intelligence), obtidas principalmente a partir de plataformas aerotransportadas e espaciais. Além de imagens fotográficas analógicas e digitais com resolução cada vez mais maior, imint é coletada e produzida utilizando-se sensores especiais para outras porções do espectro eletromagnético 4 SHULSKY, Abram (1995). What is Intelligence? Secrets and Competition Among States. In: GODSON, Roy; SCHMITT, G. & MAY, E. [eds.] (1995). U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform. New York, Brassey s, Página A literatura sobre o ciclo da inteligência é imensa e em geral repetitiva. A definição padrão é adotada pela OTAN, Departamento de Defesa dos Estados Unidos e países signatários da Junta Interamericana de Defesa (IADB/JID), inclusive o Brasil. A separação do ciclo em cinco fases características: direção-coleta-análise-disseminaçãoavaliação pode ser desdobrada, por exemplo, para incluir uma fase de processamento entre a coleta e a avaliação. A versão resumida em dois estágios separados organizacionalmente adotada aqui é fornecida por HERMAN, Michael. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge-UK, Cambridge University Press, Páginas A definição padrão pode ser encontrada no Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, elaborado para o U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS, 1994). Uma descrição norte-americana atual do ciclo pode ser encontrada em LOWENTHAL, Mark M. (2000). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington-DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, Páginas NERINT 5

6 invisíveis ao olho humano (próximas de infravermelho, termais, radar). Atualmente, sensores multiespectrais e hiperespectrais são capazes de produzir imagens através de bandas eletromagnéticas diversas que permitem detectar forma, densidade, temperatura, movimento e composição química dos objetos. Enquanto imint e sigint remontam ao começo do século XX, nas últimas três décadas surgiram diversas especializações associadas a novos meios técnicos de coleta. Sob o nome genérico de inteligência derivada da mensuração remota e da identificação de assinaturas, ou masint (measurement and signature intelligence), essa nova disciplina coleta informações sobre características singulares as assinaturas - de sistemas de armas, aeronaves, embarcações e radares, além de monitorar dados geofísicos (acústicos, sísmicos e magnéticos), radiações nucleares, composição físico-química de materiais e uma variedade de fontes para a montagem de bancos de dados, análise e posterior emprego tático, estratégico e diplomático. No caso das potências internacionais com programas aeroespaciais mais desenvolvidos, também são empregados sistemas terrestres e espaciais para a vigilância das atividades aeroespaciais de outros países. Diferentemente das áreas de humint, imint e sigint, nas quais há certas características intrínsecas da informação coletada que organizam a disciplina (relatos, imagens e códigos decifrados), nas áreas de masint e vigilância espacial há uma grande diversidade de tipos de dados coletados e empregos desses mesmos dados, tornando a identidade da disciplina mais frouxa a despeito de sua importância crescente. Finalmente, a disseminação de bases eletrônicas de dados acessíveis via Internet aumentou imensamente o papel da coleta de inteligência a partir de fontes públicas mais ou menos especializadas. A chamada inteligência de fontes ostensivas, ou osint (open sources intelligence), sempre foi importante para qualquer sistema governamental de inteligência. Trata-se da obtenção de documentos oficiais por vias legais, da observação direta e não clandestina dos aspectos políticos, militares e econômicos da vida interna de outros países ou alvos, do monitoramento da mídia (jornais, rádio e televisão), da aquisição legal de livros e revistas especializadas de caráter técnico-científico, enfim, de um leque mais ou menos amplo de fontes disponíveis cujo acesso é permitido. Quanto mais abertos os regimes políticos e menos estritas as medidas de segurança de um alvo para a circulação de informações, maior a quantidade de inteligência obtida a partir de programas de osint. Essas atividades especializadas de coleta absorvem entre 80% e 90% dos investimentos governamentais na área de inteligência nos países centrais do sistema internacional. A maioria desses recursos é dedicada às plataformas, sensores e sistemas tecnológicos de coleta e processamento de informações, especialmente os satélites no caso dos Estados Unidos, Rússia, China, França e outros poucos países que operam frotas desse tipo. O volume de dados brutos e informações primárias coletadas é muito maior do que os relatórios efetivamente recebidos pelos usuários finais, os responsáveis pela tomada de decisões e pela implementação de políticas. Segundo uma estimativa da década de oitenta, somente 10% das informações coletadas chega a sair dos muros dos sistemas de inteligência 6. A analogia mais recorrente encontrada na literatura é com a indústria petrolífera, onde a estrutura de custos também reflete o risco e os investimentos mais pesados na prospecção e extração, enquanto o valor vai sendo agregado ao produto nas diversas etapas de refino. Talvez no caso das atividades de inteligência, valha a pena acrescentar que as agências de coleta são cada vez mais obrigadas a processar e pré-analisar volumes crescentes de informações, desde produção e análise de fotos e imagens, passando pela decodificação de sinais até a tradução de materiais em língua estrangeira e mesmo o teste sistemático da 6 JOHNSON, Loch K. (1985). Decision Costs in the Intelligence Cycle. In: MAURER, A.C., TUNSTALL, Marion D. & KEAGLE, James M. [editors]. (1985). Intelligence: Policy and Process. Boulder and London, Westview Press, Páginas NERINT 6

7 confiabilidade e acuidade das fontes humanas. Uma conseqüência desse fenômeno é que alguns tipos de informações produzidas ainda na etapa de coleta, especialmente as mais efêmeras e de uso diplomático ou militar imediato, vão direto para os usuários finais sem passar pela etapa de análise e produção final (all-sources analysis). Mesmo considerando essa característica, coletores são especialistas em disciplinas, fontes, tecnologias e técnicas, enquanto analistas são especialistas em temas e problemas. Os analistas têm a responsabilidade de avaliar as evidências obtidas sobre esses temas e problemas e fornecê-las para os comandantes militares e os governantes. Feito isso, nada garante que os relatórios de inteligência terão qualquer impacto sobre as decisões tomadas ou não tomadas. Um ponto de partida importante para a discussão sobre o ciclo da inteligência é ter claro que as análises e produtos de inteligência são apenas um dos diversos fluxos informacionais (inputs) que influenciam o processo de tomada de decisões e seus relatórios específicos podem ser mais ou menos importantes para certas decisões governamentais específicas 7. A atividade de análise e produção de inteligência assemelha-se a outros sistemas de informação que apóiam decisões governamentais em pelo menos um aspecto: na necessária separação entre a produção de conhecimento relevante para a decisão e a defesa de uma alternativa específica de curso de ação (policy advocacy). Obviamente, isso é muito mais uma prescrição normativa do que uma realidade nos processos de tomada de decisão governamental 8. Ainda assim, essa e outras instituições especializadas no provimento de informações e na produção de conhecimento não justificariam sua existência se isso fosse a mesma coisa que o aconselhamento, o planejamento ou a formulação e execução de políticas 9. 7 Sobre o impacto potencial das análises e produtos de inteligência vale reproduzir um trecho de Michael Herman: Intelligence s ideal is to transfer its own analyses, forecasts and estimates of probabilities to the user s consciousness in toto. But it is doing well if it ever gets near it. The decision-taking black box works through selectivity. (...) Intelligence s justification is that it influences action in useful ways. But these uses are very varied: some reports are used immediately, while others are useful in the distant future; many more reports influence decisions through their cumulative effects; others still have long-term educational or psychological value. Warning surveillance is a precaution against what may never happen. Much intelligence is never used at all. In all these ways it is like other information. Nevertheless the effect is to optimize national strength and international influence, on varying scales.. HERMAN (1996:155). 8 Na literatura norte-americana sobre o tema, a prescrição sobre a separação entre inteligência e policymaking remete ao influente livro de KENT, Sherman. (1949). Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949 (aliás, um dos poucos livros sobre serviços de inteligência já traduzidos e editados no Brasil). Perspectiva semelhante pode ser encontrada ainda hoje em: BERKOWITZ, B. and GOODMAN, A. (1989). Strategic Intelligence for American National Security. Princeton-NJ, Princeton University Press, Third edition. No entanto, resta cada vez menos daquele otimismo liberal sobre o papel da inteligência. Seria mesmo esperável uma visão mais realista sobre a relação entre governantes e conhecimento, pelo menos depois que Herbert Simon modificou suas posições sobre as pré-condições institucionais para um processo de tomada de decisões mais racional. Ou depois que Charles Lindblom escreveu seus livros incrementalistas e pluralistas sobre o processo de tomada de decisão como muddling through, ou depois da teoria comportamental da firma de March e Olsen ou, mais influentes hoje em dia, depois dos modelos econômicos de decisão baseados em bounded rationalities, derivados da teoria dos custos de transação e da teoria sobre as relações entre principals and agents. São exemplos do impacto dessas diversas abordagens na literatura sobre inteligência os trabalhos de: HEYMAN, Hans (1985). Intelligence/Policy Relationships. In: MAURER, A.C., TUNSTALL, Marion D. & KEAGLE, James M. [editors]. (1985). Intelligence: Policy and Process. Boulder and London, Westview Press, HULNICK, A. S. (1986). The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage. In: Intelligence and National Security, vol. 1 # 2 (May 1986). HIBBERT, R. (1990). Intelligence and Policy. In: Intelligence and National Security, vol. 5 # 1 (January 1990). HERMAN, Michael (1991). Intelligence and Policy: a comment. In: Intelligence and National Security, vol. 6 # 1 (January 1991). Ver também: LOWENTHAL, Mark M. (1992). "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers". In: The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1992, pp A confusão entre as duas coisas ( informar para tornar melhor o processo decisório e aconselhar sobre a melhor decisão ) perpassa o influente trabalho sociológico de Wilensky sobre inteligência organizacional, onde ele define como informação útil aquela que é clara, compreensível, confiável, válida, adequada e wide-ranging, because the NERINT 7

8 Nesse sentido, o ethos profissional da atividade de análise em inteligência e suas regras de produção de conhecimento são as mesmas que governam qualquer outra atividade de pesquisa. Também como em qualquer outra atividade desse tipo, os serviços de inteligência podem cair bem abaixo dos padrões esperados de isenção, relevância e qualidade das análises produzidas. Por outro lado, diferentemente de institutos de geografia e estatística ou de centros de pesquisa econômica aplicada, serviços de inteligência estão voltados para a compreensão de relações adversariais e por isso a maioria de seus alvos e problemas são principalmente internacionais e difíceis. Inteligência lida com o estudo do outro e procura elucidar situações nas quais as informações mais relevantes são potencialmente manipuladas ou escondidas, onde há um esforço organizado por parte de um adversário para desinformar, tornar turvo o entendimento e negar conhecimento. Os chamados serviços de inteligência de segurança (security intelligence) têm alguns alvos puramente domésticos, mas mesmo esses compartilham a condição de outro aos olhos do arcabouço constitucional e da ordem política constituída 10. Mesmo que a lista de temas sobre os quais os sistemas de inteligência precisam informar seja crescente, indo desde aspectos culturais de outras sociedades até detalhes sobre tecnologias de uso dual, novos itens só deveriam ser acrescentados quando os sistemas de inteligência estivessem em condições de agregar valor em áreas que não são de sua especialidade, mas nas quais suas fontes e métodos fossem julgados necessários pelos usuários civis e militares 11. Do mesmo modo, é preciso deixar claro que nem todos os problemas nacionais e internacionais possivelmente relevantes para um governo são adequadamente tratados por serviços de inteligência. Quanto mais ostensivas (públicas) as fontes de informação, quanto menos conflitivos os temas e situações, menos as análises de inteligência têm a contribuir para o processo de tomada de decisão governamental. A fronteira do trabalho analítico em inteligência precisa ser traçada em relação a alguma conexão com a major policy alternatives promising a high probability of attaining organizational goals are posed or new goals suggested. A sugestão de objetivos organizacionais não me parece ser uma função que deva ser atribuída às organizações de inteligência, uma vez que isso embute um risco claro de renúncia dos responsáveis pela tomada de decisões aos elementos de barganha e construção coletiva que caracterizam o processo de construção dos objetivos organizacionais. Cf. WILENSKY, Harold. (1967). Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry. New York: Basic Books, Página viii. Por outro lado, exigências de maior proximidade entre inteligência, tomada de decisões e planejamento de políticas no governo norte-americano na década de noventa levaram a CIA a reorientar seus produtos analíticos na direção da sugestão de cursos de ação específicos. Cf. principalmente DAVIES, Jack. (1992). The Challenge of Opportunity Analysis. An Intelligence Monograph from CSI/CIA, CSI # U. July pp. Do mesmo autor, ver: DAVIES, Jack. (1995). Intelligence Changes in Analytic Tradecraft in CIA s Directorate of Intelligence. Washington-DC, DI/CIA, April Os limites entre a dissidência legítima e a criminalização da contestação são muitas vezes tênues mesmo nas poliarquias mais institucionalizadas. Definir o inimigo público (nas diversas faces do desordeiro, criminoso, subversivo, espião, terrorista, traidor etc.), longe de ser um sólido ponto de partida para as agências de imposição da lei, é parte do conflito inerente a qualquer sociedade moderna. Para um primeiro aprofundamento, ver principalmente as partes II ( National Security and Human Rights ), III ( Criticism, Dissent, and National Security ) e IV ( National Security and the Legal Process ) do livro de LUSTGARTEN, L. & LEIGH, Ian. (1994). In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy. Oxford, Clarendon Press, Nesse sentido é que o Departamento do Tesouro, o Departamento do Comércio, a Agência Nacional de Proteção Ambiental (EPA), a Drugs Enforcements Agency (DEA) e os Centros de Controle de Doenças, especialmente o de Atlanta, são usuários ou clientes dos serviços norte-americanos de inteligência, embora o grau de prioridade desses usuários seja menor que, digamos, a presidência ou o NSC. Ver: SIMS, Jennifer (1995). What is Intelligence? Information for Decision Makers. In: GODSON, Roy; SCHMITT, G. & MAY, E. [eds.] (1995). U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform. New York, Brassey s, Página 09. NERINT 8

9 relevância dos conteúdos analisados para os processos de decisão governamental em política internacional, defesa nacional e provimento de ordem pública 12. Voltando ao problema dos fluxos de informação em atividades de inteligência, a etapa da análise pode ser vista como um funil que recebe informações de fontes diversas, não necessariamente e nem principalmente secretas, analisa e produz a inteligência propriamente dita e se encarrega de disseminá-la para usuários diversos. Disseminação tende a ser o elo mais sensível do ciclo da inteligência. Em boa parte porque a diversidade de usuários finais, o papel dos analistas como usuários dos coletores, além da tendência já mencionada de alguns tipos de inteligência fluírem diretamente do estágio de coleta para os usuários finais, contribuem para tornar complexo e confuso o que a primeira vista parece ser um ciclo com estágios claros e papéis definidos. Esforços para diminuir os custos de transação no ciclo da inteligência envolvem tanto o mapeamento de necessidades dos usuários e a busca permanente de sua avaliação sobre a qualidade das informações recebidas, quanto coisas mais prosaicas como o estabelecimento de infra-estrutura e serviços de comunicação adequados Categorias de inteligência: Outra forma de ilustrar do que trata a atividade de inteligência é levar em conta as diversas categorias utilizadas para organizar o esforço de obtenção, análise e disseminação. Há várias formas de classificar os tipos de inteligência. Sherman Kent (1949) dividiu os produtos analíticos segundo a função esperada e o foco temporal (presente/passado/futuro). Resultava desse critério uma separação entre inteligência sobre fatos correntes (chamada de relatorial), sobre características básicas e estáveis dos alvos (chamada de inteligência descritiva), ou sobre tendências futuras (chamada de inteligência avaliativa ou prospectiva). A tipologia de Kent ainda é empregada em alguns livros e documentos governamentais. No entanto, as categorias mais utilizadas convencionalmente ainda são disciplinares, dividindo os produtos em, por exemplo, inteligência política (e.g. como os militares russos reagirão à expansão da OTAN para o leste europeu?), militar (e.g. como funcionam os sistemas de aquisição de alvo das novas armas anti-balísticas norte-americanas em desenvolvimento?), científica e tecnológica (e.g. quais as prioridades atuais de pesquisa em sistemas óticos e lasers direcionais nos dez principais laboratórios europeus?), econômica (e.g. quais as conseqüências da reestruturação do sistema bancário japonês para as decisões de investimento dos países do leste asiático?) e mesmo sociológica (e.g. como a composição demográfica e religiosa do Cáucaso norte condiciona as chances do fundamentalismo wahabbita expandir-se no flanco sul da Rússia?). Do ponto de vista dos alvos das operações de inteligência, eles costumam ser divididos em transnacionais (terrorismo, crime organizado etc), regionais (África Austral, União Européia etc), nacionais (Estados Unidos, China etc) e sub-nacionais (grupos militantes armados, máfias criminosas etc). Segundo autores como David Kahn (1995) e Michael Herman (1996), a diferença crucial se dá justamente entre a inteligência obtida sobre coisas ou capacidades e a inteligência obtida sobre intenções e significados. Os diferentes meios de coleta seriam mais ou menos adequados a cada um desses tipos. Por exemplo, uma foto de satélite pode fornecer uma evidência forte e irrefutável sobre a localização precisa de um porta-aviões, mas somente a interceptação e decodificação de suas comunicações pode fornecer uma forte indicação ex ante sobre sua missão. Na prática, porém, a maioria dos meios de obtenção de informações 12 Sobre o nexo entre políticas de segurança nacional e inteligência, ver: GODSON, Roy [ed.] (1986). Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Intelligence and Policy. Lexington-Mass., Lexington Books, Para uma crítica mais recente sobre a má distribuição de inteligência para os usuários finais, especialmente na área de imint, ver: Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. House Committee on Armed Services. 103th Congress, 1st Session, House Print NERINT 9

10 lida com os dois tipos de inteligência ao mesmo tempo. Prisioneiros de guerra sob interrogatório podem revelar o que eles viram, mas também o que eles sabem. Na área de inteligência de sinais, por exemplo, quando o sistema de C 3 I (comando, controle, comunicações e inteligência) de uma força armada é penetrado isso garante acesso ao conteúdo das mensagens, mas também permite localizar materialmente a ordem de batalha do inimigo através da identificação dos emissores (direction finding) e do mapeamento dos parâmetros dos sinais. Aliás, de modo geral mensagens interceptadas fornecem informações sobre intenções e significados (ordens transmitidas, planos, requisições, relatórios etc.), mas também sobre capacidades e coisas (equipamentos, logística, desempenho operacional etc.). Isso não quer dizer que sigint seja intrinsecamente superior a imint. O que existe são diferentes tipos de adaptabilidade a inferências. Assim, quando a questão é saber se um determinado governo possui ou não ogivas químicas, amostras ou pelo menos fotos das mesmas são evidências mais fortes do que mensagens interceptadas do estado-maior mencionando sua existência. Por outro lado, a vulnerabilidade da inteligência de sinais às contra-medidas defensivas de um alvo é maior do que a da inteligência de imagens. Uma força tarefa naval atravessando um oceano para fazer um ataque surpresa pode observar silêncio de rádio ou aumentar o nível de segurança de sua criptografia, mas não pode se esconder facilmente de operações de reconhecimento aéreo, especialmente de um inimigo que disponha de cobertura de satélites para vigilância oceânica. Em resumo, a adaptabilidade das diferentes fontes de inteligência a inferências depende dos problemas analíticos a serem resolvidos. Na verdade, o próprio esforço de categorizar a atividade de inteligência deve ser visto antes como uma necessidade administrativa do que como um imperativo epistemológico. Para dar uma idéia de como os países da OTAN alocaram recursos em inteligência na década de 1990, Michael Herman (1996:54) organizou a seguinte hipótese de trabalho por categoria de investimento e não por volume de produção: inteligência de defesa, incluindo comércio internacional de armamentos e proliferação nuclear, cerca de 35%. Vigilância de conflitos internacionais e insurgências, cerca de 15%. Inteligência sobre a política interna de outros países e suas políticas externas, inclusive econômicas, cerca de 10%. Suporte tático para negociações diplomáticas bilaterais, fóruns econômicos multilaterais e outras negociações internacionais, cerca de 10%. Inteligência externa e interna sobre terrorismo, cerca de 20%. Contra-inteligência, contra-espionagem, subversão e narcotráfico, 10%. Supondo-se que essa alocação hipotética reflita a realidade, ela diz bastante sobre a manutenção da agenda de segurança nacional dos países capitalistas mais poderosos do sistema internacional no imediato pós-guerra Fria. Ela também indica o quanto a chamada inteligência política básica, ou descritiva, agora pode ser obtida de fontes ostensivas sem controle direto por parte dos serviços de inteligência. Note-se que essa distribuição de prioridades e recursos dificilmente seria a mesma em outros complexos regionais de segurança, tais como o Oriente Médio, o Leste Asiático ou a área da ex-união Soviética. 4 - Inteligência e atividades correlatas: O parágrafo acima conduz a discussão para um outro ponto importante. Como separar as atividades de inteligência no sentido restrito utilizado aqui das outras atividades informacionais do governo? Traçar essa linha divisória constitui um esforço difícil e ao mesmo tempo necessário para se poder avaliar adequadamente as capacidades de qualquer país na área de inteligência, mas também é importante para a discussão sobre a supervisão congressual e a alocação de recursos. Em relação ao trabalho analítico, já foram exercitados alguns critérios para essa distinção no tópico sobre o ciclo da inteligência. No caso dos serviços de inteligência especializados na coleta de informações baseada em fontes e métodos especializados (humint, NERINT 10

11 sigint, imint e masint), a linha divisória entre o que é próprio da atividade e o que costuma recair na área de responsabilidade de outras organizações e funções governamentais é um pouco mais definida. Em tempo de paz, os países mantêm relações diplomáticas normais e permitem que as representações dos demais em seus territórios enviem relatórios para os países de origem. É certo que oficiais de inteligência usam cobertura diplomática, assim como certas fontes confidenciais dos embaixadores podem se superpor às fontes menos secretas dos espiões, mas as diferenças entre uma atividade e outra são claras. Especialmente no que diz respeito ao grau de fragilidade das fontes diplomáticas ou secretas de informação em relação às contramedidas de segurança dos alvos. Enfim, para marcar a questão basta dizer que diplomatas, adidos militares ou inspetores internacionais suspeitos de espionagem são declarados personae non grata, expulsos do país de hospedagem e devolvidos aos seus países de origem com base na Convenção de Viena de Além disso, criptologia para obtenção de inteligência de sinais, assim como certos meios de coleta de imagens, dificilmente têm equivalentes fora da atividade de inteligência. Ou seja, a ênfase da distinção entre inteligência e informações recai sobre os meios e técnicas específicos utilizados para obter dados que o outro está tentando preservar como segredos 14. Na guerra seria mais apropriado pensar em termos de um continuum entre informações de combate e inteligência. Entretanto, mesmo em situações de combate algumas especificidades marcam a atividade de inteligência. A mais óbvia é o grau de controle que as organizações de inteligência têm sobre cada tipo de fluxo informacional. No caso das informações de combate, tratam-se normalmente daqueles dados obtidos em função do contato direto com o inimigo, utilizados imediatamente para alerta operacional, dados que são controlados pelos staffs de operações (e não de inteligência) dos comandos das unidades. As linhas de separação entre uma atividade e outra, no entanto, são muitas vezes difíceis de visualizar. Na Guerra do Golfo Pérsico de 1991, a coalizão sob mandato da ONU era apoiada por satélites e analistas norte-americanos controlados nacionalmente pelas agências de inteligência do Pentágono como recursos estratégicos, além de contar com recursos táticos comandados pelos staffs de inteligência no teatro de operações. Tanto o trabalho de inteligência quanto a gerência de informações de batalha dependia fortemente dos sistemas de controle e comando aerotransportados, como os AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) e os JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems), subordinados ao comando aliado no teatro de operações. Ou seja, com uma maior integração das operações militares conjuntas, o controle operacional de recursos específicos de inteligência e de informações de combate pode mudar de esfera de comando dependendo das necessidades, como no caso das unidades militares de coleta de inteligência tática empregadas eventualmente pela artilharia, ou dos satélites que transmitem imagens e/ou decodificações processadas diretamente sob demanda dos comandantes de unidades no teatro de operações. Comunicações em tempo real e a crescente sofisticação dos recursos disponíveis para a obtenção de informações de combate (aquisição de alvos, alerta avançado e operações de guerra eletrônica) também contribuem para a criação de novas áreas de sombra entre 14 Essa distinção não se aplica à inteligência de segurança, pois o policiamento também emprega informantes, técnicas de vigilância, interceptação de comunicações e métodos similares para obtenção de informações sobre criminosos. Nesse caso, a especificidade da inteligência de segurança deriva dos seus alvos e objetivos: proteção do ordenamento constitucional contra a subversão, detecção de espionagem, prevenção e repressão do terrorismo etc. Inteligência policial, por sua vez, volta-se principalmente para os condicionantes da criminalidade em geral, o tráfico de drogas e o crime organizado como sua área de expertise. Sobre as diferenças entre inteligência policial e inteligência de segurança, ver as referências mencionadas em notas anteriores e também os capítulos 4 ( Agents, Informers and Infiltrators ) e 14 ( The Legal Mandate ) do livro de LUSTGARTEN, L. & LEIGH, Ian. (1994). In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy. Oxford, Clarendon Press, NERINT 11

12 inteligência e informações operacionais de combate. Especialmente entre as áreas de inteligência de sinais e de operações de suporte de guerra eletrônica, por exemplo quando se trata da localização, identificação e produção de contramedidas contra as emissões eletromagnéticas dos radares e sistemas adversários. Nessas áreas, é muito difícil saber onde começa uma coisa e termina outra. Mas isso não quer dizer que não se possa tentar diferenciá-las. Durante a II Guerra Mundial, por exemplo, a superioridade informacional foi um fator importante para o resultado das batalhas da Inglaterra e do Atlântico. Porém, na Batalha da Inglaterra foram decisivas as informações de combate imediatamente produzidas pelos radares britânicos, enquanto na Batalha do Atlântico o fator decisivo foi o esforço anglo-americano de longo prazo na decodificação das cifras e códigos secretos alemães na área de inteligência de sinais 15.Historicamente, o critério mais importante de distinção entre inteligência e informação de combate tem sido o grau de intervenção humana requerido para a análise e disseminação de informações militares, associado ao grau de vulnerabilidade das fontes de informação às contramedidas de segurança e à conseqüente necessidade de segredo para proteção das atividades de inteligência 16.Na prática, como já se disse as fronteiras são móveis e resultam de uma variedade de acidentes históricos, disputas jurisdicionais, possibilidades tecnológicas, prestígio organizacional e outros fatores, inclusive os critérios doutrinários ilustrados aqui. Recentemente, o conceito de guerra informacional (IW) passou a ser empregado para abarcar a obtenção e negação tanto de informações de combate quanto de inteligência, mas trata-se ainda de uma mudança em curso 17. Além das áreas de fronteira entre informações e inteligência, um problema adicional é posto pela natureza ambígua da contra-inteligência e das chamadas operações encobertas (também designadas como atividades especiais por alguns autores e governos) Para o papel do radar na Batalha da Inglaterra, ver: STARES, P. B. (1991). Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security. Washington-DC, Brookings, Sobre sigint na Batalha do Atlântico, ver: HINSLEY, F.H. (1993). British Intelligence in the Second World War: Abridged Edition. London, HMSO, Ambos os autores consideram o radar a mais importante e revolucionária inovação na área de informações durante a II Guerra Mundial. 16 Reduções de assinaturas térmicas e acústicas, bem como o uso de tecnologias stealth são cada vez mais importantes para a defesa e o ataque em operações de combate, mas isso não diz respeito ao grau de fragilidade das fontes. 17 O conceito de information warfare (IW) resulta da tentativa de integração e expansão das operações de guerra 2 eletrônica, guerra de comando e controle (C warfare) e disciplinas defensivas em inteligência. Por analogia com a guerra terrestre ou marítima, a guerra informacional compreende o conjunto de ações ofensivas e defensivas conduzidas no ambiente informacional para controlar o cyberspace. Ciberespaço é aqui entendido como o "lugar" onde interagem computadores, programas, sistemas de comunicação e equipamentos que operam via irradiação de energia no espectro eletromagnético. Porém, menos por um "lugar" ou um conjunto classificável de ações, a guerra informacional define-se melhor por seus objetivos: obter e manter superioridade informacional na batalha ou na guerra. Ações tão diferentes entre si como um ataque aéreo a uma central de telecomunicações, operações de sigint, missões aéreas para reconhecimento do campo de batalha, ou a implantação clandestina de códigos de computador com "bombas lógicas", poderiam ser parte de uma campanha de guerra informacional. Destaque-se que essas operações de IW não devem ser tomadas como configurando uma guerra à parte. A guerra permanece una e indivisível enquanto realidade; o que está em jogo é a perspectiva ainda não consolidada ou atestada como mais útil do que a preocupação com este tema por organizações combatentes já consolidadas de criação uma arma ou especialidade combatente de informações. Sobre o tema, ver: LIBICKI, Martin C. (1995). What is Information Warfare?. Washington-D.C., Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Para os aspectos defensives, ver: ALBERTS, David S. (1996). Defensive Information Warfare. Washington-DC, National Defense University, Dois trabalhos mais recentes são: SCHWARTAU, Winn (1997). An Introduction to Information Warfare. In: PFALTZGRAFF, Robert L. Jr. & SHULTZ, Richard H. Jr. (1997). War in Information Age: New Challenges for U.S. Security. Washington/London, Brassey's. Páginas No mesmo volume, ver: O NEILL, Richard P. (1997). Integrating Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare. Op. Cit. Páginas Sobre contra-inteligência e operações encobertas, ver: GODSON, Roy. (1995). Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence. Washington-DC, Brassey s, NERINT 12

13 A noção de contra-inteligência remete ao esforço de obtenção de inteligência sobre as capacidades, intenções e operações dos serviços de inteligência adversários. Como esse foco em suas contra-partes só pode ser atingido tendo em vista o contexto mais geral em que operam aqueles serviços, contra-inteligência tende a constituir um inteiro subciclo das operações de inteligência, especialmente por causa da diversidade de fontes tecnológicas e humanas utilizadas na obtenção de um escopo variado de informações que precisam ser analisadas e incorporadas aos acervos de conhecimento das instituições responsáveis pela área de segurança de informações (infosec) de um país ou organização. Por isso, contrainteligência poderia ser considerada em tese como uma das chamadas disciplinas defensivas da área de infosec, muito mais do que inteligência propriamente dita. Nesse sentido, contrainteligência envolve um leque bem mais amplo de atividades do que a contra-espionagem, esta sim voltada principalmente para a prevenção, detecção, neutralização, repressão ou manipulação de atividades hostis de espionagem. No entanto, é precisamente essa dimensão ativa da contra-espionagem que distingue a contra-inteligência dos demais aspectos da segurança de informações e recomenda sua alocação sob responsabilidade dos serviços de inteligência. Operações encobertas ou atividades especiais não são propriamente inteligência, entendida como aqueles inputs informacionais produzidos pelos serviços secretos para os processos de decisão e planejamento de políticas externas, de defesa e segurança pública. Na verdade, operações encobertas são ferramentas de implementação de políticas, tais como sanções econômicas, ameaça de uso ou uso da força militar. Operações encobertas são atividades governamentais voltadas para influenciar as condições políticas, econômicas ou militares no estrangeiro, quando se pretende que o papel do governo que patrocina a operação não seja aparente ou publicamente reconhecido. Essa definição abarca um amplo leque de atividades situadas na zona cinzenta entre a diplomacia e a guerra. Ações que vão do suporte relativamente "aberto" a governos e forças políticas aliadas, até o uso de agentes de influência, agitação e propaganda, campanhas de desinformação, treinamento de guerrilhas, desestabilização de adversários, assassinatos, apoio a golpes de estado e operações paramilitares. A ênfase é posta na negação da autoria, mais do que na clandestinidade da operação em si mesma. A alocação dessas atividades sob a responsabilidade dos serviços de inteligência em muitos países resulta de escolhas históricas e do tipo de capacidade instalada nas agências de humint para gerir contatos e segredos em territórios estrangeiros. Como exemplo dessas escolhas históricas relativamente arbitrárias, basta lembrar que na tradição britânica o serviço secreto conduziu operações encobertas além da espionagem propriamente dita desde sua criação no começo do século e, mesmo assim, durante a II Guerra Mundial o governo britânico decidiu alocar as operações encobertas de tipo paramilitar sob a responsabilidade de um Special Operations Executive (SOE), enquanto a propaganda clandestina era feita pelo Political Warfare Executive (PWE), ambas as organizações estando fora do comando do serviço de inteligência. Atualmente, na maioria dos países que possuem tais capacidades as operações especiais são responsabilidade dos serviços de inteligência, que obtêm das tropas especiais de elite das forças armadas os recursos humanos e materiais que lhes faltam internamente na medida em que as operações de influência afastam-se do terreno da propaganda e aproximam-se das ações paramilitares e de guerrilha. Segundo estimativas de um autor norteamericano, operações encobertas ainda representavam cerca de 2% das atividades e recursos da CIA na primeira metade da década de HEDLEY, John Hollister. (1995). Checklist for the Future of Intelligence. Washington-DC, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, [Occasional Paper]. Página 05. NERINT 13

14 Uma vez mencionado o problema da relação entre operações encobertas e inteligência, ele remete para duas questões finais. A primeira diz respeito à compatibilidade ou não entre inteligência e democracia. A segunda questão diz respeito à utilidade esperada da inteligência no estado contemporâneo. 5 - Inteligência e democracia: A habilidade de controlar fluxos e acervos informacionais é decisiva para a capacidade de dominação de qualquer grupo que esteja maximizando poder, seja sob um regime democrático ou autocrático 20.No caso da inteligência, tratam-se de informações que não estão disponíveis através de outros meios e cuja disseminação é protegida pelo segredo governamental. Assim, por controlar um importante corpo de informações, por ter especialização em técnicas de vigilância e interceptação de comunicações e por operar sob um manto de segredo, um aparato de inteligência sempre pode ameaçar o governo a que serve e os próprios cidadãos. Note-se que não é preciso supor (o que seria equivocado) qualquer tipo de monopólio dos serviços de inteligência em termos de fornecimento de informações relevantes para o processo decisório governamental. Com o grau de desenvolvimento tecnológico dos sistemas de inteligência nas últimas décadas, ao problema do segredo junta-se cada vez mais o peso da tecnocracia, destacado em particular por John K. Galbraith em O Novo Estado Industrial (1979: passim). Essas duas dimensões compõem aquilo que Norberto Bobbio (1984:30-31) chamou de poder invisível que corrompe crescentemente a idéia democrática ao ponto de impedir, no limite, que se possa dizer que a democracia existe onde existem serviços de inteligência. Ora, mesmo deixando de lado aqui a discussão mais geral sobre o grau de afastamento entre os regimes políticos democráticos realmente existentes (chamados de poliarquias) e os ideais democráticos 21, o fato de países norte-americanos e europeus ocidentais considerados dentre os mais democráticos do mundo segundo quaisquer padrões de medida contarem com serviços de inteligência mais ou menos poderosos indica duas coisas diferentes. Por um lado, que a mera presença de serviços de inteligência não viola as condições institucionais de existência da própria poliarquia 22. Por outro lado, que isso está longe de significar que o recurso a essas atividades seja isento de problemas, dilemas, tensões e situações de perda de controle mesmo naqueles países. 20 Sobre a relação entre democracia e inteligência, ler inicialmente os capítulos 10 ( Oversight and Accountability ) e 13 ( Ethical and Moral Issues ) do livro de LOWENTHAL, Mark. (2000). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington-DC, CQ Press, Ver também HOLT, Pat. (1995). Secret Inteligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy. Washington-DC, CQ Press, Sobre direitos civis e inteligência, ver: LUSTGARTEN, L. & LEIGH, Ian. (1994). In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy. Oxford, Clarendon Press, Sobre teoria democrática, ver DAHL, Robert (1971). Poliarquia: Participação e Oposição. São Paulo, Edusp, Sobre a tensão entre fato e valor, ver: SARTORI, Giovanni. (1987). A Teoria da Democracia Revisitada. São Paulo, Ática, Vol. 1 (Questões Contemporâneas) e Vol. 2 (Questões Clássicas). Sobre a incidência de regimes democráticos na década de noventa (cerca de 45% do total), ver: HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. (1991). A Terceira Onda: A Democratização no final do Século XX. São Paulo, Ática, Nos termos de Robert Dahl, essas condições sine qua non seriam garantias para o exercício individual de três capacidades: formular preferências, exprimir preferências e ter preferências igualmente consideradas na conduta do governo. Essas garantias traduzem-se em oito condições institucionais: 1) liberdade de formar e aderir a organizações; 2) liberdade de expressão; 3) direito de voto; 4) elegibilidade para cargos públicos; 5) direito de políticos disputarem apoio e votos; 6) fontes alternativas de informação; 7) eleições livres e idôneas; 8) instituições para fazer com que as políticas governamentais dependam de eleições e de outras manifestações de preferências. Como os regimes variam enormemente na amplitude com que as oito condições institucionais estão abertamente disponíveis, são publicamente utilizadas e plenamente garantidas ao menos para alguns membros do sistema político que queiram contestar a conduta do governo DAHL (1997:27), em princípio se poderia medir o impacto dos serviços de inteligência e segurança sobre a democracia verificando o quanto a atuação das agências restringe essas garantias. NERINT 14

15 Em uma comunidade política democrática os serviços de inteligência e segurança recebem poderes extraordinários para proteger as liberdades dos cidadãos. Precisamente por causa desses poderes, tais serviços (bem como as polícias e as forças armadas que formam com eles o núcleo coercitivo do estado) são capazes de causar danos a essas mesmas liberdades e às instituições democráticas. Os riscos envolvidos nesse caso são vários. Num extremo está a instrumentalização dos serviços de inteligência por parte de um governo contra seus oponentes políticos internos, enquanto no outro extremo está a autonomização dos serviços e sua transformação em centros de poder independentes no sistema político. Há risco também no uso de meios intrusivos de obtenção de informações no exterior, que pode contribuir para uma espiral de reações que termina por aumentar a insegurança nacional ao invés de a reduzir. Por tudo isso, o tema do controle público sobre as atividades de inteligência é inescapável e central. Nos regimes democráticos, esse controle é assumidamente indireto, exercido por comissões especiais, corregedorias e comitês parlamentares. No caso do poder executivo, trata-se mais da supervisão dos mandatos legais das agências e do controle administrativo sobre a eficiência no cumprimento de missões e prioridades. No caso da supervisão congressual ou parlamentar, são as próprias missões e prioridades das agências de inteligência que levantam problemas de legitimidade. Em termos bastante genéricos, está em jogo o quanto as noções de interesse nacional e de segurança nacional (que justificam em última análise as atividades de inteligência) ainda podem ser tomadas por governantes democráticos como descendentes diretas da Raison d etat do Antigo Regime, pelo menos nessas áreas de sombra internacionais. Algo semelhante ocorre com o segredo, que já não corresponde aos arcana imperii dos reis absolutistas, mas cuja excepcionalidade sob a democracia é parcialmente neutralizada pela escala em que é empregado e pelos custos decorrentes. Tais custos estão longe de ser apenas financeiros, mas estimativas do governo norte-americano sobre os gastos com sistemas de classificação de segurança para informações, instalações, procedimentos de gestão de segredos e investigações pessoais para concessão de credenciais de acesso (background investigations) indicaram gastos de 5,6 bilhões de dólares anuais em 1996, sendo 2,9 bilhões nas empresas contratadas pelo Pentágono e 2,7 bilhões nas agências governamentais (a CIA não foi incluída no levantamento) 23. Em resumo, tanto do ponto de vista dos modelos institucionais e procedimentos mais adequados e efetivos para a supervisão externa das atividades de inteligência, quanto do ponto de vista da reflexão sobre os problemas éticos e morais associados à espionagem internacional, ao segredo governamental, ao uso de operações encobertas e aos acordos secretos entre governos para compartilhamento de inteligência, essa é uma área de pesquisa sobre o impacto dessas atividades que tende a ser subestimada na literatura especializada. Isso é uma lacuna importante porque mesmo nos países mais democráticos os mecanismos de supervisão congressual são muito recentes e ainda estão em fase de consolidação. 6 - Utilidade da inteligência na paz e na guerra: Dadas as dificuldades mencionadas para se conseguir compatibilizar inteligência com democracia, é o caso de se perguntar por que os governos da maioria dos países importantes no sistema internacional têm serviços de inteligência afinal de contas? As utilidades esperadas com a atividade regular de inteligência formam uma lista diversificada. Antes de mais nada, espera-se que a inteligência contribua para tornar o processo decisório governamental nas áreas relevantes de envolvimento (política externa, defesa nacional e ordem pública) mais racional e realista, ou seja, menos baseado em intuições 23 Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. Pursuant to Public Law Chairman of the Comission: Daniel P. Moynihan. Washington-DC, GPO, pp [plus 110 pp with appendices]. Essas estimativas são encontradas na parte II do relatório. NERINT 15

16 e convicções pré-concebidas e mais baseado em evidências e reflexão. Em segundo lugar, espera-se que o processo interativo entre policymakers (responsáveis pelas políticas públicas, sejam eles funcionários de carreira, dirigentes nomeados ou políticos eleitos) e oficiais de inteligência produza efeitos cumulativos de médio prazo aumentando o nível de especialização dos tomadores de decisões e de suas organizações. Em terceiro lugar, que a inteligência apóie diretamente o planejamento de capacidades defensivas e o desenvolvimento e/ou aquisição de sistemas de armas, de acordo com o monitoramento das sucessivas inovações e dinâmicas tecnológicas dos adversários. Em quarto lugar, que apóie mais diretamente as negociações diplomáticas em várias áreas, não tanto afetando a definição da política externa mas propiciando ajustes táticos derivados da obtenção de informações relevantes. Em quinto lugar, que a inteligência seja capaz de subsidiar o planejamento militar e a elaboração de planos de guerra, bem como suportar as operações militares de combate e outras (operações de paz, assistência, missões técnicas etc). Em sexto lugar, que a inteligência possa alertar os responsáveis civis e militares contra ataques surpresa, surpresas diplomáticas e graves crises políticas internas que podem nunca ocorrer, mas para as quais os governantes preferem assegurar-se ao invés de arriscar. Em sétimo lugar, sistemas de inteligência monitoram os alvos e ambientes prioritários para reduzir incerteza e aumentar o conhecimento e a confiança, especialmente no caso de implementação de tratados e acordos internacionais sem mecanismos de inspeção in loco. Finalmente, sistemas de inteligência servem para preservar o segredo sobre as necessidades informacionais, as fontes, fluxos, métodos e técnicas de inteligência diante da existência de adversários interessados em saber tais coisas. Por mais incompleta e telegráfica que seja essa lista, ela implica um papel menos imediato e dramático para a atividade de inteligência enquanto dimensão do poder do estado. Claro que casos como o do telegrama Zimmerman 24 ou a ruptura dos códigos alemães na II Guerra têm impacto direto sobre o curso dos acontecimentos históricos, mas eventos assim são relativamente mais raros. Principalmente em tempo de paz, a atividade de inteligência visa a otimizar a posição internacional de um país ou organização, não a transformá-la radicalmente 25. Na guerra o impacto da inteligência é mais imediato, mas também predominam os efeitos de otimização. A superioridade informacional permite em tese uma gestão mais eficiente de recursos humanos e materiais, aumenta a sobrevivência das forças em combate (survivability) e contribui para o desempenho das funções de comando. Implica dizer que a capacidade de inteligência de uma força armada precisa ser avaliada em termos de seu valor absoluto (grau de aproximação em relação a algum tipo de critério sobre o que seria a realidade) e relativo (contraste com a inteligência disponível para os comandantes das forças inimigas). Embora inteligência seja apenas uma das dimensões que afetam a performance do comando na guerra, ela pode constituir um fator crítico na condução das operações pois permite acelerar o ciclo de tomada de decisões e resposta dos comandantes das forças amigas, ao mesmo tempo que opera desorganizando moral e analiticamente o ciclo de tomada de decisões do comando inimigo, reduzindo sua capacidade de resposta às iniciativas e eventualmente destruindo sua vontade de seguir lutando. Em particular, inteligência superior é um fator crítico na guerra de comando e controle (C 2 warfare) na medida em que cria fricção e aumenta a entropia no chamado ciclo OODA (Observ-Orient-Decide-Act) das forças inimigas. 24 Telegrama interceptado durante a I Guerra Mundial pela organização criptológica da marinha real britânica (Room 40), no qual a Alemanha propunha ao México que atacasse os Estados Unidos em troca da reconquista dos territórios perdidos na guerra de 1844 caso a Alemanha vencesse a guerra. A revelação do conteúdo do telegrama foi um dos fatos que levou os Estados Unidos a entrarem na guerra do lado dos britânicos e franceses. 25 Sobre o impacto geral da inteligência sobre a capacidade do Estado na guerra e na paz, ver o capítulo 8 ( Intelligence and National Action ) do livro de HERMAN, Michael. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge-UK, Cambridge University Press and Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs, NERINT 16

17 Por vezes, a atividade de inteligência também causa efeitos transformadores da própria natureza das operações militares 26.A blietzkrieg alemã contra a França em 1940, bem como o impacto da ruptura dos códigos de comunicação alemães sobre a dinâmica da guerra naval no Mar do Norte em e no Atlântico em , ou ainda o papel da inteligência de imagens no uso da artilharia e do bombardeio desde a I Guerra Mundial até a Guerra da Iugoslávia de 1999, são todos exemplos de efeitos cumulativos e não lineares que foram além da mera otimização do uso de recursos 27.É importante destacar, porém, que tais efeitos de transformação resultam da eventual qualidade superior dos processos de análise, produção e disseminação de inteligência, muito mais que da mera quantidade de informações coletadas. Pelo contrário, o excesso de informações captadas por uma infinidade de sensores e canalizadas massivamente através das múltiplas instâncias de comando pode contribuir para aumentar o que Clausewitz chamou de fog da guerra, no limite paralisando a própria capacidade de decidir das forças amigas 28. Para David Kahn (1995:95), a função predominante de otimização de recursos materiais e psicológicos seria uma das três características centrais da inteligência, observável na guerra e também na paz. As outras duas características seriam mais visíveis no âmbito estratégico e envolveriam, por um lado, o reconhecimento do papel auxiliar da inteligência em relação à capacidade combatente e, por outro lado, a associação eletiva entre a defesa e a inteligência 29.Segundo George O Toole (1990:39-44), dessa lei de Kahn desdobram-se quatro corolários: 1) a ênfase na defesa tende a ser acompanhada pela ênfase na inteligência. 2) a ênfase no ataque tende a ser acompanhada pela ênfase na contra-inteligência para garantir segurança operacional e surpresa. 3) em situações de impasse e equilíbrio de forças os dois lados tendem a enfatizar a busca de inteligência. 4) as operações ofensivas que adquirem características defensivas tendem a aumentar a ênfase na inteligência. Sem recusar essa hipótese, Michael Herman (1996: ) chama a atenção para evidências históricas que poderiam enfraquecer-lhe a universalidade. Por exemplo, a qualidade superior da inteligência que dispunham os alemães na invasão da Noruega em 1940, ou os japoneses no ataque contra Pearl Harbor em 1941, ou de modo geral a superioridade da inteligência aliada a partir da metade da II Guerra evidencia que inteligência pode favorecer tanto o ataque quanto a defesa 30. Mais ainda, sugere que a superioridade em inteligência 26 Sobre inteligência e performance das estruturas de comando e controle (C 2 ), ver: STARES, P. B. (1991). Command Performance: The Neglected Dimmension of European Security. Washington-DC, Brookings Institution, Para uma discussão recente sobre a formulação clausewitziana a respeito, ver: FERRIS, J. and HANDEL, Michael I. (1995). Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command. In: Intelligence and National Security, vol. 10, # 01 (January 1995). Sobre o impacto das novas tecnologias e dinâmicas operacionais da batalha no chamado ciclo OODA (Observ-Orient-Decide-Act), ver: McDONALD, John W. (1997). Exploiting Battlespace Transparency: Operating Inside an Opponent s Decision Cycle. In: PFALTZGRAFF, Robert L. Jr. and SHULTZ, Richard H. Jr. (1997). War in Information Age: New Challenges for U.S. Security. Washington/London, Brassey's. Páginas Para uma discussão detalhada sobre inteligência e operações militares em três guerras (Guerra Civil dos Estados unidos, I Guerra Mundial e II Guerra Mundial), ver os diversos ensaios do volume organizado por: HANDEL, Michael I. [editor]. (1990). Intelligence and Military Operations. Great Britain, Frank Cass, Ver em especial o longo ensaio introdutório do próprio Handel (páginas 01-95). 28 Por isso: The technology challenge lies in building filters at all levels to sort massive amounts of data by type, time, and spatial orientation to meet the critical requirements of the commander. Only by limiting information requirements can commanders approach becoming a unitary actor at lower levels and fully exploit the advantages of faster decision cycles. McDONALD (1997:167). 29 KAHN, David. (1995). Toward a Theory of Intelligence. In: Military History Quarterly, vol. 07 # 02, (winter 1995). Páginas A sistematização anterior da proposição teórica de Kahn foi feita por O TOOLE, George J. A. (1990). Kahn s Law: A Universal Principle of Intelligence?. In: International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 04 # 01 (spring 1990). Páginas O Toole baseia-se nas conclusões do livro de KAHN, David (1978). Hitler s Spies. New York, Macmillan, Herman reconhece que tudo depende do grau de abrangência utilizado para a análise. Assim, mesmo que em campanhas específicas os atacantes tenham demonstrado possuir inteligência de melhor qualidade que seus adversários atuando defensivamente, em termos da II Guerra Mundial como um todo a lei de Kahn parece correta NERINT 17

18 reflete em parte uma superioridade militar já existente. Afinal, imagens são melhor obtidas pelo lado que possui superioridade aérea, assim como são as forças vitoriosas no campo de batalha que tendem a extrair mais informações úteis de prisioneiros de guerra e documentos capturados, bem como é o exercício do comando do mar que potencializa a obtenção de material criptográfico crucial para a decodificação e decifração de sinais. Não se trata, porém, de substituir o entendimento equivocado de que a inteligência é a arma do fraco pelo argumento simétrico (e igualmente equivocado) de que a inteligência sempre favorece o forte. Mas, sim, de destacar que o desenvolvimento de capacidades de inteligência é demorado e depende das experiências prévias de cada país. Historicamente, a ocorrência prévia de derrotas militares e surpresas diplomáticas desagradáveis foram o tipo de experiência crucial na decisão de construir sistemas de inteligência. Em resumo, inteligência não garante de antemão a vitória na guerra nem pode dizer o que vai ocorrer no futuro da política. Embora possa ser decisiva em momentos cruciais na guerra e na paz, em geral os governos contam com a atividade de inteligência para reduzir a incerteza nas suas decisões, para aumentar a segurança nacional e para posicionarem-se melhor no sistema internacional. 2. The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice Fonte: SCOTT, Len and JACKSON, Peter (2004). The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice. Intelligence and National Security, n. 19, vol.2, pp The first few years of the twenty-first century have witnessed a transformation in the role of secret intelligence in international politics. Intelligence and security issues are now more prominent than ever in Western political discourse as well as the wider public consciousness. Public expectations of intelligence have never been greater, and these demands include much greater disclosure of hitherto secret knowledge. Much of this can be attributed to the shock of the terrorist attacks of September These events drove home the vulnerability of Western societies and the importance of reliable intelligence on terrorist threats. But debates over the role of intelligence in the build-up to the Second Gulf War have played an equally important role in transforming the profile of the secret world in Western society. As Christopher Andrew points out in his contribution to this collection In the space of only a year, the threats posed by Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein had succeeded in transforming British government policy on the public use of intelligence 31. The relationship between political leaders and their intelligence advisors came under unprecedented public scrutiny in both Britain and the United States. Both Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W. Bush were widely charged with purposefully distorting intelligence information in order to justify their decision to make war on Iraq in April The need for a better understanding of both the nature of the intelligence process and its importance to national and international security policy has never been more apparent. Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century draws upon the views of academics, journalists and former practitioners to consider the nature of intelligence and its evolving role in domestic and international politics. It also examines the development of intelligence as an area of academic study and assesses its emerging contribution to the study em relação às ênfases britânica e soviética em inteligência, enquanto os alemães desenvolveram principalmente serviços de contra-inteligência. 31 Christopher Andrew, Intelligence, International Relations and Under-theorisation, this volume, pp NERINT 18

19 of international relations. It aims to explore the way the subject is studied, for what purpose and with what consequences. It is nearly five decades since intelligence first emerged as a subject of serious academic study with the publication of Sherman Kent s Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy 32. It is some 20 years since two eminent British historians invoked Sir Alexander Cadogan s description of intelligence as the missing dimension of international affairs 33. The development of intelligence studies as a sub-field of international relations has continued to gather momentum ever since. Initially the terrain of political scientists, the role of intelligence in domestic and international politics now attracts the attention of an ever larger number of historians. The subject is firmly established in centres of teaching and research in both Europe and North America. As a result, the study of international security has been increasingly influenced by a better understanding of the role of intelligence in policy making although Christopher Andrew maintains that intelligence is still denied its proper place in studies of the Cold War 34. And, as Andrew argues persuasively in this collection, the specific and potentially crucial subject of signal intelligence remains almost wholly neglected in Cold War historiography 35. The rapid growth of intelligence as a focus of academic enquiry will surely continue. Recent progress in archival disclosure, accelerated by the end of the Cold War and by changing attitudes towards official secrecy and towards the work of the security and intelligence services, has further facilitated research, understanding and debate 36. Newly released documents, along with a range of other sources, provide an opportunity to reconsider longstanding assumptions about the motives of policy makers and the institutional character of foreign and security policy making. The events of September 11 and the war on Iraq have focused attention on all aspects of the subject. In light of these developments, the time seems right to take stock of what has been accomplished in this relatively new area of scholarly enquiry, to reflect upon the various methodological approaches used by scholars as well as the epistemological assumptions that underpin research and writing about intelligence. SCOPE AND FOCUS: WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? HOW DO WE STUDY IT? Popular perceptions and general understanding of the nature of intelligence and its role in international relations leaves much to be desired. A starting point is the question: what is intelligence? The way intelligence is defined necessarily conditions approaches to research and writing about the subject. Sherman Kent s classic characterisations of intelligence cover the the three separate and distinct things that intelligence devotees usually mean when they use the word ; these are: knowledge, the type of organisation that produces that knowledge and the activities pursued by that organisation 37. In most contemporary analyses, intelligence is understood as the process of gathering, analysing and making use of information. Yet beyond such basic definitions are divergent conceptions of exactly what intelligence is and what it is for. This is perhaps because, as James Der Derian has observed, intelligence is the 32 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1949). 33 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press 1984). 34 Christopher Andrew, Intelligence in the Cold War: Lessons and Learning, in Harold Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in the 21st Century (London: St Ermin s Press 2000), pp Andrew, Intelligence, International Relations, pp For recent research on signals intelligence, see Matthew Aid and Cees Wiebes (eds), Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond, Special Issue of Intelligence and National Security, 16/1 (2001). 36 An important recent development in the evolution of more liberal classification and declassification policies in the United States is the implementation of Executive Order Classified National Security Information in April 1995, although the significance of this has been contested. The Blair government has been largely unsuccessful in its attempts to establish a similar regime in Britain. 37 Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p. ix. NERINT 19

20 least understood and most undertheorized area of international relations 38. David Kahn, one of the most eminent scholars in the field, similarly laments that [n]one of the definitions [of intelligence] that I have seen work 39. A brief survey of various approaches to the study of intelligence illuminates the difficulties inherent in any search for an inclusive definition. Many observers tend to understand intelligence primarily as a tool of foreign and defence policy making. Others focus on its role in domestic security. Still others concentrate on the role intelligence services have played as mechanisms of state oppression 40. One interesting divergence of views pertains to the basic character of intelligence. Michael Herman (a former practitioner) treats it as a form of state power in its own right and this conceptualisation is at the heart of the analysis in his influential study Intelligence Power in Peace and War 41. John Ferris (an historian) proffers a different view, judging that Intelligence is not a form of power but a means to guide its use, whether as a combat multiplier, or by helping one to understand one s environment and options, and thus how to apply force or leverage, and against whom 42. Whichever formulation one adopts and whatever the quality of intelligence on offer, it is the judgement of political leaders and their grasp of the value and limitations of intelligence that is most crucial 43. So how do we define intelligence work? Should we make a distinction between secret and open source information? Does the internet change how we evaluate open source information? What distinguishes the intelligence process from the information gathering activities of other government agencies? Michael Herman has offered a solution to this problem by identifying government intelligence as the specialised organizations that have that name, and what they do and produce 44. This distinction can become problematic, however, when it comes to analyzing the impact of intelligence on decision making. Assessments drafted by intelligence agencies are usually based on a combination of secret and open source information. And a substantial percentage of the information from open sources is quite often drawn from material acquired and processed by other government departments, the popular media and even work that has been contracted out to nongovernment agencies. Since all of these areas cannot reasonably be defined as intelligence activity, this suggests that the essence of intelligence lies at the level of analysis or assessment 45. The problem is that assessments are only one element in the decision-making process, and the illumination that they provide may only complement information provided by other government agencies or other sources of information at the level of decision. It therefore remains difficult to make confident judgements about exactly what intelligence is and precisely how it influences decision making. Should scholars accept this level of imprecision as inevitable? Or, conversely, should we continue to strive to come up with a definition of intelligence that resolves this uncertainty? 38 James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War (Oxford: Blackwell 1992); see also Michael Fry and Miles Hochstein, Epistemic Communities: Intelligence Studies and International Relations in Wesley K. Wark (ed.), Espionage: Past, Present, Future? (London: Frank Cass 1994), pp (also published as a Special Issue of Intelligence and National Security, 8/3 (1993)). 39 David Kahn, An Historical Theory of Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security, 16/3 (2002), p Examples of the last approach include Richard Thurlow, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Blackwell 1994), Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin s First Lieutenant (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993), Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990). 41 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996). 42 John Ferris, Intelligence in R. Boyce and J. Maiolo (eds), The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2003), p For an excellent analysis of US presidents and their use of intelligence see Christopher Andrew, For the President s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins 1995). 44 Michael Herman, Diplomacy and Intelligence, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 9/2 (1998), pp For discussion see Herman, Intelligence Power and Abram Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (London: Brassey s US 1993). NERINT 20

21 A good illustration of the difficulties inherent in defining intelligence is the controversial question of secret intervention in other societies (most commonly referred to as covert action ). Scholars have frequently ignored covert action in their analyses of intelligence. As Elizabeth Anderson has argued: the specific subject of covert action as an element of intelligence has suffered a deficiency of serious study. She further observes that while academics have developed different theoretical concepts to explain other instruments of international relations for example, weapons, trade and diplomacy the separation of covert action from traditional foreign policy instruments means that these same concepts have not been applied to covert action 46. There is a clear need to locate covert action within the study of international relations in general and within intelligence in particular. This may also pose an interesting challenge for theorists of intelligence because considering covert action as intelligence work means that intelligence might be better understood as a tool for the execution of policy as well as a tool to inform policy. Since September 11 the political context, both national and international, has changed. Amid widespread calls for intelligence reform in the United States there are those who argue for a radical new conceptualization of the role of intelligence in national security policy. In this collection Charles Cogan, a former senior officer in the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advocates, inter alia, a change in the orientation of US intelligence from gathering information to hunting the United States adversaries. Such a transformation may require a new conceptual architecture for intelligence reflecting its changed role in the exercise of US military power. There is also substantial, if rarely articulated, divergence in approaches to studying intelligence. Scholars tend to approach the subject from three relatively distinct perspectives, in the pursuit of relatively distinct objectives. The first approach, favoured among international historians in particular, but also characteristic of theoretical approaches that seek to explain the relationship between organisational structure and policy making, conceives of the study of intelligence primarily as a means of acquiring new information in order to explain specific decisions made by policy makers in both peace and war. Close attention is paid by these scholars to the process of intelligence collection, to the origin and nature of individual sources of intelligence, and to the precise use that is made of intelligence as it travels up the chain of decision. A thorough understanding of the organizational structure of government machinery, and of the place of intelligence within this machinery, is crucial to this approach. This literature overlaps with journalistic endeavours that focus on particular cases of espionage and biographies of individual officials and agents. A second approach strives to establish general models that can explain success and failure in the intelligence process. Characteristic of political science approaches to the discipline, it focuses almost exclusively on the levels of analysis and decision. Decisive importance is attributed by adherents of this approach to structural and cognitive obstacles to the effective use of intelligence in the policy process. The aim is to identify and analyse the personal, political and institutional biases that characterize intelligence organisations and affect their performance in the decisionmaking process. The emphasis is on the role of preconceptions and underlying assumptions in conditioning the way intelligence is analysed and used. The result has been a range of insights into the nature of perception and misperception, the difficulty in preventing surprise, and the politicization of the intelligence 46 Elizabeth Anderson, The Security Dilemma and Covert Action: The Truman Years, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 11/4 (1998/99), p NERINT 21

22 process 47. Both of the first two conceptual approaches focus primarily on intelligence as a tool of foreign and defence policy making. A third approach focuses instead on the political function of intelligence as a means of state control. The past decade, in particular, has seen the appearance of a range of historical and political science literature on this subject. If the Gestapo has long been a subject of historical study, recently released archival material has enabled scholars to study the role of state security services in political and social life in the USSR and Eastern bloc states after This has provided a stimulus for a new wave of scholarship on state control since Historians are now working on a wide range of topics from the role of British and French intelligence services in maintaining imperial control overseas to the activities of security services such as MI5 or the FBI and their impact on political culture in Britain and the United States 48. Many of the scholars engaged in this research would not consider themselves as contributing to intelligence studies. Their focus is instead the use of intelligence sources to understand better the role of ideology and state power in political, social and cultural life. Yet there are strong arguments for embracing this scholarship under a broader definition of intelligence studies and no reason to remain confined by disciplinary boundaries that are porous and arbitrary. One area of contemporary social science that has clear relevance to intelligence studies is the concept of surveillance. The potential of this area of enquiry is demonstrated in this volume by Gary Marx in his analysis of the new forms of surveillance in both official and private contexts. Marx explores an empirical, analytic and moral ecology of surveillance and demonstrates how the evolution of information technology poses serious challenges to existing conceptions of individual liberty and security 49. The best writing about intelligence incorporates all three of the above approaches in different ways. But there are nearly always differences in emphasis even in the seminal works that have been crucial in pushing research forward. At the heart of these divergences, arguably, is disagreement concerning the extent to which political assumptions and political culture shape the intelligence process at all levels. Few would deny that the process of identifying threats is inextricably bound up with political choices and assumptions. The same is true for the gathering, assessment and dissemination of information on these threats. Yet how we understand political processes and political culture is crucial. Scholars vary in the importance that they attribute to political culture and to ideology. Christopher Andrew, for example, argues in this collection that, For the conceptual framework of intelligence studies to advance further, it is essential to make a clearer distinction than is usually made at present between the roles of intelligence communities in authoritarian and democratic regimes 50. It is interesting to note, for example, that the first two lines of enquiry tend to pay less attention to the importance of ideological assumptions in the business of gathering, analysing and using intelligence than does the third. 47 See, for example, Michael I. Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University 1980), idem, Intelligence and Military Operations in idem (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations (London: Frank Cass 1990), pp. 1 95; Richard Betts, Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable, World Politics, 31/1 (1978), pp ; and Robert Jervis, Intelligence and Foreign Policy, International Security, 2/3 (1986/87), pp See Martin Thomas, French Intelligence Gathering and the Syrian Mandate, , Middle Eastern Studies, 38/2 (2002) and his forthcoming, Intelligence and Empire: Security Services and Colonial Control in North Africa and the Middle East, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, forthcoming). See also Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, (London: Frank Cass 1995). 49 See Gary Marx, Some Concepts that may be Useful in Understanding the Myriad Forms and Contexts of Surveillance, this volume, pp For an authoritative overview of the concepts and context of surveillance in social and political theory see Christopher Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity (Oxford: Polity Press in association with Blackwell 1990). 50 Andrew, Intelligence, International Relations, p. 34. NERINT 22

23 One notable area where differing approaches converge is research into the role of Soviet and other Communist intelligence organisations, whose study has been facilitated by (some) declassification in former communist states. One especially fascinating area that has begun to be illuminated is nuclear threat perception. It now seems clear that in the early 1960s and in the 1980s Soviet authorities became genuinely concerned about the prospect of imminent US nuclear attack 51. The role of Soviet intelligence in generating these perceptions was crucial and study of this issue offers fertile ground for exploring the role of cognitive, bureaucratic and ideological obstacles to the effective assessment of intelligence. Moreover, such revelations have cast new light on the nature of the Cold War in general and the danger of inadvertent nuclear war in particular. Another crucial set of questions concerns the methodological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the way the subject is studied. There has been insufficient consideration of these issues on either side of the Atlantic. Richard Aldrich has cautioned against interpreting the official records of the Public Record Office as an analogue of reality 52. He has argued persuasively that British archives are a highly manipulated source of evidence for historians. The British government s success in controlling knowledge of its wartime achievements in signals intelligence and strategic deception is a good example of official policy shaping the parameters of historical enquiry. There are almost certainly other such cases that have yet to come to light. One does not need to embrace a conspiratorial view of contemporary politics to appreciate the ramifications of this state practice for the generation of knowledge. These questions are especially important to consider in light of criticisms of studies of Soviet security and intelligence services that have been based on partial and controlled access to Soviet records 53. When advancing such criticisms, we are obliged to consider whether recent archive-based histories of British or US intelligence are based on a more comprehensive and reliable sample of the documentary record. And what of other sources, in particular oral testimony and interviews? Many journalists have written authoritative and well-researched accounts of intelligence-related issues, which rely on extensive contacts with officialdom 54. Are these accounts more or less reliable than those based on the written archival record? Are they more or less prone to manipulation? And what of memoirs? And spy fiction? In his essay on Fiction, Faction and Intelligence Nigel West demonstrates that behind the supposedly impenetrable veil of British official secrecy, many former intelligence officers have written accounts (factual, fictional and factional) of their experiences. While this material cannot take the place of greater transparency and oversight, it does provide an interesting perspective on how various former members of the secret services choose to represent the world of intelligence to the wider public. The extent to which British intelligence memoirs and spy fiction can function as propaganda for the secret services remains an open question. While this material must be 51 See in particular Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble : Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: John Murray 1997); Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1990); and Benjamin B. Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence 1997). 52 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray 2001), p. 6. On this important methodological issue see also idem, Intelligence and the War against Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), pp , and P. Jackson, The Politics of Secret Service in War, Cold War and Imperial Retreat, Contemporary British History, 14/4 (2003), pp See Sheila Kerr, KGB Sources on the Cambridge Network of Soviet Agents: True or False, Intelligence and National Security, 11/3 (1996), pp , and Oleg Tsarev s Synthetic KGB Gems, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 14/1 (2001), pp ; see Nigel West s rejoinder, No Dust on KGB Jewels, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 14/4 ( ), pp See for example, Mark Urban, UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence (London: Faber & Faber 1996) and Michael Smith, New Cloak, Old Dagger: How Britain s Spies Came in From the Cold (London: Victor Gollancz 1996). The pre-eminent figure in combining recently released archival material with the fruits of personal disclosure and oral testimony is undoubtedly Peter Hennessy; see his The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Allen Lane Penguin Press 2002). NERINT 23

24 used with care, it should not be ignored by scholars of British intelligence. There are areas, such as the role of women in espionage/intelligence and the perspective of gender where so far the study of the subject has often been dependent on such sources 55. Questions about the manipulation of intelligence have been underlined by September 11 and by allegations that the British government sexed up intelligence to mislead the public about Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It was through the media that details of al-qaeda operations and plans were made known to Western populations. For the student of intelligence as for the practitioner the provenance and credibility of the source remains central to understanding. Yet where the dissemination of knowledge accords with discernable agendas, how we deal with the problem of knowledge is crucial. Claims made about contacts between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence officers in Prague have now been shown to be false. Yet they were of potential importance in helping prepare the public and political ground for an attack on Iraq. The same is true of claims about Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Niger. Whether the claim about al-qaeda represents misinformation or disinformation, it underlines the fact that we learn of some events because those in control of relevant information wish us to learn of them, and what we learn may inform broader political perceptions. Michael Smith s paper in this collection is a reminder of the tension between disclosing intelligence and risking sources, and how different leaders in different political cultures view their options and responsibilities differently 56. These issues are of central importance to any attempt to establish the methodological foundations necessary for the effective study of intelligence. INTELLIGENCE AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS A further objective of this volume is to assess both the influence and importance of intelligence studies in broader debates concerning the history and theory of international relations. Intelligence has attracted limited interest from scholars of political philosophy and International Relations (IR) theory. Tsun Tsu is much quoted for the importance he attaches to military intelligence, but later thinkers on war were less interested and less impressed. Von Clausewitz held that knowledge of the enemy and his country was the foundation of all our ideas and actions 57. Yet much of the knowledge or information obtained in war is false and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character. How the information was acquired and processed did not detain Clausewitz, who looked to officers with a certain power of discrimination to guide their analysis. Clausewitz s omissions are shared by many political and international theorists, including classical realists and contemporary neo-realists. Machiavelli, for example, demonstrates understanding of, and enthusiasm for, what the twentieth century would come to know as strategic deception: Though fraud in other activities be detestable, in the management of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomes an enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who does so by force. Yet elsewhere in the Discourses, when reflecting on conspiracy, he shows no understanding of the opportunities for espionage and counter-espionage in dealing with the conspiracies of coup plotters 58. On the other hand, Toni 55 For recent examples of writing on women, gender and intelligence see Sandra C. Taylor, Long-Haired Women, Short-Haired Spies: Gender, Espionage, and America s War on Vietnam, Intelligence and National Security, 13/2 (1998), pp and Tammy M. Proctor, Female Intelligence: Women and Espionage in the First World War (New York and London: New York University Press 2003); see also the journal, Minerva: Women and War published by Taylor & Francis. We are grateful to Jenny Mathers for this information. 56 Michael Smith, Bletchley Park and the Holocaust, this volume, pp Carl von Clausewitz, On War (ed. by Anatol Rapoport, New York: Pelican 1968), p For analysis of Clausewitz on intelligence see John Ferris and Michael I. Handel, Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Military Operations, Intelligence and National Security, 10/1 (1995), pp John Plamenatz (ed.), Machiavelli, The Prince, Selections from the Discourses and other Writings (London: Fontana/Collins 1975), pp NERINT 24

25 Erskine makes clear in her essay in this collection that Thomas Hobbes, writing in the seventeenth century, understood the potential importance and value of espionage 59. Writing in 1994 Michael Fry and Miles Hochstein observed that, while intelligence studies had developed into an identifiable intellectual community, there was a noticeable failure to integrate intelligence studies, even in a primitive way, into the mainstream of research in international relations 60. In Britain the academic study of intelligence has developed overwhelmingly within international history, and thus reflects the methodological predisposition towards archive-based research characteristic of this sub-discipline. Common methodological cause between British and US historians has not prevented robust and fruitful exchanges and debates on the subject 61. In North America, however, political scientists have played at least as prominent a role as historians in the study of intelligence in international relations. Their contributions have provided students of intelligence with a range of theoretical reflections on the nature of intelligence and its role in decision making. But interest in intelligence within the political science community has been confined mainly to those scholars working on theories of decision making. Intelligence is all but absent, conversely, in the work of most international relations theorists, and does not figure in key IR theory debates between realist, liberal institutionalist, constructivist and post-modernist approaches. It is interesting to note that, while there exists an implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption that the study of intelligence falls within the realist camp, contemporary neo-realist writers have largely ignored intelligence in their reflections. The literature on US covert action for example, is ignored by leading neo-realist theorist, Stephen Krasner, in his analysis of the systematic violations of sovereignty in world politics. Although he advances trenchant arguments about the organised hypocrisy of international discourse on sovereignty, he does not explore the potential role of intelligence as a source of both evidence and theoretical insight 62. The neglect of intelligence is apparent in other areas of international relations. Although one prominent item on the post-cold War agenda was the role of intelligence in support of the United Nations and its agencies, the role of intelligence has not engaged the attention of those writing about humanitarian intervention, even though it is clear that intelligence has various roles to play, not least in providing evidence in war crimes tribunals. The role of intelligence services in promoting (or retarding) human rights is an area particularly worthy of exploration. Similarly, in debates about the democratic peace (whether democracies are less likely to engage in military operations against other democracies), attempts at regime change by clandestine means are an important dimension illuminated by the history of US covert action in various democracies (Chile, Italy, Iran and so forth). How far the events of September 11 and the war on Iraq may help change academic attitudes and research agendas in these areas remains to be seen. If international relations theory has shown limited interest in intelligence, to what extent have students of intelligence engaged with international relations theory? It seems clear that different theoretical perspectives are beginning to permeate the sub-field of intelligence. The journal Intelligence and National Security has carried important theoretical contributions which reward Fry and Hochstein s optimistic assertions that international relations and intelligence studies can fruitfully search for common ground. One notable example is Andrew Rathmell s essay on the potential importance of post-modern theorizing to 59 Toni Erskine, As Rays of Light to the Human Soul? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering, this volume, pp Fry and Hochstein, Epistemic Communities, p See in particular the reflections of John Lewis Gaddis, Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins, Diplomatic History, 13 (Spring 1989), pp , and D. Cameron Watt, Intelligence and the Historian: A Comment on John Gaddis s Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins, ibid, 14 (Spring 1990), pp Stephen D. Krasner, Rethinking the Sovereign State Model, in Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth (eds), Empires, Systems and State: Great Transformations in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001). We are grateful to Tim Dunne for drawing our attention to this. NERINT 25

26 the practice of intelligence 63. Rathmell argues that intelligence services must make radical changes in terms of both conceptual approach and organizational structure to adapt to the social, cultural and technological conditions of the twenty-first century. He posits that existing state-based intelligence agencies are products of modernity, but that the political and economic conditions of the modern era are disappearing. Capital intensive modes of mass production in highly urbanised nation-states are giving way, in the age of the world-wide web and digital technology, to knowledge intensive, dispersed globalized systems. The end result is what Rathmell calls the fragmentation of threat. What is needed, he argues, are different conceptual approaches to understanding the nature of security threats and radical changes in the way intelligence agencies collect and process knowledge on these threats. Obvious questions arise about how these new approaches might be implemented in practical terms. What is also necessary is greater awareness of the political role of the analyst in the construction of threats and threat assessments for makers of security policy of all kinds 64. The need to engage constructively with post-modernist thinking on security will surely increase, and this includes identifying areas where postmodernists themselves need to reflect further on existing approaches. The history of intelligence before the onset of the Cold War, for example, is often neglected. One resulting misconception is that open sources have only recently risen to prominence. The reality is that open sources have nearly always provided the majority of information for intelligence services during peacetime. It is also misleading to describe the emergence of globalised threats as a post-modern phenomenon. Imperial intelligence services faced such challenges throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Information technology has changed many aspects of intelligence work, but the intellectual challenges of dealing with security problems across immense spaces and over different cultures are by no means exclusively postmodern. This is admirably demonstrated by the fascinating recent work of Martin Thomas 65. It is also the case that the threat from non-state actors did not arrive with the end of the Cold War, as the history of the Anarchists and the Fenians well testifies. An important argument made by Rathmell is that intelligence communities must become less hierarchical and more based on the concept of information networks with a greater focus on open sources of information. Here, the challenges identified by Rathmell and others have stimulated rather different diagnoses and prognoses. Writing before September 11, and from a very different ontological perspective, Bruce Berkowitz also argues the case for breaking down hierarchies and stovepipes that restrict information flows within the intelligence community 66. Berkowitz s article is notable for his analysis of the litany of what he terms US intelligence failures. The pressure to reform structure and culture in the US intelligence community is strengthened, and in some cases even driven, by advances in information technology. These trends and pressures are critically examined by John Ferris in his article in this collection. Where post-modernism rejects the notion of an absolute truth, the epistemological goal of those who proselytise the revolution in information warfare is perfect battlefield knowledge. Ferris casts doubt on their various assumptions and moreover reminds us that concerns with hierarchies and structures are crucial in communications security and counter-intelligence. He rightly observes that web-based nets within the US intelligence community are the richest treasure ever for espionage and a grave potential vulnerability Andrew Rathmell, Towards Postmodern Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security, 17/3 (2002), pp See also the work of James Der Derian who has written extensively on aspects of intelligence from a post-modern perspective. See, for example, his Antidiplomacy. 64 This is a central focus of the interesting and important work being done in France by scholars such as Didier Bigo and others, whose work is most often published in the journal Cultures et Conflits. 65 See Thomas, French Intelligence Gathering and Intelligence and Empire. 66 Bruce Berkowitz, Better Ways to Fix US Intelligence, Orbis (Fall 2001), pp John Ferris, Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?, this volume, p. 64. NERINT 26

27 Other theoretical innovations may well have something to offer. Recent constructivist theorising about the importance of identity and political culture in shaping both elite and public perceptions of international politics is a case in point. Its focus on identity as a central factor in the process of threat identification has obvious relevance to the study of security and intelligence. The same is true with the emphasis on cultural institutional contexts of security policy. Intelligence services certainly have their own institutional cultures and a focus on the rules and norms which govern intelligence work in different national contexts has much to offer intelligence studies 68. Reluctance to engage with this and other currents in international relations theory will not help efforts to expand the conceptual parameters of intelligence studies. In addition, a reluctance to engage with different strains of social theory may also comply with the intentions of those who seek to configure and inform public understanding of intelligence through the control of information. The way we choose to study the subject informs our analysis and our conclusions. As Aldrich warns, taking the archive as analogue of reality is a methodological and epistemological trap that can inadvertently legitimise activities that merit a much more critical approach. SPEAKING TRUTH UNTO POWER OR POWER UNTO TRUTH? Much of the study of intelligence concerns the relationship between power and knowledge, or rather the relationship between certain kinds of power and certain kinds of knowledge. A sophisticated exponent of this view has been Michael Herman, writing on the basis of 25 years experience at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Cabinet Office. Herman has received wide acclaim for his expositions of the process of intelligence and has been described as an historian and philosopher of intelligence 69. Although an advocate of broadening the scope of the subject, Herman s primary aim is to promote greater public understanding of intelligence. Yet, it is also undeniable that, in engaging with critical issues about the practice of the intelligence process, Herman seeks to legitimise that process. The same goals of education and legitimisation may also be ascribed to other intelligence mandarins who have written about intelligence after their retirement, notably Sir Percy Cradock, former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 70. The work of both Herman and Cradock epitomizes the prevalent self-image of the intelligence mandarin as providing objective, policy-free analysis to decision makers. Sir Percy Cradock s characterisation of the JIC and its staff as having an eye always to the future and to British interests, and free from the political pressures likely to afflict their ministerial masters reflects the self-image of the intelligence community as guardian of the national interest against transient and feckless politicians. The role of the intelligence official in the British context is therefore represented as speaking truth unto power. This self-image, so central to the identity of the public servant, has been the cornerstone of both the structure and the culture of British intelligence. It is represented as the fundamental safeguard against the politicisation of intelligence, which is often alleged to be a defining characteristic of autocratic and totalitarian regimes. Clearly this image of an independent and apolitical intelligence community has been called into serious question by the Iraq Dossier affair. In the summer of 2003 the British government and intelligence community became embroiled in one of the most serious political controversies in recent memory amid charges that intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was politicised in order to bolster 68 For constructivist approaches to IR see, for example, the essays in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press 1996), and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999). 69 Hennessy, Secret State, p. xiii. See also Lawrence Freedman, Powerful Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security, 12/2 (1997), pp Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John Murray 2002). NERINT 27

28 support for the government s bellicose posture towards the regime of Saddam Hussein. The publication of an intelligence dossier, written by the chair of the JIC, John Scarlett, included both Joint Intelligence Committee assessments and raw human intelligence obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The aim was to strengthen support both at home and abroad for war with Iraq. It was claimed in the dossier that The Iraqi military are able to deploy [chemical and biological] weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so 71. When introducing the dossier in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Tony Blair explained that it concluded that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability 72. In this instance, intelligence was clearly employed to gain public support for government policy rather than as a guide for policy makers. Intelligence information was selected and presented in such a way as to emphasise the need to deal forcefully with the Iraqi regime. As Michael Handel observed nearly two decades ago, the closer the relationship between intelligence assessment and policy making, the greater the likelihood that the whole process will become politicised 73. Indeed, a former Chairman of the JIC, Sir Rodric Braithwaite, has criticised his successors with the observation that JIC members went beyond assessment to become part of the process of making and advocating policy. That inevitably undermined their objectivity. 74 At the same time, contemporary concern with use of intelligence should not obscure the fundamental reality that intelligence informs but rarely drives policy: Joint Intelligence Committees propose and Prime Ministers dispose. Another serious indictment of the Blair government policy concerns its commitment to counter-proliferation. If the Iraqi state possessed WMD, the destruction of that state means that ownership and control of these weapons are dispersed. These events could hasten the nightmare scenario of terrorist use of WMD against centres of population. As Christopher Andrew points out in his contribution to this volume, the publication of Joint Intelligence Committee assessments is unprecedented. It is unlikely to remain so rare, however. Changes in the international system will likely make the public use of intelligence common practice. The decline of the Westphalian principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, along with the effects of September 11 and the war on terror, has led to the emergence of the doctrine of pre-emptive self defence in the United States. This has introduced an important new dimension to the role of intelligence in international relations which students and practitioners have yet fully to comprehend. In this context it will be essential to establish the existence of a threat before public opinion in order to provide legitimacy for pre-emptive interventions. Despite the political problems created by the public use of intelligence to justify the invasion of Iraq, intelligence will remain central to debates about future pre-emptive action. Pressure on governments to disclose secret intelligence will lead to pressure on intelligence services to meet public needs. This was almost certainly the case in the months leading up to the Second Gulf War. It is a trend that will surely grow as long as the doctrine of pre-emptive intervention holds sway in Western foreign policy. All this means that we need to evaluate critically this image of the intelligence official as apolitical 71 Iraq s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government (London: The Stationery Office, 24 September 2002), p Hansard, HC deb. Vol. 390, Col. 3, 24 September Michael Handel, The Politics of Intelligence, in idem, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass 1987), pp Richard Norton-Taylor, Intelligence Heads Under Fire, The Guardian, 6 December NERINT 28

29 interpreter of the real world for political decision makers. The dangers of not doing so are clear. The case of government deception over the role of British intelligence during the Second World War is just one example of the state s willingness to intervene in an effort to shape the conceptual horizons of intellectual enquiry. An uncritical acceptance of official or semi-official representations of the intelligence process as singularly free of ideological assumptions and political biases leaves the intelligence scholar open to the familiar charge that she or he is merely legitimising and perpetuating the ideology of the state. These issues are of central concern for all scholars interested in the relationship between power and knowledge. Again it seems clear that intelligence studies and international relations theory would both benefit from greater engagement with one another. The idea of speaking truth unto power also has clear relevance to debates over the proper relationship between government and academia 75. Among academics, notions and theories of truth and power are more explicitly contested. Claims of objectivity run counter to concern with developing multiple rather than unitary narratives of the past. This, of course, is the very antithesis of Whitehall s immaculate conception of a Joint Intelligence Committee. At the same time, official practice and academic study exercise an undeniable attraction to one another. But there are obstacles in the way of sustained engagement between the government and the academy. Intelligence is probably the field of academic enquiry over which the British government has been most anxious to exert control. Despite a recent trend toward more openness, particularly on the part of the British Security Service (MI5), access to archival material remains tightly regulated, though the National Archives (formerly the British Public Record Office) and the Lord Chancellor s Advisory Council on Public Records have endeavoured to engage British historians in the development of declassification policy. Yet it should be noted that, although the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) will be fully enacted in January 2005, the intelligence agencies are specifically exempt from its provisions 76. In the United States the relationship between academics and government has always been much more porous. Since the formation of the first centralised US intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services, during the Second World War, academics have played a prominent role in the evolution of US intelligence policy. The study of intelligence is often informed by quasi-official links, and the CIA has been keen to promote the academic study of the subject. Both the National Security Agency and the CIA each employ their own team of fulltime professionally trained historians. Each has also invited scholars in residence to spend extended periods working within the agencies. Such links have at times generated debate about the proper limits and intellectual integrity of such endeavours 77. But the overall benefits of these relationships are widely acknowledged. In Britain it has long been difficult to discern any comparable relationship. A greater distance has generally been maintained between academics and practitioners. And, as Wolfgang Krieger demonstrates in this volume, the situation in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, shows even less engagement 78. There have been important exceptions to this general trend, most notably the scholars who were given privileged access to official records in order to write the official histories of the Second World War. Another notable exception is Christopher Andrew, whose collaborations with KGB defectors Oleg Gordievsky and Vasili Mitrokhin have illuminated KGB activities as well as British (and particularly SIS) successes in the espionage war. But it is only recently that a culture of greater openness has led to greater engagement between Britain s 75 See William Wallace, Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations, Review of International Studies, 22/3 (1996), pp and replies: Ken Booth, A Reply to Wallace, Review of International Studies, 23/3 (1997), pp and Steve Smith Power and Truth: a Reply to William Wallace, Review of International Studies, 23/4 (1997), pp We are grateful to Stephen Twigge for this information. 77 For scrutiny of the relationship between US academia and US intelligence see Robin Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War (New York: William Morrow 1987). 78 Wolfgang Krieger, German Intelligence History: A Field in Search of Scholars, this volume, pp NERINT 29

30 intelligence community and its universities. A good illustration of this trend was the willingness of Sir Stephen Lander, then Director-General of MI5, to attend academic meetings and conferences on the study of intelligence over the past few years. Further evidence of greater openness, at least on the part of the Security Service, is MI5 s recent appointment of an academic historian, Christopher Andrew, to write its centenary history. Yet there are those who would argue that this kind of engagement is not without costs. For some academics the Ivory Tower should remain a sanctuary from the compromises of officialdom and provide a panorama (or, a camera obscura) on the world outside. For others, academics are there to tell the world about the world. Yet, while many academics aspire to policy relevance, intelligence is one area where officialdom may remain sceptical about the value of engagement with the academy. DARK SIDES OF MOONS Reflecting on the work of the JIC, Sir Percy Cradock has observed that ithas a predilection for threats rather than opportunities, for the dark side of the moon 79. Certainly the issues of strategic surprise and of intelligence failure have loomed large in the evolution of the study of intelligence. This is unlikely to change significantly. Providing warning against surprise is central to both official and public perceptions of the fundamental role of intelligence services. The events of September 11, 2001 have clearly reinforced this trend. Desmond Ball has described September 11 as the worst intelligence failure by the US intelligence community since Pearl Harbor 80. Yet such judgements also raise questions about the meaning we give to the term intelligence failure as well as to how we explain and assign responsibility for what happened. Historians and political scientists will continue to study Pearl Harbor, the Tet offensive, the Yom Kippur War, Argentina s seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas, Iraq s invasion of Kuwait, and, of course, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But they will also need to revisit from time to time the conceptual foundations of their studies. Recent developments in the study of security in international politics have attempted to broaden predominant conceptions of security to provide a more sophisticated understanding of the problem of instability in international society. The study of intelligence, with its focus on the identification and interpretation of threat, and on the architecture of threat perception, has much to offer and much to gain from greater engagement with new approaches to security. Contemporary intelligence agendas (both official and academic) range from economic security to environment to health to organised crime, as well as to more traditional areas of arms transfers, proliferation of WMD, and UN peace keeping and peace enforcing. Changes in world politics since the end of the Cold War have created greater awareness of the importance of these issues. The fact that the CIA has primary responsibility for the HIV/ AIDS threat suggests that official thinking in Washington has responded to these trends in ways that have not always been acknowledged. Intelligence communities must play closer attention to the many dimensions of global insecurity, not least so that policy makers can better understand the need to alleviate social and economic conditions that are one source of disaffected recruits for extremist groups. In short, the practice of intelligence will change and adapt to new political problems facing world politics, as well as to more longstanding concerns with injustices that lie at the heart of much global instability. The same is true of the study of intelligence. The aim of this collection of essays is to stimulate reflection upon what new directions might be taken. 79 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p Desmond Ball, Desperately Seeking Bin Laden: The Intelligence Dimension of the War Against Terrorism, in Ken Booth and Tim Booth (eds), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002), p. 60. NERINT 30

31 The role of threat perception in the policy process is bound to remain a central concern in the study of intelligence. The same is true of the relationship between producers and consumers. But it is important to remember that many intelligence services do more than just collect and process information. Many internal security agencies in democratic as well as non-democratic states possess powers of arrest and thus function as tools of state power. Indeed the Gestapo, the KGB and the Stasi are only the most notorious examples of the potential threat to individual freedom posed by domestic security and intelligence services. Yet another controversial and problematic area of intelligence activity is that of secret intervention in the affairs of other states (and non-state actors). As noted above, the case of covert action provides an interesting perspective on the role of intelligence and intelligence services in the exercise of power. Over the past half-century, covert action has often undermined the legitimacy of Western intelligence services both domestically and internationally. A fundamental question is therefore: to what extent and in what ways should covert action be considered a function of intelligence and intelligence services. One answer is provided by Sherman Kent in his arguably tautological observation that intelligence is what intelligence services do. A variation on this might be to say that intelligence knowledge is power, and other exercises of power by intelligence services fall within the same ambit. A rather different view would be to suggest that secrecy, rather than power or knowledge, is the unifying theme of intelligence discourse. This is the line of argument pursued by Len Scott in this collection; a more radical perspective on secrecy is proffered by Robert A. Goldberg who argues that secrecy plays a crucial and perfidious role in sustaining conspiracy theories 81. The distinction between gathering intelligence and intervening in the internal affairs of other states, and thus the distinction between intelligence as a guide to policy rather than a tool of policy, can be misleading. This is particularly true in the realm of human intelligence, where the idea of an agent of influence, for example, challenges a simple distinction between gathering knowledge and taking action. It is interesting to compare the British and US literature on covert action. In the United States there has been long-standing awareness of the subject that has generated both public and scholarly debates. More recently, systematic declassification of files dealing with covert action has made a significant contribution to understanding the origins and dynamics of the Cold War. The declassification of CIA records has more clearly revealed the scope and scale of operations from Cuba to Chile to Indonesia to Guatemala. Indeed, in the view of some scholars, the history of covert action compels revision of the historical and political accounts of the Cold War, and fatally weakens the view that the US policy was simply concerned with containment 82. These issues have not received the attention they deserve in the study of British intelligence so far. Although recently published studies by Richard Aldrich and Stephen Dorril have illuminated a great deal, British covert action in both Cold War and post-imperial contexts is an area that requires further study. Here the endeavours of senior intelligence mandarins to divert the focus to the sanitised and cerebral contexts of Whitehall analysis may reflect a conscious (or unconscious) attempt to divert attention away from the more dramatic and controversial question of covert action. It may be that such activities are marginal to the primary missions of the British intelligence services. Yet the fact is that this question remains shrouded in uncertainty. INTELLIGENCE AND ETHICS One contribution of the (largely US) study of covert action has been to bring together ethics and intelligence studies. There is a significant literature which has been largely ignored 81 Len Scott, Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy, this volume, pp ; Robert A. Goldberg, Who Profited from the Crime? Intelligence Failure, Conspiracy Theories and the Case of September 11, this volume, pp Sara-Jane Corkem, History, Historians and the Naming of Foreign Policy: A Postmodern Reflection on American Strategic Thinking during the Truman Administration, Intelligence and National Security, 16/3 (2001), pp NERINT 31

32 by scholars working on the role of intelligence in policy making 83. The ethical and legal dimensions of intelligence are rarely analysed, particularly in historical accounts although in the United States ethical issues have frequently been explored within debates over intelligence accountability. The need for an explicit concern with moral issues has been identified by Michael Herman, who has begun to explore ethical dimensions of intelligence in a broader sense 84. Herman has argued that intelligence requires a similar ethical foundation to the use of armed force. An equally telling and compelling observation is his view that Ethics should be recognized as a factor in intelligence decisions, just as in anything else. 85 Such a view compels attention not least given its provenance. This is not an entirely new concern. Abram Shulsky has also contended that an ethical case for conducting intelligence operations can be found in Tsun Tsu as early as the fifth century BC 86. In his famous essay on The Profession and Vocation of Politics, Max Weber observes that No ethics in the world can get round the fact that the achievement of good ends is in many cases tied to the necessity of employing morally suspect or at least morally dangerous means. 87 This dilemma is a central concern for all those interested in the role of intelligence in politics. To what ends should the morally suspect means of intelligence be put? For whose good ends should these means be employed? To whom, or to what, should they be ultimately responsible? Can their responsibilities ever be to the universal or will they always be to the particular? The crux of the issue, according to Weber, is a crucial dilemma of politics: that the interests of particular communities or polities will not always be compatible with the wider interests of humanity. Weber rejects the universalist assumptions of the ethics of principled conviction for their disregard of the consequences of political choice. He argues instead that the first responsibility of those involved in politics must be to their own community 88. These questions are addressed by both Michael Herman and Toni Erskine in their contributions to this volume. Michael Herman reflects further on the ethical justifications for intelligence and explores the opportunities for doing so in the wake of September In her contribution, Toni Erskine locates emerging ethical reflections on intelligence gathering within the traditional frameworks of realist, consequentialist and deontological traditions 90. Such an approach offers new vistas for potential research and has obvious relevance to efforts to combine intelligence and security concerns with an ethical foreign policy. Hitherto ethics has remained an under-explored area in intelligence studies. A former permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Sir Michael Quinlan, who played a key role in British thinking about the morality of nuclear deterrence and was also responsible for an official overview of British intelligence in the post-cold War era, has remarked upon the lack of a conceptual structure for studying the morality of espionage. Quinlan has lamented the absence of a doctrine for what he terms Just Espionage 91. On the other hand, Quinlan 83 See for example, John Barry, Covert Action can be Just, Orbis (Summer 1993), pp ; Charles Beitz, Covert Intervention as a Moral Problem, Ethics and International Affairs, 3 (1989), pp ; William Colby, Public Policy, Secret Action, Ethics and International Affairs, 3 (1989) pp ; Gregory Treverton, Covert Action and Open Society, Foreign Affairs, 65/5 (Summer 1987), pp ; idem, Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York: Basic Books 1987), idem, Imposing a Standard: Covert Action and American Democracy, Ethics and International Affairs, 3 (1989), pp Michael Herman, Modern Intelligence Services: Have They a Place in Ethical Foreign Policies?, in Shukman, Agents for Change, pp Cited in Herman, Modern Intelligence Services, ibid., pp. 305 and 308 respectively. 86 Shulsky, Silent Warfare, p Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), p Ibid., pp See Herman, Ethics and Intelligence after September 11, pp Erskine, Rays of Light to the Soul. 91 Michael Quinlan, The Future of Covert Intelligence, in Shukman, Agents for Change, pp Michael Herman also embraces the Just War notion of proportionality as a criterion for determining what is acceptable in covert collection. Herman, Modern Intelligence Services, p NERINT 32

33 fascinatingly refers to ethical problems as a cost of intelligence. The tension between these two positions suggests that intelligence may often be situated at the fault-line between the theory and practice of international politics. In any case, this is a fascinating and important aspect of intelligence that bears further reflection and research. Ethics are not only relevant at the level of high-policy. The ethical ethos of an intelligence organisation is of great importance to understanding it as an institution. Studying that ethos remains a significant methodological hurdle. How intelligence services and intelligence officers view their responsibilitiesto their agents and to others, for example, is a potentially fascinating question. How far intelligence agencies will go to protect their sources is an ethical and operational matter that has surfaced for example in accounts and allegations concerning British security activities in Northern Ireland. The codes of conduct both written and unwritten of intelligence services provide one potential avenue for exploring the ethical constraints and dilemmas involved in human intelligence gathering as (to a lesser extent) do the ethical views of the individual agents. This is an aspect on which there has been little systematic study, though memoirs and other accounts of operations, including authoritative accounts by journalists, provide vignettes and insights 92. Debate about a range of ethical issues concerning the conduct of intelligence in war extends to legal questions about whether prisoners should be taken and how they should be treated. In the United States and elsewhere there has been serious public discussion about the use of torture in extracting information from terrorist suspects, reflecting the dramatic impact of events on public debate. US debates about the use of assassination as an instrument of statecraft have been rekindled 93. Ethics seems destined to be ever more closely entwined with public debate and discourse concerning intelligence. Yet public perceptions of what intelligence is and what it does owe as much to fictional representations as to public debate in the real world of international politics. POPULAR CULTURE AND INTELLIGENCE At least since the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, popular culture has often played an important role in shaping both official and public attitudes towards intelligence. Michael Miller has demonstrated the way fears of foreign espionage and national insecurity gripped the French imagination during this period. The Dreyfus Affair, which had such grievous consequences for French intelligence, unfolded in an atmosphere of spy mania over the machinations of an imaginary army of German spies in France controlled by the notorious spymaster Wilhelm Stieber. The fact that there was no army of spies and that Stieber was a police chief rather than a master of espionage, did not matter. Through to the outbreak of war in 1914 spy mania was created and sustained by memories of France s defeat in 1871 and by a spy literature which played on national anxieties about France s vulnerability to foreign espionage 94. The British public demonstrated a similar appetite for espionage stories and invasion scares, of which some of the most widely read were produced by William Le Queux. It was in the context of a wave of greatly exaggerated official and popular concern over the threat of foreign espionage that a British security service was established in See Mark Urban, Big Boys Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle against the IRA (London: Faber & Faber 1992), Peter Taylor, The Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein (London: Bloomsbury 1997), and idem, Brits: The War Against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury 2001). 93 See Jeffrey Richelson, When Kindness Fails: Assassination as a National Security Option, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 15/2 (2002), pp See Michael Miller, Shanghai on the Metro: Spies, Intrigue and the French (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1994), pp On this question see Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Sceptre 1991) pp and Nicholas P. Hiley, The Failure of British Espionage Against Germany, , Historical Journal, 26/2 (1983), pp NERINT 33

34 Fictional representations of international politics as a struggle for survival between national intelligence services thus played an important role in the evolution of both French and British intelligence before the First World War. Between the two World Wars, spy adventures stories, and even spy films, became a permanent fixture of Western popular culture. This trend continued through the Cold War era. Graham Greene, John Le Carre, Ian Fleming and Tom Clancy are only the most prominent of several generations of novelists who used intelligence as both medium and metaphor when interpreting the era of superpower rivalry for the reading public. For most of the twentieth century, representations of intelligence in popular culture were far and away the most influential factors shaping public attitudes and perceptions. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, scholars have been reluctant to reflect upon the implications of this in their analyses of the relationship between intelligence and politics. Once again, there is potentially interesting work being done in the cognate field of cultural history which could enrich the study of intelligence. Cultural historians, especially those interested in Cold War popular and political culture, have begun to pay careful attention to the role of film and fiction in shaping both elite and popular attitudes towards international politics. The intersection between this work and the study of intelligence has not received the attention it deserves. Jeremy Black provides an interesting perspective on the issue of popular culture in his exploration of the geopolitics of James Bond. Of particular interest is his analysis of the way Anglo-American relations are represented in the Bond genre 96. Fictional representations of intelligence form the basis of much public understanding. As Nigel West observes, no less an authority than former SIS Chief, Sir Colin McColl, considered Bond the best recruiting sergeant the service ever had 97 perhaps the converse view of intelligence critic Philip Knightley who complained that the fictional glorification of spies enables the real ones to go on playing their sordid games 98. A more perplexing if intriguing relationship between reality and fiction is illustrated by the occasion recounted by Jeremy Black when the Soviet Politburo issued instructions to the KGB to acquire the gadgetry displayed in the latest Bond film. Fiction provides a range of ethical representations of intelligence 99. Jeremy Black observes that the world of Bond is not characterized by ambiguity... there is good (including good rogues...) and bad 100. Other representations convey a very different moral reality. One of Le Carre s characters, Connie Sachs, characterizes Cold War espionage as half angels fighting half devils 101. This can be read as Le Carre s own perspective on intelligence and intelligence work. It stands in contrast to the self-image of Western intelligence officers proffered by a former senior member of the Secret Intelligence Service: honesty inside the service, however much deception might be practiced outside it, and never descend to the other side s methods 102. Fiction also illustrates specific ethical problems and dilemmas. How far an intelligence organisation is prepared to risk or sacrifice its own side in pursuit of a higher objective is a popular theme, well illustrated in Le Carre s The Spy Who Came in From the Cold 103. Other representations of intelligence go further in this regard. In the 1975 film Three Days of the Condor, for example, the CIA assassinates its own officers to protect its designs for global control of oil resources. The film illustrates various themes commonly found in conspiracy theories, not least that intelligence services are malign, all-powerful and allpervasive. This manner of representing the ethics of intelligence services is very common in 96 J. Black, The Geopolitics of James Bond, this volume, pp N. West, Fiction, Faction and Intelligence, this volume, pp Wesley K. Wark (ed.), Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence (London: Frank Cass 1991), p For discussion see J.J. Macintosh, Ethics and Spy Fiction in ibid., pp Black, Geopolitics of James Bond, p J. Patrick Dobel, The Honourable Spymaster: John Le Carre and the Character of Espionage, Administration and Society, 20/2 (August 1988), p We are grateful to Hugh Burroughs for drawing our attention to this source. 102 Shukman, Agents for Change, discussion of the The Future of Covert Action, pp Le Carre, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold (London: Victor Gollancz 1963). For discussion of these themes see Jeffrey Richelson, The IPCRESS File: the Great Game in Film and Fiction, , International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 16/3 (2003), pp NERINT 34

35 both literature and in film. A more recent example is the 2002 film version of Robert Ludlum s The Bourne Identity which depicts the CIA as both omnipotent and utterly immoral 104. The extent to which these types of cultural representations are influenced by public disclosure of intelligence activities would be an interesting avenue for further research. Fictional conspiracy theories frequently accord with the genuine kind in giving meaning to events. As Robert Goldberg argues in his essay for this volume: Despite their weaknesses, conspiracy theories offer much to believers. If slippery in their logic and often careless of facts and assumptions, they order the random and make consistent the paradoxical. In the face of national crisis and human failure, conspiracy theorists rush to find purpose in tragedy and clarity in ambiguity. They also respond to the traumatized who cry for vengeance and demand the identities of those responsible. Conspiracy thinking thus becomes an antidote to powerlessness 105. Some of these observations resonate with James Der Derian s analysis of Hollywood s representation of conspiracy when he writes of: the conspiratorial aesthetic, which produces and is sustained by thetension between fear and desire. The world system might, on the face of it, be speeding out of control, yet we cling to metaphysical faith and find perverse pleasure in cinematic confirmation that somewhere underthe table, in the highest corporate or government office, someone is pulling the strings or at the very least is willing with the best technology, fastest speed and longest reach to intervene secretly, if sinisterly, when necessary. It then makes sense to find in coeval events, synchronicities, even odd accidents, the intellectual evidence and psychological comfort of the hidden hand 106. Yet, merely because there are individual or collective psychological needs in a hidden hand does not mean that hidden hands do not exist. One reason why there are conspiracy theories is because there are conspiracies. Indeed the history of covert action is the history of conspiracy. While it would be simplistic to suggest that the former begat the latter, covert action is nevertheless the sturdy twin of conspiracy theory. The suggestion, for example, that the British state undertakes the murder of its citizens for political purposes is a familiar trope in popular representations of intelligence activity. The suggestion that Hilda Murrell, an elderly anti-nuclear protester, was killed by the security service in an operation against nuclear protesters gained surprising currency. MI5 s website currently proclaims that We do not kill people or arrange their assassination. 107 Yet it is now clear that there was collusion between British officials and loyalist paramilitaries in murders and other crimes in Northern Ireland Three Days of the Condor (Paramount Pictures 1975); The Bourne Identity (Universal Pictures 2002). 105 Robert A. Goldberg, Who Profited from the Crime? Intelligence Failure, Conspiracy Theories and the Case of September 11, this volume, pp James Der Derian, The CIA, Hollywood, and Sovereign Conspiracies, Queen s Quarterly, 10/2 (1993), p Stevens Enquiry, Overview and Recommendations, 17 April 2003, para. 4.8, NERINT 35

36 As Sir John Stevens has commented: the unlawful involvement of agents in murder implies that the security forcessanction killings 109. Fictional representation thrives on the plausibly implausible. Had the events of September 11 been crafted by a script writer, they may well have been dismissed as incredible and fanciful (even if they would have gained attention for transgressing Hollywood s devotion to happy endings). In the aforementioned Three Days of the Condor, the CIA analyses books to check, whether they depict actual CIA operations. After September 11 there are indications of new-found interest in how fiction writers conceptualise and represent threat. Conspiracy and conspiracy theory will remain inextricably linked with intelligence in popular perception and cultural representation. Disentangling the two remains an essential part of the enterprise. Michael Smith s defence of Prime Minister Churchill s use of intelligence on Nazi atrocities in the Soviet Union is a good illustration of how this can be done 110. The issue of how far fiction corresponds to reality is linked to questions concerning the way we perceive and construct reality. Le Carre s novels are widely accepted as authentic depictions of the techniques and tradecraft of espionage though his representation of the ethics of the service provoked anger from within 111. More recently, the film U-571 was criticised for depicting the seizure of the German naval Enigma by US rather than by British forces 112. There is of course a long tradition of changing or manipulating historical events for dramatic effect. But to what extent do such fictional representations actually shape popular attitudes? This is a question that awaits systematic exploration. How far fictional representations are intended to frame popular understandings has received rather more attention particularly in the recent boom of studies of the cultural history of the Cold War 113. The events of September 11 and the war on terror have given these questions a new saliency and urgency. How Hollywood will now depict intelligence services and how it will represent the US government will be issues to watch carefully. A FINAL MISSING DIMENSION : NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CO- OPERATION One other relatively neglected aspect in the study of intelligence is cooperation between different intelligence services at both the national and international levels. At the national level, efficient co-operation between secret services is crucial to the effective exploitation of intelligence. The importance of a rational system of inter-service co-ordination was highlighted, once again, by the events of September 11, Insufficient co-operation between various US security and intelligence services is consistently cited as a central factor in the failure to prevent the successful attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The 858-page Congressional Report on these events published in July 2003 severely criticised both the CIA and the FBI for failing to develop an effective system for sharing intelligence on terrorist activity inside the United States with one another and with other departments 109 Ibid., para The collusion identified by Commissioner Stevens was by the Army and the RUC, and not by MI5 (or SIS). 110 Smith, Bletchley Park and the Holocaust. 111 See Tom Bower, The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War, (London: Heinemann 1995), p. 275 for the views of Sir Dick White, former Chief of SIS and Director-General of MI5, on Le Carre. 112 See For explanatory discussion of the historical reality see We are grateful to Gerald Hughes for drawing our attention to these sources. 113 See, for example, Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: Granta Books 1999), Scott Lucas, Freedom s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union, (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1999) and Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds), The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe Special Issue of Intelligence and National Security, 18/2 (2003). NERINT 36

37 concerned with national security 114. Yet, despite the valuable start made by pioneers, this is a field that has not received systematic study by either political scientists or historians 115. A comparative study, examining different national approaches to solving this problem, would be particularly valuable and policy relevant. The question of intelligence co-operation at the international level has received more attention, particularly from historians. The origins, development and functioning of Anglo- American intelligence alliance since 1940 have been the subject of relatively intense study from a range of perspectives 116. Important research has also been done on such diverse subjects as intelligence sharing between the West and the Soviet Union during the Second World War, on intelligence collaboration within the Soviet bloc during the Cold War and between Soviet and Cuban intelligence, and between Western intelligence and former Nazi intelligence officers 117. We also have a very useful collection of essays on the subject of Knowing One s Friends that provides fascinating insights into the ambiguous role of intelligence between friendly states 118. Michael Herman and Richard Aldrich have both provided useful reflections on the nature of international intelligence co-operation 119. This will assist the growing number of scholars now researching the potential role of intelligence in international organisations such as NATO, the European Union or the United Nations 120. Important work has also been undertaken on the role of intelligence in international police work. The changing parameters of intelligence collaboration after September 11, and increased public awareness of this cooperation, suggest that this will be an area of great potential growth in the field. When a British arms dealer was arrested in August 2003 attempting to sell a surface-to-air missile to FBI agents posing as terrorists, news of the role of SIS and MI5 was immediately made public, illustrating changing attitudes towards disclosure as well as in practice 121. One neglected aspect identified by Len Scott in this collection is the role of intelligence services in conducting clandestine diplomatic activities with adversaries, both states and non-states 122. All of this augurs well for opening new avenues for students of intelligence and security in contemporary international relations. Yet the research trends outlined above remain disparate. There are still few monographs or collections of essays devoted to the 114 Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, See, for example, the reflections in Bradford Westerfield, America and the World of Intelligence Liaison, Intelligence and National Security, 11/2 (1996), pp , Herman, Intelligence Power, pp , , and Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass 2001). 116 See, among others, Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UK USA Countries (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin 1985); Christopher Andrew, The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance, in Hayden Peake and Samuel Halpern (eds), In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer (Washington, DC: NIBC Press 1994); Aldrich, Hidden Hand; idem, British Intelligence and the Anglo- American Special Relationship during the Cold War, Review of International Studies, 24/3 (1998), pp ; David Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (eds), American British Canadian Intelligence Relations , Special Issue of Intelligence and National Security, 15/2 (2000); Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces (Amsterdam: Routledge 2000). 117 Bradley Smith, Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 1996); Paul Maddrell, Operation Matchbox, forthcoming in Jennifer Siegel and Peter Jackson (eds), Intelligence and Statecraft (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 2004); Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble. 118 Martin Alexander (ed.), Knowing One s Friends (London: Frank Cass 1998). 119 Herman, Intelligence Power, pp , Aldrich, British Intelligence and the Anglo-American Special Relationship. 120 An excellent example of such an approach is the important recent monograph by Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, (Munster: Lit Verlag 2003). 121 Briton arrested in terror missile sting, 13 August Scott, Secret Intelligence. NERINT 37

38 specific question of co-operation and collaboration between national intelligence services. Nor has sufficient research and reflection been given to the delicate relationship between intelligence and political relations between states. The successful prosecution of the present war on terror depends largely on the ability of national intelligence services to collaborate with one another effectively in rooting out international terrorist cells. The relationship between politics and intelligence has never been more important. There is a clear need for more systematic study of this area. CONCLUSION The publication in 1946 of the lengthy and detailed Congressional Report on the Pearl Harbor attack provided the primary raw material for one of the founding texts in the intelligence studies canon 123. Roberta Wohlstetter s marriage of communications theory with detailed historical research in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision demonstrated the rich potential of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of intelligence and policy making 124. Whether or not the recently published Congressional Report on the surprise attacks of September 11 produces another seminal text, the events of the past three years are bound to have profound implications for the study of intelligence. Michael Herman has argued that, Governments and people s views of intelligence will be permanently affected by the events of September While this is debatable, it is undeniable that intelligence occupies a more prominent place in the public sphere than ever before. Quite apart from the publication of secret intelligence on Iraq, debates about the practice of intelligence now take place on a scale and at a level that would have been inconceivable three years ago. Issues such as the relative importance of human intelligence as against technical assets, the importance of international intelligence collaboration and the cognitive obstacles to effective analysis and warning have all been debated. As Wesley Wark is surely right to argue: Learning to live with an open-ended war on terrorism will mean learning to live with intelligence. 96 These developments will doubtless provide both challenges and opportunities to scholars interested in the study of intelligence. Should the terror attacks in New York and Washington force us to rethink the subject we are studying? Will they change the nature and conduct of intelligence operations forever? If so, how will this affect the study of intelligence and its role in world politics? These are questions that bear further reflection in any exercise aimed at establishing a future agenda for intelligence studies. The evidence so far suggests that, while the role of intelligence in international politics has certainly evolved, and scholars will have to adjust to its evolution, the changes may not be as revolutionary as they at first appeared. As in other areas of world politics, the immovable object of change confronts the irresistible force of continuity. It is true that there was no Pearl Harbor precedent for the debates about the ethical restraints on intelligence activity. Nor was there much public discussion of the need for transnational intelligence co-operation. These differences reflect changes that have taken place in world politics since the Second World War. International norms have evolved and now place greater limitations on the exercise of power than those that existed during and after the Second World War. Globalisation, and in particular advances in information technology, have thrown up new challenges that require new solutions. But there are nonetheless remarkable parallels between debates over Pearl Harbor and the aftermath of September 11. In both instances, predictably, the overwhelming focus was on learning lessons and prescribing 123 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 th Congress 39 vols (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office 1946). 124 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press 1962). 125 Herman, Intelligence Services, p NERINT 38

39 policies. Many of the themes are very similar: the inability to conduct effective espionage against a racially or culturally alien adversary; the failure to organise and co-ordinate interservice intelligence collection and analysis; the lack of resources for both gathering, translating and analyzing intelligence and, finally, the failure of political leaders to understand the value and limitations of intelligence. The surprise attack on United States territory in December 1941 killed over 2,000 people and precipitated the United States entry into war in Europe and Asia. Pearl Harbor portended a transformation in the US role in world politics, and indeed in world politics itself. The surprise attack on United States territory on September 11, 2001 killed a similar number of people (though these were not military personnel and included many hundreds of non-americans). It too precipitated US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. How far it has transformed world politics will remain open to debate. The context in which intelligence is conducted and studied continues to change. This collection will hopefully provide some guidance and illumination along the dimly lit pathways that lie ahead. NERINT 39

40 B CLIPPING DE NOTÍCIAS 2006/05/10 - The Intelligence Problem Stratfor 2007 Jul/Ago - Overhauling Intelligence Foreign Affairs 2008 Mar/Abr - Intelligent Design? The Unending Saga of Intelligence Reform Foreign Affairs 2008/07/26 - Pakistan: Civilian Control Over Intelligence Stratfor 2008/10/29 - Counterintelligence Implications of Foreign Service National Employees Stratfor 2009/05/20 - A Counterintelligence Approach to Controlling Cartel Corruption Stratfor 2009/08/18 - U.S. Intelligence and Afghan Narcotics Washington Post 2009/08/20 - It's Never a Quick Fix at the CIA Washington Post 2009/08/27 - For Intelligence Officers, A Wiki Way to Connect Dots Washington Post 2009/09/02- Iran, U.S.: The Intelligence Problem Stratfor 2009/09/07 - Howard, Va. Tech Join U.S. Intellience Program Washington Post 2009/09/17 Getting on Board - How an Obscure Panel Could Fix the U.S. Intelligence Community Foreign Affairs NERINT 40

41 The Intelligence Problem Stratfor 10/05/2006 Porter Goss has been fired as director of the CIA and is to be replaced by Gen. Michael Hayden -- who is now deputy to Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte and formerly was director of the National Security Agency (NSA). Viewed from beyond the Beltway -- and we are far outside the Beltway -- it appears that the Bush administration is reshuffling the usual intelligence insiders, and to a great extent, that is exactly what is happening. But there is more: White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, having decided such matters as who the new press secretary should be, has turned to what is a very real problem for President George W. Bush: a vicious battle between the White House and the CIA. The fight is simply about who bears the blame for Iraq. The White House and the Defense Department have consistently blamed the CIA for faulty intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and over the failure to predict and understand the insurgency in Iraq. The CIA has responded by leaking studies showing that its intelligence indeed was correct but was ignored by Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The truth, as usual, lies somewhere in the middle. There certainly were studies inside the CIA that were accurate on the subject -- but given the thousands of people working for the agency, someone had to be right. The question is not whether someone got it right, but what was transmitted to the White House in then-director George Tenet's briefings. At this point, it really does not matter. There was a massive screwup, with plenty of blame to go around. Still, it is probably not good for the White House and the CIA to be in a vicious fight while a war is still going on. The firing of Goss, who was a political appointee brought in to bring the agency to heel, is clearly a concession to the CIA, where he and his aides were hated (that is not too strong a word.) Hayden at least is an old hand in the intelligence community, albeit at the NSA and not the CIA. Whether this is an attempt to placate the agency in order to dam up its leaks to the press, or whether Bush is bringing in the big guns to crush agency resistance, is unclear. This could be a move by Rumsfeld to take CIA turf. But in many ways, these questions are simply what we call "Washington gas" -- meaning something that is of infinite fascination within Washington, D.C., but of no interest elsewhere and of little lasting significance anywhere. The issue is not who heads the CIA or what its bureaucratic structure might be. The issue is, as it has been for decades, what it is that the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community are supposed to do and how they are supposed to do it. On the surface, the answer to that is clear: The job of the intelligence community, taken as a whole, is to warn the president of major threats or changes in the international system. At least that appears to be the mission, but the problem with that definition is that the intelligence community (or IC) has never been good at dealing with major surprises, threats and issues. Presidents have always accepted major failures on the part of the IC. The IC failed to predict the North Korean invasion of South Korea. It failed to predict Chinese intervention there. It failed to predict the Israeli-British-French invasion of Suez in It failed to recognize that Castro was a communist until well after he took power. It failed to predict the Berlin Wall. It failed to predict or know that the Soviets had placed missiles in Cuba (a discovery that came with U-2 overflights by the Air Force). It failed to recognize the Sino-Soviet split until quite late. It failed to predict the tenacity of the North Vietnamese in the face of bombing, and their resilience in South Vietnam. The IC was very late in recognizing the fall of the Shah of Iran. It was taken by surprise by the disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It failed to predict the intentions of al Qaeda. And it failed in Iraq. Historically, the American IC has been superb when faced with clearly defined missions. It had the ability to penetrate foreign governments, to eavesdrop on highly secure conversations, to know the intentions of a particular foreign minister at a particular meeting. Given a clear mission, the IC performed admirably. Where it consistently failed was in the NERINT 41

42 amorphous mission of telling the president what he did not know about something that was about to change everything. When the IC was told to do something specific, it did it well. When it was asked to tell the president what he needed to know -- a broad and vague brief -- it consistently fell down. This is why the argument going on between the CIA and the White House/Defense Department misses the point. Bush well might have ignored or twisted intelligence on Iraq's WMD. But the failure over Iraq is not the exception, it is the rule. The CIA tends to get the big things wrong, while nailing the lesser things time and again. This is a persistent and not easily broken pattern, for which there are some fundamental causes. The first is that the IC sees its task as keeping its customers -- the president and senior members of his administration -- happy. They have day-to-day requirements, such as being briefed for a meeting with a foreign leader. The bread-and-butter work of the IC is the briefing book, which tells a secretary of state what buttons to push at a ministerial meeting. Ninety-nine percent of the taskings that come to the IC concern these things. And the IC could get 99 percent of the task right; it knows that this minister is on the take, or that that minister is in a terrible fight with a rival, or that some leader is dying. It does that over and over again -- that is its focus. It is rarely rewarded for the risky business of forecasting, and if it fails to forecast the invasion of South Korea, it can still point to the myriad useful things at which it did succeed. When members of the IC say that no one sees the vital work they do, they are right. And they are encouraged to do this work by their customers. If they miss the fall of the Soviet Union, it is the bread-and-butter work that keeps them going. If the nuts and bolts of intelligence compete with the vital need of a government to be ready for the unexpected, the nuts and bolts must win every time. The reason is simple: The unexpected rarely happens, but meetings of the G-8 happen every year. The system is built for the routine. It is hard to build a system for the unexpected. A second problem is size. The American IC is much too big. It has way too many resources. It is awash in information that is not converted into intelligence that is delivered to its customers. Huge organizations will lose information in the shuffle. The bigger they are, the more they lose. Little STRATFOR struggles to make sure that intelligence flowing from the field is matched to the right analyst and that analysts working on the same problem talk to each other, and it is tough. Doing it with tens of thousands of sources and intelligence officers, thousands of analysts and hundreds of briefers is a failure waiting to happen. All of the databases dreamt of by all of the information technology people in the IC cannot make up for total overload. It can be argued that there is no alternative. The United States has global interests and thus must have global and massive resources. But the fact is that global interests are not well-served by a system that is too large to function efficiently. Whatever the need is, the reality is that managing the vast apparatus of the IC is overwhelmingly difficult, to the point of failure. Moreover, the management piece is so daunting that finding space to look for the unexpected -- and transmit that finding efficiently to the customer -- has been consistently impossible. The intelligence services of smaller countries sometimes do much better at the big things than massive intelligence services. The KGB was an example of intelligence paralysis due, among other things, to size. A third issue is the cult of sourcing. There is a belief that a man on the ground is the most valuable asset there is. But that depends on where he is on the ground and who he is. A man on the ground can see hundreds of feet in any direction, assuming that there are no buildings in the way. It always amuses us to hear that so-and-so spent three years in some country -- implying expertise. We always wonder whether an Iranian spending three years in Washington, D.C., would be regarded as an expert around whom analysis could be built. Moreover, these three-year wonders frequently start doing freelance analysis, overriding analysts who have been studying a country for decades -- after all, they are "on the ground." NERINT 42

43 But a blond American on the ground in the Philippines is fairly obvious, especially when he starts buying drinks for everyone, and the value of his "intelligence" is therefore suspect. Sourcing is vital; so are the questions of who, where and for how long. The most significant weakness of the cult of sourcing is that the most important events -- like the Chinese intervention in Korea -- might be unreported, or -- like the fall of the shah -- might not be known to anyone. These things happened, but there was an intelligence collection failure in the first case; the second failure stemmed not from a collection problem, but from a purely analytic one. In any case, the lack of a source does not mean an event is not happening; it just means there is no source. There is no question but that sources are the foundation of intelligence -- but the heart of intelligence is the ability to infer when there is no source. Another problem is the IC's obsession with security, compartmentalization and counterintelligence. The Soviet Union's prime mission was to penetrate the U.S. IC. Huge inefficiencies were, therefore, appropriately incurred in order to prevent penetration. The compartmentalization of sensitive information increases security, but it pyramids inefficiency. Al Qaeda is not engaged in penetrating the IC. It is dangerous in a different way than the Soviets were. Security and counterintelligence remain vital, but shifting the balance to take current realities into account also is vital. Intelligence work involves calculated risk. The current system not only keeps smart and interesting people out of jobs, but more important, it keeps them from access to the information they need to make the smart inferences that are so vital. That would seem to be too high a price to pay in the current threat environment. Information on China can be compartmentalized; information on the Muslim world could be treated differently. The IC wants consistent messaging. It wants to produce one product that speaks with a single coherent voice. The problem is that the world is much messier than that. Giving a president the benefit of the official CIA position on a matter is useful, but not as useful as allowing him to see the disputes, discomfort and doubts stemming from the different schools of thought. Those disagreements are sometimes treated as embarrassing by the IC -- but honest, public self-criticism builds confidence. STRATFOR -- and we are not comparing our tiny outfit to the IC, with its massive responsibilities -- publishes an annual report card with our forecasts, specifying where we succeeded and failed. We may as well; our readers and clients know anyway. This may not be what the president wants, of course, and Negroponte and Hayden will want to give him what he wants. But the head of an intelligence agency is like a doctor: He must give the patient what he needs and try to make it look like what the patient wants. In the end, it doesn t matter what you do, as Porter Goss has just found out. Negroponte and Hayden will probably lose their jobs anyway -- through resigning or being sacked, or through Bush's second term ending. Even if they are lucky, their jobs won't last much more than two years. There is no percentage in hedging, when you think of it that way. Perhaps the single greatest weakness of the IC is its can-do attitude. It cannot do everything that it is being asked to do -- and by trying, it cannot do the most important things that need to be done. It has had, as its mission, covering the world and predicting major events for the president. It has failed to do so on major issues since its founding, finding solace in substantial success on lesser issues. But it is possible that the bandwidth of the IC, already sucked up by massive management burdens, is completely burned up by the lesser issues. It may be that the briefing book to the president for his next meeting with the president of Paraguay or Botswana will be thinner, or he might just have to wing it. The republic will survive that. The focus must be on the things that count. Rethinking why there is an intelligence community and how it does its job is the prerequisite for Hayden and Negroponte to be successful. We do not believe for a minute that they will do so. They don't have enough time in office, they have too many meetings to attend, they have too many divergent views to reconcile into a single coherent report. Above all, the NERINT 43

44 CIA has to be prepared to battle the real enemy, which is the rest of the intelligence community -- from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the FBI. And, of course, the odd staffer at the White House. Overhauling Intelligence Foreign Affairs Julho/Agosto de 2007 INTELLIGENT REFORM Before World War II, the United States' defense, intelligence, and foreign policy apparatus were fragmented, as befitted a country with a limited role on the world stage. With U.S. entry into the war, interagency collaboration developed out of crisis-driven necessity. Wartime arrangements, although successful, were ad hoc. And after the war, President Harry Truman and Congress realized that the United States could not meet its new responsibilities without a national security structure that rationalized decision-making and integrated the intelligence and military establishments. It was against this background that on July 26, years ago this summer -- Truman signed the National Security Act, a seminal piece of legislation for the U.S. intelligence community that laid the foundation for a robust peacetime intelligence infrastructure. With the proper tools and public support and the help of allies, the United States built the world's premier intelligence establishment. It put spy planes in the sky, satellites into space, and listening posts in strategic locations around the world. It also invested in its people, developing a professional cadre of analysts, case officers, linguists, technicians, and program managers and trained them in foreign languages, the sciences, and area studies. But by the time the Cold War ended, the intelligence establishment that had served Washington so well in the second half of the twentieth century was sorely in need of change. The post-cold War "peace dividend" led to a reduction of intelligence sta/ng by 22 percent between fiscal years 1989 and Only now is sta/ng getting back to pre-cold War levels. The National Security Act mandated that information be shared up the chain of command but not horizontally with other agencies. At the time of the act's passing, little thought was given to the need for a national-level intelligence apparatus in Washington that could synthesize information from across the government to inform policymakers and help support real-time tactical decisions. That reality, coupled with practices that led to a "stovepiping" of intelligence, arrested the growth of information sharing, collaboration, and integration -- patterns that still linger. Intelligent Design? The Unending Saga of Intelligence Reform Foreign Affairs Março/Abril de 2008 Two new books on intelligence reform -- Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes and Amy Zegart's Spying Blind -- distort the historical record. A third, by Richard Betts, rightly observes that no matter how good the spies, failures are inevitable. In the 67 years since the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, countless commissions, committees, and other official inquiries have lamented the shortcomings of the U.S. intelligence agencies. Even more unofficial ink has been spilled on intelligence failures and the supposed need for reform. But then why, if there is a problem that needs fixing, has it not yet been fixed, despite the enormous amount of attention devoted to it? Some observers argue that the U.S. government simply has not found the right formula for change. Yet the many volumes already devoted to the subject of intelligence failure and reform make it unlikely that any bright new ideas (or even dim ones) will emerge. Another popular explanation is that reformers have had good ideas but the political stars have not been aligned in their favor. After all, it took the combination of an election campaign, the trauma of 9/11, and an aggressive commission that skillfully exploited public insecurity to bring about legislation establishing a director of national intelligence in 2004 (an idea that had been NERINT 44

45 discussed for decades). However, this explanation overlooks the strong bias toward reform among managers inside the intelligence community. Like ambitious managers anywhere, they make their careers not by sitting on the status quo but by championing new initiatives and strategic redirections. The dominant pattern in the U.S. intelligence agencies has been not stasis but almost constant revision, even to the point of disruption. Another common claim is that the challenges faced by the intelligence agencies have changed so dramatically that solutions from the Cold War era are now obsolete. But the intelligence agencies were addressing the "new" issues of terrorism and the proliferation of unconventional weapons while the Cold War was still raging. It is true that threats such as terrorism have evolved, but they have not changed nearly as much as the public believes. The shock of the 9/11 attacks was so profound that many Americans mistakenly assumed that they must have come from a new danger that no one, including their own government, had recognized or understood. Although there is an element of truth to each of these arguments, they all miss the point. There are three far more promising explanations for why intelligence reforms so often fail to live up to the demands and expectations of U.S. citizens and politicians. First, the American public consistently believes the intelligence community's record to be worse than it actually is, prompting calls for reform even when none is required. The stir created by the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear capabilities is a case in point. Lacking important details, the media (unfortunately encouraged by the estimate's wording and structure) oversimplified what the intelligence community was actually saying, leading the public to believe that it had dramatically reversed previous judgments. In fact, the key aspects of the community's assessment of the Iranian nuclear program were unchanged: Tehran, despite its denials, remains interested in the option of building a bomb; it will have the capability to build one by the middle of the next decade; and its choice to exercise that option will depend on decisions that Iranian leaders have not yet made. Nevertheless, the outsidethe-beltway belief that this is yet another example of the intelligence community's incompetence has become widespread. In the intelligence business, failures (and apparent contradictions) make headlines, while successes generally remain secret. Failures also prompt inquiries, whereas successes go unnoticed. It is the nature of these inquiries to devise solutions to problems regardless of whether they are soluble and to shift blame in order to avoid political land mines. Moreover, retrospective evaluations make events that were cloudy and ambiguous in real time seem blindingly clear in hindsight. Second, calling for intelligence reform serves psychological and political purposes that have nothing to do with the intelligence agencies' successes or failures. Such calls remain a fixture of public debates because they satisfy Americans' deeply felt need to attribute bad things to a specific, fixable problem and because they reinforce Americans' comforting but naive belief that similar bad things will not happen in the future if a proper solution is found. But reforms that pander to psychological needs and political agendas encourage changes that are more disruptive than productive. Moreover, they foster falsely reassuring notions of accomplishment -- as if the redrawing of the intelligence community's organizational chart three years ago left Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-zawahiri shaking in their djellabas. Finally, intelligence failures are inevitable. This fact, however discomforting, flows directly from the nature of the job, which involves trying to uncover information that is extremely difficult to obtain. Intelligence officers share with debt collectors, vulture investors, and trauma surgeons the challenge of giving unpromising cases their best shot. The information they process is ambiguous and fragmentary and can be assembled in countless ways. Intelligence is called on to connect dots even though, unlike in children's puzzles, many of the dots are missing or have no number. The principal challenge for the U.S. intelligence agencies is outsmarting adversaries who work assiduously to keep secret what the U.S. government hopes to find out. One side's intelligence success is the other side's counterintelligence failure. And the difficulties mount when an intelligence service is expected NERINT 45

46 -- as the United States' services have been in recent years -- to predict almost every significant occurrence across the globe. The widespread public perception that the U.S. intelligence agencies chronically perform poorly has created a receptive audience for a slew of books and articles that both exploit and help to perpetuate misunderstandings. The most recent and most prominent specimen of this genre is Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes, which won the 2007 National Book Award for nonfiction -- but probably would have been a better candidate in the category of fiction. His much-heralded history of the CIA is a selective and haphazard treatment of the agency's record. The book's heft and alleged grounding in historical legwork (Weiner says in his preface that he read "more than fifty thousand documents") have earned Legacy of Ashes laudatory reviews. However, readers who know a little bit about the CIA and anything about historical research will not react so favorably to Weiner's work. Weiner portrays an agency careening out of control, with adventure-hungry (and often alcohol-sodden) officers doing the driving. The book's scope is also extremely narrow: Weiner focuses disproportionately on the CIA's early days. The agency, according to Weiner, has been so enraptured with covert action that it has devoted too little energy and attention to collecting foreign intelligence. Legacy of Ashes offers little about two of the CIA's core intelligence functions, the collection of technical information and intelligence analysis, and not much more about the third, espionage. There is no mention, for example, of the CIA's revolutionary A-12 Oxcart spy plane program -- a crucially important technical-collection program during the 1960s. The A-12 was the precursor to the air force's SR-71, the premier U.S. reconnaissance aircraft for over 20 years. Nor does intelligence analysis get much attention. Among many significant omissions, Weiner fails to refer to the assessments from the CIA's Saigon station that anticipated the 1968 Tet offensive, even though President Lyndon Johnson and his national security adviser, Walt Rostow, later cited these reports in claiming that the Tet offensive had not surprised them. (Weiner's only paragraph on Tet portrays the CIA as totally in the dark about the enemy's intentions.) Nor does Weiner mention the CIA analysis that anticipated the Six-Day War of 1967; instead, he attributes Washington's lack of surprise to a single tip from Israel. And there is not a word about the intelligence community's prescient analysis before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which anticipated the civil strife, terrorism, and instability that ensued. Weiner's loose treatment of the historical record begins with the book's title. The phrase "legacy of ashes" comes from a remark made by President Dwight Eisenhower at a National Security Council meeting near the end of his presidency, but Weiner conflates two events and completely misrepresents Eisenhower's words. According to Weiner's account, the CIA director, Allen Dulles, was arguing against a proposal to separate his office's responsibilities from oversight of the broader intelligence community (as legislation in 2004 eventually did). Weiner quotes Eisenhower angrily complaining -- ostensibly in response -- that the structure of U.S. intelligence was faulty and that the failure to reform it would "leave a legacy of ashes." In fact, Eisenhower was not responding to Dulles, with whom he agreed about leaving the CIA director's job intact; the president had made his remark at a different NSC meeting a week earlier, and he was not talking about the CIA at all. Rather, his remark concerned how military intelligence had been stitched together during World War II. The historical inaccuracies continue in the first sentence of Chapter 1, where Weiner claims, "All Harry Truman wanted was a newspaper." Citing a letter Truman wrote to an aide many years after he left office in which he claimed that he had never wanted the CIA to be a "Cloak & Dagger Outfit," Weiner concludes that Truman simply wanted the agency to be a source for global news. But the documented history of the Truman administration's use of the CIA to conduct extensive covert operations during the early Cold War years strongly contradicts that notion. Weiner's use of source material throughout Legacy of Ashes follows in the same vein. Damning quotations are cherry-picked, episodes are chosen to highlight failures and exclude successes, conversations are distorted, presidential desires are misrepresented, NERINT 46

47 and sweeping judgments and naked assertions are made with no apparent reference to any of those 50,000 documents. Legacy of Ashes does accurately illustrate how the agency has been at the mercy of shifting political winds for decades. This is perhaps the only element of the book relevant to current debates over intelligence reform. Legacy of Ashes is not a history of the CIA, much less the history that the subtitle promises. It is largely a collection of tales of derring-do, deceit, and defeat. This highly tendentious book should be viewed the same way as a good novel: a lively read not to be trusted as history. BLIND FAITH Amy Zegart's Spying Blind also exploits the public's attention to intelligence failures. Zegart confesses in her preface that she was researching the difficulties faced by U.S. government agencies attempting to adapt to new challenges when 9/11 suddenly supplied the perfect dramatic event to illustrate her argument. She has therefore tailored her depiction of the official reaction to 9/11 to fit her broad preexisting thesis: that traits inherent to any large organization, especially a government agency, prevent it from adapting well to new challenges and new missions. Zegart strains to fit the record of the CIA's and the FBI's handling of terrorism into this thesis, and her straining leads to factual errors. She attributes, for example, the CIA's failure to place terrorist suspects on a watch list before 9/11 to the agency's not being "in the habit" of doing so. In fact, this lapse represented a failure to apply well-established and frequently used watch-listing procedures. Most of the empirical errors in Zegart's analysis of 9/11-related intelligence stem from her extremely heavy reliance on postmortem inquiries, especially the 9/11 Commission report. In fact, much of Spying Blind is little more than a repackaging of that report. Zegart's most serious mistakes concern strategic intelligence about the jihadist terrorist threat. The 9/11 Commission staff used several techniques to suggest that the intelligence community's strategic analysis was inadequate. Most notably, they equated strategic analysis -- which in this case meant assessment of the nature, shape, and severity of the Islamist terrorist threat represented by al Qaeda -- with only one type of report and brushed aside numerous finished assessments in other formats that the intelligence community had produced on the subject prior to 9/11. Zegart uses the same approach and asserts, implausibly and incorrectly, that this flow of information provided only fragmentary insights and missed the big picture. The intelligence community used other channels in addition to regular written assessments to convey to policymakers a strategic view of the jihadist threat. These included briefings of the most senior officials; special memos from the CIA director; countless discussions in the interagency Counterterrorism Security Group, chaired by the NSC's Richard Clarke; and the assessment portions of covert-action findings. But the 9/11 Commission never mentioned the use of these channels, and so neither does Zegart. Zegart does disagree with the commission on one important point (although she buries the disagreement in an endnote). The commission asserted that on the eve of 9/11, policymakers and intelligence officials still did not fully appreciate the seriousness of the threat posed by the jihadist movement and al Qaeda. Zegart presents substantial evidence that they did. This difference reflects two different agendas: Zegart's objective is to show that even organizations that understand a threat have trouble adapting to it; the commission's agenda was to muster support for its plan to reorganize an allegedly broken intelligence community. Zegart apparently does not recognize the logical inconsistency in her presentation: she relies heavily on the 9/11 Commission as a source on many issues despite having convincingly discredited it on the central issue of whether the policy and intelligence communities fully appreciated the terrorist threat. Furthermore, given that policymakers were fully aware of the jihadist threat and there is no reason to believe that strategic insights about al Qaeda were missing or incorrect (neither Zegart nor the commission provides any evidence to the NERINT 47

48 contrary), then strategic intelligence must have done its job effectively. The missing piece was something very different: tactical information about a specific plot -- a common problem in counterterrorism. Legacy of Ashes and Spying Blind exemplify several all-too-common attributes of commentary about intelligence and intelligence reform. One is looseness in the use of evidence (which is ironic, given the tight sourcing standards that are appropriately demanded of the intelligence community). Another is uncritical (or selective) acceptance of whatever a commission or committee says. Zegart exhibits this tendency not only in her discussion of the intelligence community's record on 9/11 but also in her blanket reference to the more than 300 unimplemented recommendations of prior commissions and committees -- evidence, in her view, of the agencies' supposed failure to adapt to new challenges. She does not admit the possibility that any of these recommendations might have been misguided, mediocre, or tailored to fit the needs of the bodies that proposed them. Zegart also lacks any sense of performance standards, a common problem among commentators on intelligence. Failures are enumerated, whereas successes are omitted, and the only implied standard -- perfection -- is an unattainable one. Zegart provides one of the more methodologically absurd examples of this sort of performance evaluation when she states that the CIA had a "100 percent failure" rate on 9/11 because it missed all 11 opportunities to disrupt the attacks. (She also presents a similar list of 12 opportunities the FBI missed.) When opportunities are defined only as chances that were missed, the failure rate will naturally be 100 percent. Zegart never counts the opportunities that were successfully seized -- some of which helped create the very missed opportunities she laments. UNAVOIDABLE FAILURE Richard Betts' book provides a much-needed antidote to these outsized expectations. Betts has studied intelligence failures for three decades and understands that the nature of the intelligence business makes some failures inevitable. The "enemies of intelligence" Betts refers to in his title can be anything -- human, organizational, or situational -- that impedes the intelligence mission and contributes to failure. Enemies internal to the intelligence community -- negligence, poorly designed organizations, and imperfect flows of information -- get almost all of the attention in public commentary. But, as Betts observes, they are not as big a problem as is often assumed. The larger obstacles are hostile states and organizations that withhold secrets and what Betts calls "inherent enemies": "a collection of mental limitations, dilemmas, contradictory imperatives, paradoxical interactions, and trade-offs among objectives." These inherent enemies of intelligence agencies generally receive the least attention of all. They can be as simple as funding constraints or limited personnel, which force agencies to focus on certain targets while devoting fewer resources to others. And they can be as complex as determining how and when to issue warnings to policymakers about impending dangers. As Betts' elegant analysis shows, such warnings are not just a matter of intelligence agencies blowing a horn and policymakers jumping in response. Rather, they involve a far more complicated process that includes weighing the danger of false positives against the danger of false negatives and the costs of action against those of inaction. Betts is correct in arguing that these inherent enemies constitute an almost insurmountable obstacle and that intelligence failures are not only inevitable but natural. "The awful truth," he writes, "is that the best of intelligence systems will have big failures." This, however, does not mean reform is impossible or unnecessary. Further change in the intelligence community is both feasible and worthwhile. But policymakers must begin by heeding Betts' sound recommendation that reforms be evaluated "not just according to what they may fix but what they may break." They must also accept two uncomfortable truths. First, any improvement is likely to be marginal. Betts likens the situation to a baseball player raising his batting average by 15 points: it is worth making the effort and could possibly help the team, but it is hardly the stuff of major overhaul. Second, they must acknowledge that the NERINT 48

49 other branches of government will have to adapt to the reality that the intelligence agencies will never live up to the unrealistic expectations that citizens and politicians have placed on them. The United States must stop hoping for an intelligence superstar who will save the rest of the team from its errors and instead focus on assembling a solid, reliable interagency lineup. Pakistan: Civilian Control Over Intelligence Stratfor 26/07/2008 Pakistan announced July 26 that it was placing its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency under the control of the Interior Ministry. The move, which is designed to counter mounting international pressure to rein in jihadist activity and clean up its intelligence apparatus, is unlikely to lead to any major improvement in the security situation within the country. The announcement notwithstanding, the military is not about to relinquish complete control over the ISI to a nascent civilian administration. But an increased civilian say over the affairs of the agency will, in the short term, add to the crisis of governance faced by the state. Analysis Pakistan s new civilian government said July 26 that the country s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has been placed under the control of the Interior Ministry. A notification issued by the government s Cabinet Division stated that the prime minister approved the placement of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Inter-Services Intelligence under the administrative, financial and operational control of the Interior Division with immediate effect. The move comes just before Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani is due to arrive in Washington for a meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush. The IB is a civilian domestic intelligence agency already under the control of the Interior Ministry. But the ISI is a foreign intelligence directorate within the army, and the military establishment is unlikely to be willing to relinquish complete control of it to a nascent civilian administration. The move is designed to counter mounting international pressure to rein in jihadist activity and clean up Pakistan s intelligence apparatus, especially the ISI, which has a history of sponsoring Islamist militant proxies in the region. However, the domestic political and security situation in Pakistan is spiraling out of control, and the army s control over the state has been weakened. Therefore, the military has been forced to allow civilians to have a say in the affairs of the ISI. This should not be seen as a civilian victory over the military. On the contrary, the move was likely initiated by army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani in concert with the corps commanders and the Director-General of the ISI, Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, as a way to demonstrate that the Pakistani state was making moves toward reforming the country s security services, which are on the defensive against a surging Taliban insurgency at home and at the same time continue to sponsor Islamist militants in both Afghanistan and India. In the wake of the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, India s army chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor accused the ISI of masterminding the attack, and New Delhi s National Security Adviser MK Narayanan remarked that the ISI needs to be destroyed. Similarly, the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accused the ISI of supporting a growing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Last week, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen traveled to Pakistan on an unannounced trip, where he presented Pakistani military officials with evidence of the ISI s involvement in attacks in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis are therefore under unprecedented pressure to act. The move to place the ISI under civilian control is their way of responding to the pressure in order to buy time to sort out the incoherence within the state especially in its intelligence services and try to get ahead of the curve against the Taliban, who are threatening to expand their sphere of control to the North-West Frontier Province. The Interior Ministry having a significant say over the ISI will, however, likely exacerbate the existing situation. Already, elements within the NERINT 49

50 directorate are running their own private foreign and domestic policy, and the ISI has a significant presence of Islamist militant sympathizers. A weak civilian government is unlikely to better manage the directorate than the much more powerful military. If anything, it could make matters worse because of the involvement of too many players struggling for control over the ISI. Anything short of a total overhaul of the directorate is unlikely to allow the Pakistanis to get ahead of the domestic security curve and effectively deal with international pressure. Counterintelligence Implications of Foreign Service National Employees Stratfor 29/10/2008 Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora said Oct. 27 that five officials from the anti-organized crime unit (SIEDO) of the Office of the Mexican Attorney General (PGR) have been arrested for allegedly providing intelligence to the Beltrán Leyva drug trafficking organization for money. Two of the recently arrested officials were senior SIEDO officers. One of those was Fernando Rivera Hernández, SIEDO s director of intelligence; the other was Miguel Colorado González, SIEDO s technical coordinator. This episode follows earlier announcements of the arrests in August of SIEDO officials on corruption charges. Medina Mora said that since July, more than 35 PGR agents have been arrested for accepting bribes from cartel members bribes that, according to Medina Mora, can range from $150,000 to $450,000 a month depending on the quality of information provided. Mexican newspapers including La Jornada are reporting that information has been uncovered in the current investigation indicating the Beltrán Leyva organization had developed paid sources inside Interpol and the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and that the source in the embassy has provided intelligence on Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigations. The source at the U.S. Embassy was reportedly a foreign service national investigator, or FSNI. The newspaper El Universal has reported that the U.S. Marshals Service employed the FSNI in question. This situation provides us with a good opportunity to examine the role of foreign service national employees at U.S. missions abroad and why they are important to embassy functions, and to discuss the counterintelligence liability they present. Foreign Service Nationals U.S. embassies and consulates can be large and complicated entities. They can house dozens of U.S. government agencies and employ hundreds, or even thousands, of employees. Americans like their creature comforts, and keeping a large number of employees comfortable (and productive) requires a lot of administrative and logistical support, everything from motor pool vehicles to commissaries. Creature comforts aside, merely keeping all of the security equipment functioning in a big mission things like gates, vehicle barriers, video cameras, metal detectors, magnetic locks and residential alarms can be a daunting task. In most places, the cost of bringing Americans to the host country to do all of the little jobs required to run an embassy or consulate is prohibitive. Because of this, the U.S. government often hires a large group of local people (called foreign service nationals, or FSNs) to perform non-sensitive administrative functions. FSN jobs can range from low-level menial positions, such as driving the embassy shuttle bus, answering the switchboard or cooking in the embassy cafeteria, to more important jobs such as helping the embassy contract with local companies for goods and services, helping to screen potential visa applicants or translating diplomatic notes into the local language. Most U.S diplomatic posts employ dozens of FSNs, and large embassies can employ hundreds of them. The embassy will also hire FSNIs to assist various sections of the embassy such as the DEA Attaché, the regional security office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the antifraud unit of the consular section. FSNIs are the embassy s subject-matter experts on crime in NERINT 50

51 the host country and are responsible for maintaining liaison between the embassy and the host country s security and law enforcement organizations. In a system where most diplomats and attachés are assigned to a post only for two or three years, the FSNs become the institutional memory of the embassy. They are the long-term keepers of the contacts with the host country government and will always be expected to introduce their new American bosses to the people they need to know in the government to get their jobs done. Because FSNIs are expected to have good contacts and to be able to reach their contacts at any time of the day or night in case of emergency, the people hired for these FSNI positions are normally former senior law enforcement officers from the host country. The senior police officials are often close friends and former classmates of the current host country officials. This means that they can call the chief of police of the capital city at home on a Saturday or the assistant minister of government at 3 a.m. if the need arises. To help make sure this assistance flows, the FSNI will do little things like deliver bottles of Johnny Walker Black during the Christmas holidays or bigger things like help the chief of police obtain visas so his family can vacation at Disney World. Visas, in fact, are a very good tool for fostering liaison. Not only can they allow the vice minister to do his holiday shopping in Houston, they can also be used to do things like bring vehicles or consumer goods from the United States back to the host country for sale at a profit. As FSNs tend to work for embassies for long periods of time, while the Americans rotate through, there is a tendency for FSNs to learn the system and to find ways to profit from it. It is not uncommon for FSNs to be fired or even prosecuted in local court systems for theft and embezzlement. FSNs have done things like take kick-backs on embassy contracts for arranging to direct the contract to a specific vendor; pay inflated prices for goods bought with petty cash and then split the difference with the vendor who provided the false receipt; and steal gasoline, furniture items, computers and nearly anything else that can be found in an embassy. While this kind of fraud is more commonplace in third-world nations where corruption is endemic, it is certainly not confined there; it can even occur in European capitals. Again, visas are a critical piece of the puzzle. Genuine U.S. visas are worth a great deal of money, and it is not uncommon to find FSNs involved in various visa fraud schemes. FSN employees have gone as far as accepting money to provide visas to members of terrorist groups like Hezbollah. In countries involved in human trafficking, visas have been traded for sexual favors in addition to money. In fairness, the amount that can be made from visa fraud means it is not surprising to find U.S. foreign service officers participating in visa fraud as well. Liabilities While it saves money, employing FSNs does present a very real counterintelligence risk. In essence, it is an invitation to a local intelligence service to send people inside U.S. buildings to collect information. In most countries, the U.S. Embassy cannot do a complete background investigation on an FSN candidate without the assistance of the host country government. This means the chances of catching a plant are slim unless the Americans have their own source in the local intelligence service that will out the operation. In many countries, foreigners cannot apply for a job with the U.S. Embassy without their government s permission. Obviously, this means local governments can approve only those applicants who agree to provide the government with information. In other countries, embassy employment is not that obviously controlled, but there still is a strong possibility of the host country sending agents to apply for jobs along with the other applicants. It may be just coincidence, but in many countries the percentage of very attractive young women filling clerical roles at the U.S. Embassy appears many times higher than the number of attractive young women in the general population. This raises the specter of honey traps, or sexual entrapment schemes aimed at U.S. employees. Such schemes have involved female FSNs in the past. In one well known example, the KGB employed attractive NERINT 51

52 female operatives against the Marine Security Guards in Moscow, an operation that led to an extremely grave compromise of the U.S. Embassy there. Because of these risk factors, FSNs are not allowed access to classified information and are kept out of sections of the embassy where classified information is discussed and stored. It is assumed that any classified information FSNs can access will be compromised. Of course, not all FSNs report to host country intelligence services, and many of them are loyal employees of the U.S. government. In many countries, however, the extensive power host country intelligence services can wield over the lives of its citizens means that even otherwise loyal FSNs can be compelled to report to the host country service against their wills. Whereas an American diplomat will go home after two or three years, FSNs must spend their lives in the host country and are not protected by diplomatic status or international conventions. This makes them very vulnerable to pressure. Additionally, the aforementioned criminal activity by FSNs is not just significant from a fiscal standpoint; Such activity also leaves those participating in it open to blackmail by the host government if the activity is discovered. When one considers the long history of official corruption in Mexico and the enormous amounts of cash available to the Mexican drug cartels, it is no surprise that members of the SIEDO, much less an FNSI at the U.S. Embassy, should be implicated in such a case. The allegedly corrupt FNSI most likely was recruited into the scheme by a close friend or former associate who may have been working for the government and who was helping the Beltrán Leyva organization develop its intelligence network. Limits It appears that the FSNI working for the Beltrán Leyva organization at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City worked for the U.S. Marshals Service, not the DEA. This means that he would not have had access to much DEA operational information. An FSNI working for the U.S. Marshals Service would be working on fugitive cases and would be tasked with liaison with various Mexican law enforcement jurisdictions. Information regarding fugitive operations would be somewhat useful to the cartels, since many cartel members have been indicted in U.S. courts and the U.S. government would like to extradite them. Even if the FSNI involved had been working for the DEA, however, there are limits to how much information he would have been able to provide. First of all, DEA special agents are well aware of the degree of corruption in Mexico, and they are therefore concerned that information passed on to the Mexican government can be passed to the cartels. The special agents also would assume that their FSN employees may be reporting to the Mexican government, and would therefore take care to not tell the FSN anything they wouldn t want the Mexican government or the cartels to know. The type of FSNI employee in question would be tasked with conducting administrative duties such as helping the DEA attaché with liaison and passing name checks and other queries to various jurisdictions in Mexico. The FSN would not be privy to classified DEA cable traffic, and would not sit in on sensitive operational meetings. In the intelligence world, however, there are unclassified things that can be valuable intelligence. These include the names and home addresses of all the DEA employees in the country, for example, or the types of cars the special agents drive and the confidential license plates they have for them. Other examples could be the FSNI being sent to the airport to pick up a group of TDY DEA agents and bringing them to the embassy. Were the agents out-of-shape headquarterstypes wearing suits and doing an inspection, or fit field agents from a special operations group coming to town to help take down a high-value target? Even knowing that the DEA attaché has suddenly changed his schedule and is now working more overtime can indicate that something is up. Information that the attaché has asked the FSNI about the police chief in a specific jurisdiction, for example, could also be valuable to a drug trafficking organization expecting a shipment to arrive at that jurisdiction. NERINT 52

53 In the end, it is unlikely that this current case resulted in grave damage to DEA operations in Mexico. Indeed, the FSNI probably did far less damage to counternarcotics operations than the 35 PGR employees who have been arrested since July. But the vulnerabilities of FSN employees are great, and there are likely other FSNs on the payroll of the various Mexican cartels. As long as the U.S. government employs FSNs it will face the security liability that comes with them. In general, however, this liability is offset by the utility they provide and the systems put in place to limit the counterintelligence damage they can cause. A Counterintelligence Approach to Controlling Cartel Corruption Stratfor 20/05/2009 Rey Guerra, the former sheriff of Starr County, Texas, pleaded guilty May 1 to a narcotics conspiracy charge in federal district court in McAllen, Texas. Guerra admitted to using information obtained in his official capacity to help a friend (a Mexican drug trafficker allegedly associated with Los Zetas) evade U.S. counternarcotics efforts. On at least one occasion, Guerra also attempted to learn the identity of a confidential informant who had provided authorities with information regarding cartel operations so he could pass it to his cartel contact. In addition to providing intelligence to Los Zetas, Guerra also reportedly helped steer investigations away from people and facilities associated with Los Zetas. He also sought to block progress on investigations into arrested individuals associated with Los Zetas to protect other members associated with the organization. Guerra is scheduled for sentencing July 29; he faces 10 years to life imprisonment, fines of up to $4 million and five years of supervised release. Guerra is just one of a growing number of officials on the U.S. side of the border who have been recruited as agents for Mexico s powerful and sophisticated drug cartels. Indeed, when one examines the reach and scope of the Mexican cartels efforts to recruit agents inside the United States to provide intelligence and act on the cartels behalf, it becomes apparent that the cartels have demonstrated the ability to operate more like a foreign intelligence service than a traditional criminal organization. Fluidity and Flexibility For many years now, STRATFOR has followed developments along the U.S.-Mexican border and has studied the dynamics of the cross-border illicit flow of people, drugs, weapons and cash. One of the most notable characteristics about this flow of contraband is its flexibility. When smugglers encounter an obstacle to the flow of their product, they find ways to avoid it. For example, as we ve previously discussed in the case of the extensive border fence in the San Diego sector, drug traffickers and human smugglers diverted a good portion of their volume around the wall to the Tucson sector; they even created an extensive network of tunnels under the fence to keep their contraband (and profits) flowing. Likewise, as maritime and air interdiction efforts between South America and Mexico have become more successful, Central America has become increasingly important to the flow of narcotics from South America to the United States. This reflects how the drug-trafficking organizations have adjusted their method of shipment and their trafficking routes to avoid interdiction efforts and maintain the northward flow of narcotics. Over the past few years, a great deal of public and government attention has focused on the U.S.-Mexican border. In response to this attention, the federal and border state governments in the United States have erected more barriers, installed an array of cameras and sensors and increased the manpower committed to securing the border. While these efforts certainly have not hermetically sealed the border, they do appear to be having some NERINT 53

54 impact an impact magnified by the effectiveness of interdiction efforts elsewhere along the narcotics supply chain. According to the most recent statistics from the Drug Enforcement Administration, from January 2007 through September 2008 the price per pure gram of cocaine increased 89.1 percent, or from $96.61 to $182.73, while the purity of cocaine seized on the street decreased 31.3 percent, dropping from 67 percent pure cocaine to 46 percent pure cocaine. Recent anecdotal reports from law enforcement sources indicate that cocaine prices have remained high, and that the purity of cocaine on the street has remained poor. Overcoming Human Obstacles In another interesting trend that has emerged over the past few years, as border security has tightened and as the flow of narcotics has been impeded, the number of U.S. border enforcement officers arrested on charges of corruption has increased notably. This increased corruption represents a logical outcome of the fluidity of the flow of contraband. As the obstacles posed by border enforcement have become more daunting, people have become the weak link in the enforcement system. In some ways, people are like tunnels under the border wall i.e., channels employed by the traffickers to help their goods get to market. From the Mexican cartels point of view, it is cheaper to pay an official several thousand dollars to allow a load of narcotics to pass by than it is to risk having the shipment seized. Such bribes are simply part of the cost of doing business and in the big picture, even a low-level local agent can be an incredible bargain. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 21 CBP officers were arrested on corruption charges during the fiscal year that ended in September 2008, as opposed to only 4 in the preceding fiscal year. In the current fiscal year (since Oct. 1), 14 have been arrested. And the problem with corruption extends further than just customs or border patrol officers. In recent years, police officers, state troopers, county sheriffs, National Guard members, judges, prosecutors, deputy U.S. marshals and even the FBI special agent in charge of the El Paso office have been linked to Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. Significantly, the cases being prosecuted against these public officials of all stripes are just the tip of the iceberg. The underlying problem of corruption is much greater. A major challenge to addressing the issue of border corruption is the large number of jurisdictions along the border, along with the reality that corruption occurs at the local, state and federal levels across those jurisdictions. Though this makes it very difficult to gather data relating to the total number of corruption investigations conducted, sources tell us that while corruption has always been a problem along the border, the problem has ballooned in recent years and the number of corruption cases has increased dramatically. In addition to the complexity brought about by the multiple jurisdictions, agencies and levels of government involved, there simply is not one single agency that can be tasked with taking care of the corruption problem. It is just too big and too wide. Even the FBI, which has national jurisdiction and a mandate to investigate public corruption cases, cannot step in and clean up all the corruption. The FBI already is being stretched thin with its other responsibilities, like counterterrorism, foreign counterintelligence, financial fraud and bank robbery. The FBI thus does not even have the capacity to investigate every allegation of corruption at the federal level, much less at the state and local levels. Limited resources require the agency to be very selective about the cases it decides to investigate. Given that there is no real central clearinghouse for corruption cases, most allegations of corruption are investigated by a wide array of internal affairs units and other agencies at the federal, state and local levels. Any time there is such a mixture of agencies involved in the investigation of a specific type of crime, there is often bureaucratic friction, and there are almost always problems with information sharing. This means that pieces of information and investigative leads developed in the investigation of some of these cases are not shared with the appropriate agencies. To NERINT 54

55 overcome this information sharing problem, the FBI has established six Border Corruption Task Forces designed to bring local, state and federal officers together to focus on corruption tied to the U.S.-Mexican border, but these task forces have not yet been able to solve the complex problem of coordination. Sophisticated Spotting Efforts to corrupt officials along the U.S.-Mexican border are very organized and very focused, something that is critical to understanding the public corruption issue along the border. Some of the Mexican cartels have a long history of successfully corrupting public officials on both sides of the border. Groups like the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) have successfully recruited scores of intelligence assets and agents of influence at the local, state and even federal levels of the Mexican government. They even have enjoyed significant success in recruiting agents in elite units such as the anti-organized crime unit (SIEDO) of the Office of the Mexican Attorney General (PGR). The BLO also has recruited Mexican employees working for the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and even allegedly owned Mexico s former drug czar, Noe Ramirez Mandujano, who reportedly was receiving $450,000 a month from the organization. In fact, the sophistication of these groups means they use methods more akin to the intelligence recruitment processes used by foreign intelligence services than those normally associated with a criminal organization. The cartels are known to conduct extensive surveillance and background checks on potential targets to determine how to best pitch to them. Like the spotting methods used by intelligence agencies, the surveillance conducted by the cartels on potential targets is designed to glean as many details about the target as possible, including where they live, what vehicles they drive, who their family members are, their financial needs and their peccadilloes. Historically, many foreign intelligence services are known to use ethnicity in their favor, heavily targeting persons sharing an ethnic background found in the foreign country. Foreign services also are known to use relatives of the target living in the foreign country to their advantage. Mexican cartels use these same tools. They tend to target Hispanic officers and often use family members living in Mexico as recruiting levers. For example, Luis Francisco Alarid, who had been a CBP officer at the Otay Mesa, Calif., port of entry, was sentenced to 84 months in federal prison in February for his participation in a conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens and marijuana into the United States. One of the people Alarid admitted to conspiring with was his uncle, who drove a van loaded with marijuana and illegal aliens through a border checkpoint manned by Alarid. Like family spy rings (such as the Cold War spy ring run by John Walker), there also have been family border corruption rings. Raul Villarreal and his brother, Fidel, both former CBP agents in San Diego, were arraigned March 16 after fleeing the United States in 2006 after learning they were being investigated for corruption. The pair was captured in Mexico in October 2008 and extradited back to the United States. Plata o Sexo When discussing human intelligence recruiting, it is not uncommon to refer to the old cold war acronym MICE (money, ideology, compromise and ego) to explain the approach used to recruit an agent. When discussing corruption in Mexico, people often repeat the phrase plata o plomo, Spanish for money or lead meaning take the money or we ll kill you. However, in most border corruption cases involving American officials, the threat of plomo is not as powerful as it is inside Mexico. Although some officials charged with corruption have claimed as a defense that they were intimidated into behaving corruptly, juries have rejected these arguments. This dynamic could change if the Mexican cartels begin to target officers in the United States for assassination as they have in Mexico. NERINT 55

56 With plomo an empty threat north of the border, plata has become the primary motivation for corruption along the Mexican border. In fact, good old greed the M in MICE has always been the most common motivation for Americans recruited by foreign intelligence services. The runner-up, which supplants plomo in the recruitment equation inside the United Sates, is sexo, aka sex. Sex, an age-old espionage recruitment tool that fits under the compromise section of MICE, has been seen in high-profile espionage cases, including the one involving the Marine security guards at the U.S Embassy in Moscow. Using sex to recruit an agent is often referred to as setting a honey trap. Sex can be used in two ways. First, it can be used as a simple payment for services rendered. Second, it can be used as a means to blackmail the agent. (The two techniques can be used in tandem.) It is not at all uncommon for border officials to be offered sex in return for allowing illegal aliens or drugs to enter the country, or for drug-trafficking organizations to use attractive agents to seduce and then recruit officers. Several officials have been convicted in such cases. For example, in March 2007, CBP inspection officer Richard Elizalda, who had worked at the San Ysidro, Calif., port of entry, was sentenced to 57 months in prison for conspiring with his lover, alien smuggler Raquel Arin, to let the organization she worked for bring illegal aliens through his inspection lane. Elizalda also accepted cash for his efforts much of which he allegedly spent on gifts for Arin so in reality, Elizalda was a case of plata y sexo rather than an either-or deal. Corruption Cases Handled Differently When the U.S. government hires an employee who has family members living in a place like Beijing or Moscow, the background investigation for that employee is pursued with far more interest than if the employee has relatives in Ciudad Juarez or Tijuana. Mexico traditionally has not been seen as a foreign counterintelligence threat, even though it has long been recognized that many countries, like Russia, are very active in their efforts to target the United States from Mexico. Indeed, during the Cold War, the KGB s largest rezidentura (the equivalent of a CIA station) was located in Mexico City. Employees with connections to Mexico frequently have not been that well vetted, period. In one well-publicized incident, the Border Patrol hired an illegal immigrant who was later arrested for alien smuggling. In July 2006, U.S. Border Patrol agent Oscar Ortiz was sentenced to 60 months in prison after admitting to smuggling more than 100 illegal immigrants into the United States. After his arrest, investigators learned that Ortiz was an illegal immigrant himself who had used a counterfeit birth certificate when he was hired. Ironically, Ortiz also had been arrested for attempting to smuggle two illegal immigrants into the United States shortly before being hired by the Border Patrol. (He was never charged for that attempt.) From an investigative perspective, corruption cases tend to be handled more as oneoff cases, and they do not normally receive the same sort of extensive investigation into the suspect s friends and associates that would be conducted in a foreign counterintelligence case. In other words, if a U.S. government employee is recruited by the Chinese or Russian intelligence service, the investigation receives far more energy and the suspect s circle of friends, relatives and associates receives far more scrutiny than if he is recruited by a Mexican cartel. In espionage cases, there is also an extensive damage assessment investigation conducted to ensure that all the information the suspect could have divulged is identified, along with the identities of any other people the suspect could have helped his handler recruit. Additionally, after-action reviews are conducted to determine how the suspect was recruited, how he was handled and how he could have been uncovered earlier. The results of these reviews are then used to help shape future counterintelligence investigative efforts. They are also used in the preparation of defensive counterintelligence briefings to educate other employees and help protect them from being recruited. NERINT 56

57 This differences in urgency and scope between the two types of investigations is driven by the perception that the damage to national security is greater if an official is recruited by a foreign intelligence agency than if he is recruited by a criminal organization. That assessment may need to be re-examined, given that the Mexican cartels are criminal organizations with the proven sophistication to recruit U.S. officials at all levels of government and that this has allowed them to move whomever and whatever they wish into the United States. The problem of public corruption is very widespread, and to approach corruption cases in a manner similar to foreign counterintelligence cases would require a large commitment of investigative, prosecutorial and defensive resources. But the threat posed by the Mexican cartels is different than that posed by traditional criminal organizations, meaning that countering it will require a nontraditional approach. U.S. Intelligence and Afghan Narcotics Washington Post 18/08/2009 The Afghanistan Intelligence Fusion Center, begun in 2004 and run by an American contractor under U.S. Air Force direction, is based at the offices of the Afghan counternarcotics police in Kabul. It produces "time-sensitive, counter-narco terrorism intelligence" that is critical for "compilation of actionable target packages" for U.S. and coalition forces, according to a recent Air Force notice on expanding the operation. The Aug. 6 announcement said that the Air Force's 350th Electronic Systems Group, based at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts, will award a six-month "bridge" contract to Virginia-based Cambridge Communications Systems this Friday to allow that company to continue operating and maintaining the fusion center through Feb. 22, Meanwhile, a broader new long-term contract will be opened for bidding. As U.S., Afghan and coalition forces increase their focus on breaking up Afghan drug rings that help finance the insurgents, more support is being given to gathering and processing intelligence on drug operations. Years ago, the Air Force was designated as the lead service for drug detection and monitoring under the deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics. That's why an Air Force unit is in charge of the contract. It was five years ago that the U.S. Central Command first decided to upgrade the intelligence gathering and sharing that supported this effort. The task was undertaken by the 350th Electronic Systems Group, which specializes in hiring contractors knowledgeable in electronic communications and computer systems that integrate, standardize and analyze information. The 350th initially turned to Cambridge to design and install a computerized intelligence system that could take data from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Center for Drug Information and fuse it with information from Global Positioning System satellites, signals intelligence, human intelligence, imagery (including full motion video), and data from other technical and open sources, including coalition partners. The system also included a Dari-language-based interface, which allowed it to accept locally generated Afghan intelligence and in return supply finished reports in that language to the Afghan counternarcotics police. It became "the only source of critical intelligence captured that is available from host nation sources," according to the Aug. 6 notice. In a report released by the Air Force in 2007, data from the Kabul-based fusion center got credit for aiding in the seizure of more than 45 tons of drugs with an estimated street value of $1 billion and aid that helped the drug arrest rate by 75 percent. Its information also helped break up groups involved in narcotics and weapons smuggling that originated in Nigeria, Pakistan, Ivory Coast, Zambia, South Africa and Thailand. Its information aided in picking up 80 memory chips from cellphones, which when studied by the U.S. National Security Agency, has led to the identification of new smuggling rings outside Afghanistan. NERINT 57

58 The Afghan fusion center is linked in Kabul to the Interagency Operations and Coordination Center (IOCC), which is run jointly under U.S. and British leadership. The cosponsors are the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Serious Organized Crimes Agency (SOCA), a British intelligence unit that has law enforcement powers. Leadership rotates between the two agencies. DEA and SOCA personnel, along with Afghan units trained and mentored by those agencies, use the target packages to track down the country's major narcotics networks and interdict traffickers. Wing Commander Tom Wood of the British Royal Air Force, IOCC chief of staff, told a reporter for Stars and Stripes in May: "We look at the intel. We work out who the key players are." Wood said with good information they get arrest warrants that the Afghan special narcotics police this year have used to take in 51 people through May 24. At that point, Wood said, there is a difficulty. "Even though we do arrest these people, they quite often get out," he said. "The judicial system is still being put into place. The problem is the system is so corrupt still." Meanwhile, the report released last week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan noted that a new task force targeting drug traffickers along with insurgents and corrupt officials is planned for the Kandahar air field in southern Afghanistan. This unit, designed to gather intelligence and build legal cases, will inevitably link to both the fusion center and the IOCC. Though the committee report said formal approval from Washington and London has yet to come, operations are already being coordinated. A SOCA operative told committee investigators it is critical to unite military and law enforcement experts. "In the past, the military would have hit and the evidence would not have been collected," he said. "Now, with law enforcement present, we are seizing the ledgers and other information to develop an intelligence profile of the networks and the drug kingpins." It's Never a Quick Fix at the CIA Washington Post 30/08/2009 This tale, perhaps apocryphal, is one that CIA officers still tell with glee: It's the mid-1950s, and two elderly lawmakers sit in a Senate subcommittee hearing room, listening to the CIA's deputy director of operations drone through his prepared statement on the agency's latest covert action. One of the senators rests his head in his arms and falls asleep. His colleague stares blankly at the briefer, stealing glances at a newspaper. The CIA official raises his voice for a moment, more to relieve his own boredom than to stir his audience. "Paramilitary activities," he intones, "have been an important part of our program since the early days of the Cold War." The slumbering senator awakens with a start. "Parliamentary activities?" he bellows. "You fellas can't go messin' round with parliaments. I won't have it!" With that, the octogenarian rose and left the room. The moral of the story is evident: Not only did the CIA's legislative watchdog have no teeth, it was sound asleep. Attorney General Eric Holder's appointment last week of a special prosecutor to investigate CIA prisoner abuses is but the latest of many efforts to rein in the agency. I've been a witness to some of those efforts, as an assistant to Sen. Frank Church of Idaho during his committee's investigations in the 1970s and later as an aide to former defense secretary Les Aspin when he led a probe of agency structures in the aftermath of the Aldrich Ames spying scandal. Such inquiries can prove useful, leading to critical reforms, stronger oversight and, perhaps most important, changed attitudes about the CIA and other intelligence agencies. But I've also learned that high-profile investigations will not transform human nature, turning intelligence officials -- or the presidents and White House aides who direct them -- into angels, unsusceptible to zeal and folly. Even when the watchdogs on Capitol Hill or in the Justice Department awaken, intelligence abuses and scandals will recur. We will launch new NERINT 58

59 investigations and introduce new reforms, but sometimes all we can do is clean up the messes after the fact. So let's get used to it. During the first half of the Cold War, the CIA was largely free of serious congressional supervision. And despite controversies such as the U2 shoot-down over the Soviet Union, the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the covert funding of the National Student Association, the agency escaped widespread public opprobrium. That changed in 1974, when the New York Times's Seymour Hersh reported that the CIA had deployed its dark arts at home, spying on American citizens. In response, Senate leaders tapped Church to lead the first major investigation of the CIA. The Church Committee discovered that intelligence abuses ran far deeper than initially reported. The CIA had indeed spied on Vietnam War dissenters at home, but the FBI had gone further, disrupting the lives of antiwar protesters and civil rights activists. It was "a road map to the destruction of American democracy," committee member Walter Mondale said during a public hearing. Church was equally appalled by the overseas excesses of the CIA, including covert actions against democratic regimes -- such as Chile's -- and assassination plots. He blasted the agency for "the fantasy that it lay within our power to control other countries through the covert manipulation of their affairs." At the time, Church told me that when he first came to the Senate in 1957, "some of those senior senators who did have this so-called [CIA] watchdog committee were known to say, in effect: 'We don't watch the dog. We don't know what's going on, and furthermore, we don't want to know.' " He vowed to take a new approach but found it difficult to learn exactly who told the CIA to do what -- a dilemma the nation faces today in trying to understand who ordered secret prisons, harsh interrogations and extraordinary renditions. After one of our closed sessions on CIA assassination plots, Church leaned back in his chair and rubbed his forehead in frustration. Who had ordered the plots against Patrice Lumumba of Congo and Fidel Castro of Cuba? The president? The director of central intelligence? Someone lower down in the CIA? The testimony from the agency's witnesses was filled with ambiguities. " 'Could,' 'would,' 'probably,' 'assume,' 'might,' 'have a feeling,' " Church fumed to a particularly evasive (or forgetful) witness. "And we're talking about a matter of such grave importance as assassination!" The committee was never able to pinpoint responsibility. For Intelligence Officers, A Wiki Way to Connect Dots Washington Post 27/08/2009 Intellipedia, the intelligence community's version of Wikipedia, hummed in the aftermath of the Iranian presidential election in June, with personnel at myriad government agencies updating a page dedicated to tracking the disputed results. Similarly, a page established in November immediately after the terrorist attack in Mumbai provided intelligence analysts with a better understandinsg of the scope of the incident, as well as a forum to speculate on possible perpetrators. "There were a number of things posted that were ahead of what was being reported in the press," said Sean Dennehy, a CIA officer who helped establish the site. Intellipedia is a collaborative online intelligence repository, and it runs counter to traditional reluctance in the intelligence community to the sharing of classified information. Indeed, it still meets with formidable resistance from many quarters of the 16 agencies that have access to the system. But the site, which is available only to users with proper government clearance, has grown markedly since its formal launch in 2006 and now averages more than 15,000 edits per day. It's home to 900,000 pages and 100,000 user accounts. "About everything that happens of significance, there's an Intellipedia page on," Dennehy said. Intellipedia sprung from a 2004 paper by CIA employee Calvin Andrus titled "The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community." NERINT 59

60 Dennehy listened to a presentation by Andrus and recalled the skepticism among colleagues about adapting Wikipedia to the intelligence community. He shared their skepticism. "But something he said interested me enough to look into it further," Dennehy said. Context was also a factor. After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, intelligence agencies had come under intense criticism for failing to pull together disparate strands of information pointing to the possibility of a major incident. "We were all doing it in stovepipes," Dennehy said. Dennehy described 9/11 not so much as a catalyst but as a selling point to explain how Intellipedia could help collate information. "Cal used 9/11 as a backdrop," said Dennehy. "It was really more about what was happening on the Web." In 2005, Dennehy was given the job of leading the effort and persuading the intelligence community to use it, a task likened to "promoting vegetarianism in Texas" by the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit group devoted to improving the federal government. Iran, U.S.: The Intelligence Problem Stratfor 04/09/2009 Despite on-again, off-again rumors of an American or Israeli airstrike against Iran, considerable challenges remain for carrying out such a campaign. Among them is the problem of gathering and sifting through the intelligence on Iran s nuclear efforts while Tehran engages in a concerted effort to deny and deceive. It all turns on the unknowns. Talk of an American air campaign against Iran to degrade the country s nuclear efforts has surfaced and resurfaced for years now. One of the reasons such a campaign has not happened, despite the preponderance of American air power, is Tehran s extensive list of retaliatory options. Sitting astride one of the world s biggest energy bottlenecks, Iran could mine the Strait of Hormuz and target supertankers with anti-ship missiles. It could also use its influence in Iraq to destabilize the country and its proxies in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip to stir up trouble for Israel (and even conduct terrorist strikes around the world). But just as important a consideration for a potential air campaign is the problem of intelligence and targeting. Tehran watched how the international community the United States and Israel in particular dealt with Saddam Hussein s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. The lessons of Israel s strike on Iraq s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and the series of U.S. air campaigns from Operation Desert Storm in 1991 to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 were not lost on Iran. In pursuing its nuclear efforts, Tehran has sought not only to harden key facilities and build more redundancy into its program but also to obscure those efforts and deceive those who are watching. This presents a series of critical problems for the international community: how to destroy hardened facilities, how to assemble a target set and how to parse through Iran s sophisticated deception operations. Hardening In the late 1980s, Hussein was able to build a series of bunkers outside Baghdad to withstand the United States most capable conventional bunker-buster warhead, which was then the BLU-109. In 1991, early in the six-week air campaign of Desert Storm, the United States discovered that its concerns were well founded. The BLU-109s, fitted with precision guidance kits, were not succeeding in destroying these bunkers. Over the course of two weeks, and in the midst of the air campaign, the U.S. Air Force and the American defense industry were able to design, build, test and deploy in combat the BLU-113 hard-target penetrator, which did the trick against Hussein s bunkers. This is a lesson now nearly two decades old: Considerable additional hardening must be built into any facility if it is to have a chance of withstanding sustained bombardment. NERINT 60

61 Of course, any nuclear facility Iran was going to invest significant resources in would be designed or retrofitted principally with an American attack (or an Israeli attack with American weapons) in mind, so the documented capabilities of the U.S. bunker-busting arsenal would be a principal design consideration. Indeed, unlike Iraq, Iran has mountainous terrain, which is far more appropriate for burying facilities than the desert terrain of Iraq. Nevertheless, prudence and the Iraqi example would both argue for considerable additional hardening to account for a potentially classified and more powerful American weapon and to prepare for developments down the road. One such improvement now under development and likely to be accelerated is the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). The MOP offers impressive new capabilities in terms of destroying hardened and deeply buried facilities, and it will undoubtedly leave Tehran more concerned about the security of its facilities. But even the MOP has operational limitations. In any case, even if development is accelerated and goes smoothly, the MOP will not be deployable until the summer of And at that point, the United States may have only a few in its arsenal perhaps not enough for multiple attempts to destroy multiple facilities. (While the example of the BLU-113 certainly argues for an American ability to accelerate efforts in times of crisis, it is not clear how much more could be squeezed out of the MOP development program or what the maximum production capacity might be; unlike the BLU- 113, the MOP s principal design consideration has not been expediency.) Ultimately, the problem comes down to the unknown. Despite its formidable arsenal and ability to project air power, the United States simply does not know to what extent Iran has hardened its nuclear facilities. And this makes it difficult for the United States to have a high level of confidence in embarking on an air campaign against those facilities. The Target Set Some of Iran s nuclear facilities are indeed large, fixed and readily identifiable this is an inescapable reality for a nuclear program. Even when air-defense assets are dedicated to such facilities, the assets and facilities remain vulnerable to air power. This is particularly true of the industrial-scale facilities that are ostensibly involved in Iran s civilian nuclear power program. Though there is significant crossover between civilian and military efforts in nuclear development, the capability to enrich uranium on a scale sufficient to fuel a reactor capable of generating a gigawatt of power requires large facilities that are generally connected to an established transportation and power infrastructure, which cannot be completely hidden from the prying eyes of space-based reconnaissance satellites. And space-based reconnaissance is a foundational strength of American intelligence. Some of Iran s facilities, like centrifuge halls at Natanz, are thought to be buried and significantly hardened. The reactor at Bushehr, however, is above ground and vulnerable to even conventional bombing. But while some significant targets in Iran are readily identifiable and unmovable, many are not. Research and development associated with a limited, clandestine nuclear weaponization effort can be smaller and better concealed than industrialscale facilities for nuclear-power generation. Some work can be conducted out of completely unrelated research facilities, and other work may even be possible to do in multiple places with a minimal trail for satellites to track. Work on the lensing of high-quality explosives necessary for an implosion-type warhead, for example, need not entail a massive, high-profile facility. Moreover, to truly degrade a nuclear program, it is perhaps even more important to target the actual human expertise the individual scientists and engineers who make it all happen. Finding out who and where these people are at any given time depends on other forms of intelligence-gathering. This is not to underestimate American intelligence capabilities. U.S. space-based assets, imagery and analysis are the most advanced in the world. But imagery is only one component of the intelligence collection process, and must be complemented by other NERINT 61

62 sources of information, especially when it comes to identifying what goes on within a facility deep inside Iran. Unfortunately for Washington, its human-source network in Iran is not thought to be very strong. Though complemented by what is almost certainly a more robust Israeli human-intelligence effort in Iran, the U.S. effort still must confront the challenges of Iranian deception and counterintelligence. Any human intelligence collection effort faces complex challenges, and deception is always one of them. And Iran has developed particularly sophisticated methods and capabilities over the years, since the United States essentially lost its awareness on the ground in Iran in 1979 with the fall of the Shah and the rise of the Islamic republic. Overall, Iran has invested considerable effort in obscuring the true nature and status of its nuclear program, almost certainly pushing beyond efforts to physically conceal its facilities to actively and creatively generating misinformation about it. The challenge for an air campaign, then, is not simply tracking down the hidden facilities but dealing with the fact that any one piece of intelligence on the Iranian program may not be accurate at all. Intelligence Capabilities Iran commands capable and robust domestic and foreign intelligence services as well as internal security organs. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, the new republic had to dismantle the Shah s intelligence agency, the SAVAK (an Israeli-trained organization); build its own from scratch (the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS); and, at the same time, suppress internal dissent. While still getting on its feet, the MOIS was quickly forced to react to the invasion by Iraq, and the agency cut its teeth as a foreign intelligence service during the eight bloody years of the Iran-Iraq War. During the war, Tehran also created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which, in addition to having land, air and naval forces, took on a major foreign intelligence role. Together, the MOIS and IRGC have cultivated an array of Shiite Islamist groups in Iraq and supported proxies in Lebanon (most notably Hezbollah) and the Palestinian territories (Hamas). With the support of Iranian intelligence, Hezbollah went from being a terrorist group to a militia and in recent years has emerged as a force more powerful than the armed forces of the Lebanese state. More recently in Iraq, Tehran has been able to effectively utilize its Shiite proxies to ensure Shiite consolidation of the government in Baghdad. Despite having had no official diplomatic relations with the United States since 1979, Iran was able to manipulate matters as far away as Washington. Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi Shiite politician in exile who was in close contact with the architects of the invasion of Iraq within the Bush administration, was used by Iran to channel intelligence about Iraq s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction to the administration that fit its case for war. Tehran did not orchestrate the war, but it certainly pushed information to Washington that supported the case for war. The precise means and methods Iran is now using to cloud its own nuclear efforts are only partially clear. Facilities have likely been disguised, inspectors have probably been misled and front companies are almost certainly acquiring materials from abroad clandestinely. But what rises above all the well-founded suspicions is an unequivocal sense that Iran has long cultivated a sophisticated knack for denial and deception that enables it to obscure the true shape and nature of its nuclear program. Consequences Taken as a whole, Iran s efforts to both defend and obscure its nuclear program create a serious challenge for a U.S. air campaign. Tehran has dispersed the program across a country four times the size of Iraq with much more rugged terrain. With only a limited understanding of the status and disposition of the program and of Iran s efforts to weaponize it, and given the pervasive problem of Iranian disinformation, the United States will find it NERINT 62

63 difficult to properly estimate what an air campaign might accomplish. Certainly the Iranian program can be degraded, but it is almost impossible to know how much. And because Iran has significant options for reprisal when it comes to an air campaign asymmetric options that, for the most part, are difficult to degrade with air power the question of carrying out such a campaign turns on the unknowns. If Iran s nuclear program can be set back for a decade or so, then the United States may be willing to endure the costs of halting the program as it reaches a critical stage. If, on the other hand, the program can only be set back a few years, then the costs of the strike may well outweigh the potential benefits. In this environment of uncertainty, it will be hard for the Obama administration, with so many other problems on its plate including economic troubles that would be significantly exacerbated by an air campaign that leads to Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz to push forward with strikes unless they are absolutely necessary. Iran s lengthy list of retaliatory options and the unknowns surrounding its nuclear program make absolutely necessary something of a nebulous threshold. And the resulting inertia of the problem suggests a tendency to withhold action until the last possible minute. Howard, Va. Tech Join U.S. Intelligence Program Washington Post 07/09/2009 Howard University and Virginia Tech have joined forces in a $2.5 million academic program funded by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence designed to teach undergraduates skills that are critically needed by the nation's intelligence agencies. The aim of the program receiving the five-year grant is to develop a pipeline of graduates "who will come to work for us," said Ronald Sanders, the chief human capital officer for the intelligence community. This will not be novel on the campuses of the two schools because both have ROTC programs. Howard has Army and Air Force units, and Virginia Tech has units from all three services. The grant was announced last week by Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair at the national annual conference of the White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities. Blair said two other historically black colleges in addition to Howard were joining the intelligence program for the first time: Florida A&M University and Miles College, near Birmingham, Ala. Speaking to an audience that included a large number of black educators, Blair said intelligence agencies are recruiting on campuses of all black colleges and universities. He called on those present, whether in the intelligence program or not, "to encourage your best graduates to come think about us when they're thinking about where they go in their professions." Howard and Virginia Tech join 19 other colleges and universities in the DNI's Centers of Academic Excellence program aimed at developing national security studies that support critical skills needed by intelligence agencies. Begun in 2004, it provides grants to institutions that agree to design, develop or reshape their curricula with courses that teach competence in regional and international issues, cultural awareness and languages needed by intelligence specialists. The DNI grants last five years, but part of joining the program is a commitment by the institutions involved to continue the national security courses after the money ends. Lenora Peters Gant, who founded and directs the DNI centers program, said in an interview that the Howard-Virginia Tech program would focus on engineering and science, with some of the new courses held through video conferencing that would reach students at both schools. One element of the program is a special overseas experience for so-called intelligence community scholars who take the national security courses at the colleges. It involves a 10-to-14-day stay in a foreign country with an itinerary worked out by the scholar's home university. Although the overseas program might involve getting assistance from U.S. embassies abroad, the intelligence community plays no part, Sanders said. Recent NERINT 63

64 intelligence community scholars traveled to China, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, South Africa and Turkey, according to Blair. Sanders said there have been 600 intelligence community scholars selected to date, some of whom have received scholarships to aid in covering their college expenses. "It seems to be working," he said. However, he added, the amount of money in the program and the rate of placement of participants in the agency are classified. Both the House and Senate have approved language in the fiscal 2010 Defense authorization bill that would establish an Intelligence Reserve Officers Training program, much like those in the military. Getting on Board - How an Obscure Panel Could Fix the U.S. Intelligence Community Foreign Affairs 17/09/2009 Among the many issues U.S. President Barack Obama is grappling with early in his first term are some thorny intelligence problems. His director of national intelligence, Dennis Blair, and his CIA director, Leon Panetta, have clashed over their respective roles, the politically charged investigation of the CIA's involvement in the "enhanced" interrogation of terror suspects continues to generate controversy. Although Obama could clearly use some independent advice on these and other intelligence issues, he should be forgiven if he did not initially think of asking the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB). The board, one of the smallest and most obscure parts of the U.S. intelligence system, has not always, especially in recent years, distinguished itself in providing independent counsel to presidents on the larger issues affecting the organization of the intelligence community and some of the core technologies on which it depends. It has developed a reputation among the intelligence cognoscenti as either a cushy "do-nothing" panel or as a highly politicized cabal that meddles in the affairs of the professional intelligence community. Although there is some truth behind both views, the board is far from useless: over the decades, it has helped streamline the U.S. intelligence community and has pushed it to develop the technology crucial to the acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. Likewise, it would be a mistake to ignore it today. President Dwight Eisenhower established the board in 1956 as a bipartisan body that could serve as an independent source of advice on intelligence affairs. During the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations, the board fit that ideal. Its eight to ten members were prominent individuals with experience in the U.S. government and had the managerial or technical skills relevant to intelligence matters. These early panels, reflecting the intensifying technological race between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the growing sophistication of intelligence collection, tended to focus on the role of science and technology in intelligence. The PIAB is a unique presidential asset that, if properly employed, could help identify and meet the intelligence challenges that future presidents will face. From its inception through the end of the George W. Bush administration, the PIAB has been involved in almost every important intelligence issue. (There are a few notable exceptions, such as National Security Review 29, a major effort during the George H.W. Bush administration to reconcile future intelligence resources and requirements.) And it has made important recommendations: to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Attaché System, and the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology. It also suggested improving the operation of the Pentagon's National Reconnaissance Office. These recommendations have markedly improved the U.S. intelligence community. But it has also had its share of failures, particularly in recent years. The nadir of the PIAB began with the competitive intelligence analysis exercise it conceived during the Ford administration -- the "Team B" study that analyzed the Soviet threat. The problem was not so much with the basic concept of having analysts with different ideological perspectives examine the same intelligence to see if they reached different conclusions about Soviet strategic behavior. Indeed, the intelligence community's Team A and the independent Team B -- both of NERINT 64

65 which researched the accuracy of the Soviets' intercontinental ballistic missiles and analyzed their air defenses -- worked well together, despite their ideological disagreements. But the teams studying Soviet strategic objectives had a very different experience. Unlike the other two issues, which were highly technical and about which there was relatively hard intelligence data, the third issue was subjective and, not surprisingly, contentious, given that the hard-liners on Team B had long thought the intelligence community had downplayed the Soviet Union's malign intentions. This controversy cast a pall over the whole exercise, and the proceedings were leaked to the Boston Globe. Although he had reluctantly green-lighted the exercise, George H.W. Bush, then the director of the CIA, later complained at a National Security Council meeting in 1977, saying that "the competitive analysis idea seemed good at the time, and I certainly did not think it would go public. But now I feel I have been had." Although the Team B report itself remained classified for 16 years, the major conclusions of the panel became public during the first year of the Carter administration. Conservatives used the Team B report to support increases in defense spending and to solidify the image of the Soviet Union as an aggressive, expansionist power. The report accused the CIA of underestimating the Soviet threat by focusing too much on technical data at the expense of considering the history, strategy, society, and leadership of the Soviet Union. The leak had the effect of delegitimizing the PIAB in the eyes of subsequent administrations. As a result, Carter abolished the board altogether. During the 1980 presidential election, the Reagan campaign pointed to Carter's failure to reconstitute the PIAB as emblematic of his intelligence and foreign policy shortcomings. But this was more of a political ploy than an indication of President Ronald Reagan's support of the PIAB. And although Reagan did eventually revive the board a year after taking office, he filled it with many individuals who had little intelligence-related experience. This action set a precedent for future presidents, who would either minimize their use of the board (George H.W. Bush and, in his first term, George W. Bush) or further politicize it (Bill Clinton). Today, the Obama administration faces both challenges and opportunities in revitalizing the board. The enhanced power of the National Security Council staff and the intelligence community means that formidable bureaucratic obstacles stand in the way of allowing a part-time presidential advisory board to have much influence. But in the aftermath of the 9/11 intelligence failures that exposed the weaknesses of the current institutional arrangements, outside bodies can now play a significant role in redesigning them. Nothing could better illustrate this shift than the very different roles played by the PIAB during the first and second terms of the George W. Bush administration. In the first, the board was largely ineffectual, in part due to policy differences between Bush and the board's chair, Brent Scowcroft, over the Iraq War. But it was also ineffective because the Pentagon successfully resisted Scowcroft's proposal to remove the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office from the Department of Defense -- an effort to finally consolidate the intelligence community's resources under the director of Central Intelligence. Conversely, as pressure mounted during Bush's second term to reorganize the U.S. intelligence community, the board became much more influential. It stands to reason, therefore, that the board could once again help reshape the intelligence community -- provided that Obama demonstrates committed leadership and a willingness to appoint and listen to people with proven expertise. According to a well-placed former Obama campaign adviser, the administration has decided to create a real working board that would be directly responsible to the president, charged with advising him on contentious intelligence issues, such as the future of the Guantánamo detention facility, and acting as a venue for thinking about long-term efforts, such as further adjusting the structure for managing the U.S. intelligence community. NERINT 65

66 The White House appears interested in such a body, one filled with members who have backgrounds in intelligence, security, and economics. It drew up a lengthy list of possible appointees and has already whittled it down to fewer than 20. To avoid conflicts of interest and other problems that have plagued previous boards, the administration is also planning on instituting a set of ethics rules that will likely be the most substantial in the history of the PIAB. Former Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Nebr.), who supported Obama's campaign, has been mentioned as a possible co-chair of the board, along with former Senator David Boren (D- Okla.), who served as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Their appointments as co-chairs would be unprecedented but in keeping with the board's bipartisan tradition. The Obama administration faces some major policy challenges in the intelligence community, and the board can help. It has long been a proponent of transforming the intelligence community into a real community, rather than just a collection of bureaucratic fiefdoms, and it could provide the administration with advice and political cover to take the hard steps to finally make that happen. It could also evaluate the effectiveness of various collection methods, including detention and interrogation, in countering current and future threats while remaining within the boundaries of the U.S. government's legal rules and foreign policies. The PIAB is a unique presidential asset that, if properly employed, could help identify and meet the intelligence challenges that future presidents will face. It has been least successful when it was involved in day-to-day operational or crisis-management issues, or when it engaged in controversial political analyses such as the Team B exercise. It has been at its best when it looked ahead to anticipate future technological trends or international political developments. Obama has the chance to truly revitalize and empower the board. So far, it looks like he is on the right track. NERINT 66

67 C CLIPPING DE NOTÍCIAS COLÔMBIA 2005/10/31 Desmovilizar Al Das? El Tiempo 2009/09/12 Chuzadas Del Das Son Alarmantes: E.U. El Tiempo 2009/09/16 A Scandal Over Spying Intensifies in Colombia New York Times 2009/09/18 Uribe Dice Que Das Sería Dependencia De La Policía El Tiempo 2009/09/18 Presidente Quiere Acabar El Das El Tiempo 2009/09/22 La Historia Detrás De Chuzadas A Velásquez El Tiempo 2009/09/23 Después del DAS El Tiempo 2009/09/24 El servicio secreto de Uribe, contra las cuerdas El País 2009/09/25 DAS: disolución o reforma? El Tiempo NERINT 67

68 Desmovilizar Al Das? El Tiempo 31/10/2005 Después de leer la reveladora crónica que la revista Semana trae sobre la relación tan estrecha entre los paras y el DAS, es evidente que lo mejor que puede hacer el presidente Uribe no es cerrar esa agencia de inteligencia... sino desmovilizarla. La frase, que podría parecer una exageración digna del humor de Vladdo, es infortunadamente una realidad que le ha explotado al Gobierno en sus propias narices, y que este venía negando de manera taxativa en todos los foros nacionales e internacionales, aduciendo que se trataba de una campaña urdida por ciertas ONG interesadas en horadar la imagen del presidente Uribe y sus éxitos en la política de seguridad democrática. Dos años después, ya no se puede tapar el sol con las manos y la realidad es peor de lo que muchos presentíamos. Quién se iba a imaginar que mientras el DAS no tenía carros blindados para la seguridad del senador Germán Vargas, al otro día del atentado perpetrado contra él, los lugartenientes de jefes narcoparas buscados por la Policía y la DEA, como El Pájaro, sí contaran con un dispositivo de seguridad a su disposición, como bien lo reveló Semana. Casas fantasmas conocidas como oficinas, desde donde se les ofrece protección a los paras, se encaletan armas y se interceptan celulares. Miembros del DAS que borran historiales de los narcos y funcionarios que trabajan para los paramilitares y les sirven de ojo avizor para evitar ser capturados. Si este es el organismo encargado de proteger a nuestros precandidatos, por más afinada que salga de la Corte la Ley de Garantías, a lo que deberían aspirar los precandidatos es a tener siquiera la misma seguridad que se les proporciona en el DAS a los jefes paras. Con estas historias haciendo carrera por ahí, y que nadie puede desmentir, no es extraño que el Gobierno ande con la idea de cerrar ese chuzo. Sin embargo, la preocupación que deja este episodio es que el Gobierno del presidente Uribe crea o nos quiera hacer creer que el problema de la penetración narco-paramilitar en el Estado se circunscribe sólo al DAS. Lo digo, porque no veo que le preocupen mucho las denuncias que se hacen en su reino sobre la manera avasalladora como los narco-paras están interviniendo en casi todos los escenarios políticos y sociales de este país. Hasta el momento, todas las denuncias que se hacen en ese sentido han caído en saco roto. Comenzando por las planteadas por el ex presidente César Gaviria en torno a la forma como estos señores de la guerra han influido en el proceso electoral apoyando a candidatos impuestos por ellos. La senadora Piedad Córdoba también ha denunciado el caso específico de que el señor Habib Merek ha sido impuesto como candidato de un jefe paramilitar, pero la denuncia no ha ameritado mayor preocupación por parte del jefe del partido de la U, Juan Manuel Santos. Desde Palacio, estas denuncias son recibidas con desgano y solo se atina a decir que esta campaña va a ser histórica, porque todos los candidatos van a tener plenas garantías. No les importa que luego de esta afirmación hecha por el consejero José Obdulio Gaviria, en la cárcel de Itagüí, algunos días después se realizara una manifestación de los desmovilizados en favor de su jefe, el señor Berna, y se le proclamara a la semana siguiente en otra reunión en Medellín amo y señor de los narco-paramilitares que quieren meterse en política. Ni siquiera a los uribistas les han puesto bolas en sus denuncias. Ahí está lo que hizo Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez, desde la trinchera cada vez más estrecha del uribismo urbano en el sentido de que un jefe paramilitar le advirtió que como él tenía su propio candidato ella no podía hacer política en su territorio. Si Nancy Patricia no puede hacer proselitismo, pero los desmovilizados de don Berna sí, el que está quedando derrotado es el uribismo urbano. NERINT 68

69 Ojalá al Presidente no le pase en estas elecciones lo mismo que con el DAS y se apersone del tema antes de que sea tarde y que el jefe del Congreso termine siendo Berna. Chuzadas Del Das Son Alarmantes: E.U. El Tiempo 12/09/2009 El escándalo de las chuzadas y seguimientos ilegales del DAS a políticos, periodistas y magistrados empezó a causar ruido en las relaciones de Colombia con Estados Unidos, a tal punto que ayer el Departamento de Estado hizo un fuerte reclamo y demandó una investigación. Paralelamente, EL TIEMPO conoció que en el Senado hace trámite un proyecto que condiciona la entrega de fondos para el organismo de Inteligencia. En su primera declaración sobre las grabaciones ilegales, el Departamento de Estado las consideró alarmantes e inaceptables y pidió resultados en las investigaciones. (Sabemos) la importancia que le ha dado la Fiscalía a investigar esos crímenes dice un comunicado, pero reportes de prensa y ONG indican que las actividades ilegales continúan, lo cual vuelve más vital que el Gobierno colombiano dé pasos para asegurar que este no sea el caso y (que) la Fiscalía adelante una investigación rigurosa, exhaustiva e independiente, que determine el alcance de estos abusos y castigue a los responsables. En el mismo documento, Washington anunció que, aunque con serias objeciones, certificó el desempeño de Colombia en materia de Derechos Humanos y dio vía libre al desembolso de unos 32 millones de dólares que estaban pendientes y que corresponden al año fiscal Se trata de la primera certificación en la era Obama. El Gobierno colombiano ha hecho esfuerzos significativos para mejorar la seguridad y promover el respeto por los DD.HH. de las Fuerzas Armadas (...), señala. Pero, acto seguido, anota que los casos de ejecuciones extrajudiciales demuestran que las reformas no han penetrado lo suficiente. Aunque destaca que se haya destituido e investigado a cerca de 75 militares por el caso de los jóvenes desaparecidos en Soacha, el Departamento de Estado asegura que no se trata de un caso aislado y afirma que se requieren medidas adicionales para resolver y eliminar el problema. Felipe Muñoz, director del DAS, dijo ser el primer interesado en que las investigaciones lleguen hasta las últimas consecuencias y anunció que el próximo mes espera viajar a E.U. para dar las explicaciones (ver nota anexa). Ayuda con condiciones La preocupación no es sólo del Gobierno Obama. Según pudo establecer este diario, tanto las chuzadas como los llamados falsos positivos ya comenzaron a tener un impacto en el Congreso, en el que hace carrera una iniciativa que le pide a la Secretaria de Estado revisar el tema antes de hacer cualquier desembolso. El condicionamiento está incluido en el proyecto de presupuesto para las Operaciones en el Exterior 2010, que hace trámite por la Cámara Alta y que tendrá que ser conciliado con el texto que ya se aprobó en la Cámara. El Comité está preocupado porque el Ejército se ha visto implicado en un patrón de asesinatos extrajudiciales de civiles. Aunque el Ministerio de Defensa ha dado pasos para prevenir estos crímenes, pocos oficiales han sido castigados. También hay reportes de que el DAS está espiando ilegalmente a defensores de DD.HH., jueces, periodistas y otros, dice el proyecto. El informe añade que mantendrá los condicionamientos que existen para el desembolso de hasta el 30 por ciento de la ayuda militar e incluirá nuevas restricciones en el caso del DAS, lo cual sería la primera vez que se establecen exigencias para entrega de la ayuda a esta institución. Aunque el monto que recibe el DAS de E.U. es pequeño (menos de US$10 millones), es muy simbólico y podrá entorpecer el intercambio de inteligencia con esta entidad. Y dado que depende de la Presidencia, puede provocar más fisuras con el Congreso, donde está en juego la continuidad del Plan Colombia y del TLC. NERINT 69

70 Suspenden viaje a Washington EL TIEMPO conoció que el Gobierno tenía planeada una visita a Washington la próxima semana, con el nuevo director del DAS a bordo, pero esta tuvo que ser pospuesta. E.U., dicen fuentes oficiales del Legislativo, está tremendamente preocupado por recientes revelaciones que demostrarían que el DAS ha espiado conversaciones hasta de funcionarios de este país. No hay ambiente para una visita en estos momentos. Desde que E.U. comenzó con el Plan Colombia en el hay una lista de exigencias que amarran el desembolso de los fondos militares a un certificado de buena conducta, que debe expedir el Departamento de Estado. En otras palabras, de los 150 millones de dólares que reciben las Fuerzas Armadas, unos 32 dependen de esa certificación. Como consecuencia de los señalamientos al Ejército, por las ejecuciones extrajudiciales, el Senado ha venido frenando la ayuda militar en los últimos tres años. De hecho, apenas acaba de levantar el veto que pesaba sobre 52,5 millones de dólares del 2007 y permanecen en el congelador otros 19 millones del Se preve, además, que los 32 millones que acaba de autorizar el Departamento de Estado sean bloqueados nuevamente en el Senado. ''Reportes de prensa y ONG indican que las actividades ilegales continúan, lo cual vuelve más vital que el Gobierno colombiano dé pasos para asegurar que este no sea el caso y (que) la Fiscalía adelante una investigación rigurosa, exhaustiva e independiente. Señala un informe del Senado de los Estados Unidos A Scandal Over Spying Intensifies in Colombia New York Times 16/09/2009 President Álvaro Uribe, the top ally of the United States in Latin America, is enmeshed in a scandal over growing evidence that his main intelligence agency carried out an extensive illegal spying operation focused on his leading critics, including members of the Supreme Court, opposition politicians, human rights workers and journalists. The scandal, which has unfolded over months, intensified in recent weeks with the disclosure of an audio intercept of a top official at the United States Embassy. Semana, a respected news magazine, obtained an intercept of a routine phone call between James Faulkner, the embassy s legal attaché, and a Supreme Court justice investigating ties of Mr. Uribe s political supporters to paramilitary death squads. Other recordings obtained in investigations by journalists and prosecutors point to resilient multiyear efforts to spy on Mr. Uribe s major critics by the Department of Administrative Security, a 6,500-employee intelligence agency possibly South America s largest that operates directly under the authority of the president s office. The agency, known widely by the acronym DAS, has been the focus of accusations of illegal spying before. But this case is sowing fear among Mr. Uribe s critics in the political elite, coming as the president, a conservative populist, presses ahead with a project to secure a third term. While Mr. Uribe is ideologically isolated on a continent that has shifted to the left, he is following the example of neighbors who have changed their constitutions to remain in office, like Venezuela s president, Hugo Chávez, and Ecuador s, Rafael Correa. Uribe is seriously weakening Colombia s democracy, said Ramiro Bejarano, a lawyer and opposition leader who was a director of DAS in the 1990s. Earlier this year, Semana obtained recordings, transcripts of intercepts and other files from current and former DAS employees that showed that Mr. Bejarano was among several senior opposition leaders whose phones were illegally tapped by DAS. Five appointees have led DAS since Mr. Uribe came to power in The first four resigned amid claims of illegal surveillance and are being formally investigated by Colombia s attorney general. The accusations against Mr. Uribe s first DAS director, Jorge Noguera, are the most serious. He is charged with organizing the murders of three trade union activists and a well- NERINT 70

71 known sociologist, Alfredo Correa d Andreis. The charges are based on reports that under his leadership, DAS gave paramilitary leaders their names on an assassination list. Mr. Noguera stepped down in 2005, when Mr. Uribe appointed him consul in Milan. Mr. Noguera has since left that position, and the government has distanced itself from him. But all of Mr. Noguera s successors including the current director, Felipe Muñoz, are under scrutiny over reports of irregularities, notably wiretaps, which are illegal in Colombia without a court order. Some of the most recent disclosed intercepts were recorded just weeks ago. Others were made over several years earlier this decade. For instance, the Special Intelligence Group, a secret DAS unit also known as G-3, operated into 2006 and focused on monitoring human rights groups critical of Mr. Uribe s government, like the Colombian Commission of Jurists and the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective. Chills went down my spine when I discovered the lengths that DAS went through to watch my every movement, said Alirio Uribe, a human rights lawyer (no relation to President Uribe) for the José Alvear Restrepo Collective who, through prosecutors investigations and congressional testimony, gained access to part of the file that G-3 kept on him and his wife and children. He compared what he saw in the file, which included photos of his children, transcripts of phone and conversations, details on his finances and evidence that DAS agents rented an apartment across from his home to monitor him, to The Lives of Others, the Academy Award-winning 2006 German film about Stasi surveillance in East Germany. The DAS was searching for evidence that we received money from the guerrillas, and of course they found none because there was none to find, Mr. Uribe said. What does this say about our society and our form of government if the president s own intelligence service deems NGO s its enemies and fit for violations of this kind?. A spokesman for Mr. Uribe declined to comment, referring queries to Mr. Muñoz, a former urban planning official who became director of DAS this year. In an interview near Bogotá s old center at DAS s bunkeresque headquarters, which were rebuilt after being gutted in a 1989 bombing attack by drug traffickers, Mr. Muñoz grimly acknowledged the possibility that surveillance irregularities had occurred earlier this decade. He said he was leading the most profound reorganization of DAS since its founding in the 1950s, with plans to cut the agency s work force by as much as half to focus on intelligence, counterintelligence and border control. Reflecting the legacy of presidents who strengthened DAS at the expense of other institutions, the agency still carries out a broad range of activities, including registration of foreigners, providing bodyguards to 500 people considered at risk of assassination and serving as Interpol s headquarters in Colombia. DAS s secret police unit also competes with other Colombian intelligence agencies, including the Finance Ministry s financial crimes division, in carrying out investigations. The sprawling nature of DAS s operations may have allowed some of its agents to sell intelligence to the private armies that have plagued Colombia during its four-decade war, or otherwise be infiltrated by paramilitary and guerrilla operatives. In one case investigated by Semana, a computer that had been used last year by rebels from the National Liberation Army held detailed information collected by DAS on the military plans against the group. Mr. Muñoz said he preferred to comment on claims of irregularities since he took over the agency. He said an investigation of the recent intercepts was under way, and suggested that rogue agents might be seeking to thwart his overhaul. There may be people interested in countering the reforms, he said. For the United States, which works closely with DAS on many intelligence-gathering issues, the scandal complicates its warm relations with Mr. Uribe s government, the recipient of more than $5 billion in security aid from Washington this decade. Ian C. Kelly, a State Department spokesman, said last week that the accusations of illegal wiretapping were troubling and unacceptable. But in the same statement, he said Colombia s human rights record was satisfactory enough to meet standards allowing Mr. Uribe s government to receive NERINT 71

72 all of the military assistance included in the $545 million in American aid that Colombia was set to receive this year. Uribe Dice Que Das Sería Dependencia De La Policía El Tiempo 18/09/2009 En una institución que prestaría servicios migratorios y de inteligencia, y que sería manejada por la Policía, podría quedar convertido el Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS). Así lo anunció ayer el presidente Álvaro Uribe durante el conversatorio Presidente: tengo una pregunta, realizado en el Gimnasio Moderno de Bogotá. Ante más de 400 colegiales y universitarios, Uribe aseguró que el Gobierno está trabajando de frente en la reforma profunda del DAS. Yo soy partidario de eliminar la institución y de dejar una pequeña prestando unos servicios migratorios, de inteligencia, que pueda ser manejada por la Policía, aseguró. Y agregó que en la tarea de esta reforma de fondo, que parte de la base de eliminar el DAS, nos encontramos en este momento. Aunque el tema ya había sido planteado por el ex ministro de Defensa Juan Manuel Santos, el Gobierno lo había negado. El pasado 24 de febrero, desde Washington, Santos se refirió al DAS y afirmó que el paciente está demasiado enfermo y de pronto es mejor darle cristiana sepultura. Las palabras de Santos se dieron luego de los cuestionamientos que recibió el organismo de inteligencia del Estado por los seguimientos ilegales denunciados por la prensa. Tras las declaraciones del ex ministro, el DAS, con la anuencia del Gobierno, emitió un comunicado en que negaba que en el Ejecutivo se estuviera contemplando ese escenario. El Gobierno Nacional no ha pensado en la posibilidad de cerrar la institución (...) Antes de pensar en cerrar el DAS, se está buscando darles solución a los problemas que actualmente enfrenta la institución. Sin embargo, las palabras de ayer de Uribe parecen darle el puntillazo final. Durante el encuentro de ayer, Uribe se mostró sonriente y complaciente con los colegiales y universitarios que vinieron de distintas partes del país para reunirse con él. Uribe aprovechó la cita para reafirmar que la preocupación de Colombia es la recuperación de orden público interno y no una carrera armamentista. Uribe sonrió cuando le indagaron sobre sus intenciones de una posible nueva reelección, lo que ocurrió en más de una ocasión. No es la primera vez que el presidente Álvaro Uribe advierte que transformará el DAS. El pasado 30 de agosto, a raíz de nuevas publicaciones de prensa en las que se dio cuenta de otras posibles irregularidades, el mandatario habló de una reforma que le permitiría al Estado contar con una agencia dedicada a la diligencia estratégica y prospectiva del país. Presidente Quiere Acabar El Das 23/09/2009 En el conversatorio Presidente: tengo una pregunta, en el cual respondió a cuestionamientos de más de 400 universitarios y colegiales, el presidente Álvaro Uribe revivió la idea de eliminar el DAS, envuelto en constantes escándalos en los últimos años. El mandatario, quien había planteado la misma idea el 30 de agosto, reveló que es partidario de dejar una pequeña parte de esa entidad para los servicios migratorios y que los de inteligencia los maneje la Policía. Curiosamente, en febrero, el ex ministro de Defensa Juan Manuel Santos dijo desde Washington que el paciente (el DAS) está demasiado enfermo y de pronto es mejor darle cristiana sepultura. Sin embargo, con la anuencia del Gobierno, el mismo DAS emitió entonces un comunicado que negaba que se estuviera contemplando esa posibilidad. La Historia Detrás De Chuzadas A Velásquez El Tiempo 22/09/2009 A partir de la denuncia de un comerciante que estaba siendo extorsionado, el teléfono móvil del magistrado auxiliar Iván Velásquez, investigador estrella de la parapolítica, terminó interceptado. NERINT 72

73 El comerciante instauró la denuncia en la URI de Paloquemao en Bogotá y dijo que un hombre que se identificó como El boyaco, del frente 42 de las Farc, lo llamó y le exigió 5 millones de pesos en tarjetas prepago y en medicinas. Según la Fiscalía, el comerciante afirmó que luego un informante le dio dos números de celular de sospechosos de la extorsión y que a partir de eso el fiscal del caso pidió la interceptación de esos números. Uno de ellos resultó ser el del magistrado Velásquez. El 11 y 15 de agosto pasados, una investigadora del CTI habría escuchado las conversaciones de Velásquez sin saber de quién se trataba, y habría pedido la cancelación de la interceptación tras considerar que la persona escuchada no tenía que ver con la extorsión. Sospechosamente, el 19 de agosto el teléfono del Magistrado fue interceptado de nuevo. Esa vez fue por una denuncia por secuestro ante el Gaula de la Policía, en Fusagasugá. Después de seis días de escuchar a Velásquez, el investigador asignado al caso habría llegado a la misma conclusión que la agente del CTI. Ayer, cuando los llamaron para que explicaran las interceptaciones, los dos fiscales se habrían sorprendido al saber que habían escuchado al magistrado Velásquez. Quién, por qué y para qué dio el número celular del Magistrado?, son las preguntas que rondan hoy la investigación de las autoridades. Se usaron órdenes legales para escuchar ilegalmente, reconoció ayer el fiscal general (e.), Guillermo Mendoza. La Fiscalía y la Policía buscan al informante del Llano que habría dado los números al comerciante que denunció extorsión. Hace justamente tres semanas se conoció una interceptación a Velásquez cuando hablaba con un alto funcionario de la embajada de E.U., lo que provocó gran preocupación entre las autoridades de ese país. Y el pasado fin de semana, el presidente Álvaro Uribe denunció que había un complot para interceptar y desprestigiar al Gobierno y al DAS. Anoche, la Casa de Nariño expidió un comunicado en el que dijo: Afortunadamente se empieza a esclarecer la verdad que desvirtúa la infamia contra el Gobierno Nacional. Como siempre, el Gobierno apoya el curso de esta investigación que adelanta la Fiscalía General, para que se llegue al origen delictivo que ha generado las interceptaciones ilegales. También, al conocer las revelaciones de la Fiscalía, el vicepresidente Francisco Santos dijo que esto es el comienzo del descubrimiento de una gran campaña de desprestigio muy bien orquestada, muy bien pagada. Y añadió: Los medios se han dejado manipular y eso pone en tela de juicio todo lo publicado (...) sobre las interceptaciones. Precisamente ayer, el director del DAS, Felipe Muñoz, entregó las conclusiones de Sergei Koval, un experto ruso en acústica forense que analizó las últimas chuzadas reveladas por la revista Semana a comienzos de agosto, y quien determinó que estas no se hicieron desde el DAS. Koval y Muñoz mostraron las gráficas del análisis y la conclusión a la que llegaron es que las curvas acústicas están más cercas a un equipo fijo, como una plataforma, que a las de un equipo de interceptación móvil, como los que tiene el DAS. Las grabaciones publicadas por el medio de comunicación son de excelente calidad y los equipos móviles de monitoreo con los que cuenta el DAS no permiten una calidad auditiva óptima, dice el informe Después del DAS El Tiempo 23/09/2009 El sorpresivo anuncio hecho por el presidente Álvaro Uribe la semana pasada, en el sentido de expedirle partida de defunción al Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), ha sido recibido por muchos como el desenlace lógico de una historia llena de escándalos. Episodios recientes, conocidos y preocupantes, como la infiltración paramilitar del organismo, el seguimiento de personajes públicos y la intervención telefónica de opositores del Gobierno hicieron imposible su supervivencia. Pero, más allá de las graves implicaciones que han traído los líos por corrupción de la institución -cuyos responsables deben ser investigados y castigados ejemplarmente-, hay que NERINT 73

74 preguntarse qué viene. Y es que, si bien es clave buscar la verdad tras estos deplorables hechos, lo que ha sucedido es que no se ha emprendido la tarea de reforma de fondo que requiere no solo el DAS, sino el sistema de inteligencia del país como un todo. Por ejemplo, resulta paradójico que, mientras el tema de las 'chuzadas' estaba en pleno auge, en el Congreso de la República se discutiera la llamada ley de inteligencia, que fue sancionada en marzo pasado por el Presidente de la República. Lamentablemente, en esta a duras penas se plantearon unas reglas de juego generales para dicha función, unos mecanismos de control interno y político de la misma y un dispositivo de coordinación entre organismos. En este caso no se tocaron temas básicos e inaplazables, como un marco mínimo de definiciones que permita, para empezar, establecer qué quiere decir "inteligencia estratégica", que supuestamente será la misión exclusiva de la agencia que reemplace al DAS a partir del próximo primero de enero. Tampoco se avanzó en el eterno problema de la duplicidad de misiones entre las entidades estatales que hacen trabajos similares, pues no se determinaron los ámbitos de acción de estas. Y lo más paradójico es que la norma, si bien tocó el asunto de los controles externos, al crear la Comisión Legal Parlamentaria para el Seguimiento a las Actividades de Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia -que no se sabe si se ha conformado o no-, no se ocupó del de las interceptaciones. Por ejemplo, en el caso de España, a raíz de un escándalo de escuchas ilegales, se introdujo un mecanismo de control judicial previo, en el cual un magistrado especial de la Sala Penal del Tribunal Supremo autoriza a las agencias de inteligencia para ejecutar ciertas acciones encubiertas, en especial la interceptación de comunicaciones. Es de suponer que, dada la creciente pugnacidad entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia y el Ejecutivo, una propuesta de esta índole no sería considerada en Colombia. Sin embargo, además de debatir en dónde reside la responsabilidad de dicha labor, es indudable que las atribuciones deben quedar definidas claramente, tanto para evitar abusos, como para castigarlos. De lo contrario, existe el peligro de perpetuar un esquema que hace agua hace tiempo y que viene siendo usado de manera creciente para propósitos criminales de todo tipo. Sin entrar en el debate de si existe una conspiración o no, de lo que no hay duda es del desorden reinante. Así lo comprueba el más reciente episodio, que involucra a la Fiscalía General y que demuestra que no basta con cerrar el DAS para acabar con las 'chuzadas'. Por tal motivo, aparte de crear una nueva agencia que no se sabe muy bien a qué servirá, falta sin duda un debate profundo y técnico sobre la función de inteligencia en sus distintos niveles (táctica, operativa y estratégica) y saber a cargo de quién está cada una, incluyendo la inteligencia exterior, que cada día es más necesaria para la seguridad nacional. Eso, y no cambiarle de nombre a la institución que genera los escándalos, es lo que necesita el país cuanto antes. El servicio secreto de Uribe, contra las cuerdas El País 24/09/2009 Tres meses; ése es el plazo que ha fijado el Gobierno de Colombia para que desaparezca el Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad -DAS, la agencia de inteligencia del Estado- y en su lugar nazca otro ente encargado de "producir inteligencia y contrainteligencia" para garantizar la seguridad nacional. Otras labores pasarán a ser competencia de distintos organismos, como la dirección de la policía y la fiscalía. El Gobierno sale el paso así a más de cinco años de escándalos que involucran a esta entidad, dependiente de Presidencia, en graves hechos: alianzas con narcotraficantes y paramilitares -el DAS, entre otros, pasó información a los paramilitares sobre sindicalistas y defensores de derechos humanos asesinados más tarde-, interceptaciones telefónicas NERINT 74

75 (chuzadas) y seguimientos a políticos, periodistas, magistrados de los altos tribunales y defensores de derechos humanos. La preocupación mostrada desde Washington y desde la ONU por las chuzadas -escándalo que salió a la luz a comienzos del año- fue el punto de inflexión. Hace pocos días, el Departamento de Estado las consideró "alarmantes e inaceptables" y pidió encontrar a los culpables. Cuatro ex directores del DAS están vinculados a la investigación y 11 funcionarios han sido detenidos. Dos de ellos, los jefes de inteligencia y contrainteligencia, han quedado en libertad por fallos de procedimiento. El vienes pasado, la alta comisionada de la ONU para los Derechos Humanos, Navy Pillay, pidió al presidente, Álvaro Uribe, los archivos recaudados por el organismo de inteligencia sobre Naciones Unidas. Existen serias sospechas de que en 2005 le siguieron los pasos al relator especial de la ONU para los pueblos indígenas en su visita a Colombia en Según el presidente Uribe, las últimas chuzadas denunciadas no las hizo el DAS; forman parte, aseguró, de un complot criminal contra Colombia. Ya se sabe que las interceptaciones, de agosto pasado, al magistrado investigador estrella en el escándalo del maridaje políticaparamilitarismo fueron hechas desde la fiscalía. Un fiscal y tres miembros de la policía se encuentran hoy en el punto de mira de la justicia. Esta semana se supo que la Procuraduría -Ministerio Público- tenía equipos para hacer grabaciones. Las investigaciones por las escuchas se extendieron ya a empresas e importadoras que venden servicios y equipos para espiar. El fin del DAS, con 56 años de historia, anunciado el viernes por la noche, causó revuelo y dividió a la opinión pública. "Para salvar el DAS, lo único que había que hacer era que desde Palacio sede del Gobierno de la República de Colombia] no se siguieran ordenando las chuzadas", dijo de inmediato el presidente del Partido Liberal y ex presidente César Gaviria. "Es maquillaje", comentó Gustavo Petro, del Polo Democrático Alternativo y una de las víctimas de chuzadas y seguimientos. El DAS no es el único organismo que ha desaparecido en los siete años de Gobierno de Uribe. Si el presidente logra mantenerse en el poder durante tres periodos continuados -la segunda reelección le posibilitaría 12 años consecutivos-, a los niños que nacieron con su Gobierno el país de antes les sonará completamente ajeno. Uribe fundió ministerios -por ejemplo, el de Interior y Justicia- y liquidó entidades emblemáticas, como el Seguro Social y la Caja Agraria. Es posible también que se siga desdibujando uno de los partidos que fueron hegemónicos desde el nacimiento de la República: el Conservador, que podría terminar refundiéndose completamente en el uribismo. Una reciente reforma permitió a los políticos en un lapso corto de tiempo cambiar de partido. Las siete agrupaciones que conformaron el uribismo se refundieron en dos: el partido de la U y el Conservador. DAS: disolución o reforma? El Tiempo 25/09/2009 Lo que conviene tomar como punto de partida frente a la crisis del organismo duramente cuestionado -y con razón- por el uso indebido de atribuciones autoadjudicadas, es arrojar claridad sobre la función de inteligencia estratégica para la cual existe y debe prepararse adecuadamente. Los múltiples comentarios, columnas de prensa y discusiones políticas de alto nivel indican por lo general desconocimiento del sentido mismo del término. Dentro del vasto universo de la Inteligencia, así con mayúscula, tanto militar como política, entendida como el esfuerzo del Estado por identificar y detectar las amenazas contra la nación que gobierna, el ámbito estratégico es el que cubre riesgos, peligros, amenazas externas. O sea, precisamente, el que corresponde al DAS o sus organismos equivalentes en cualquier nación que disponga del instrumento legal y los medios necesarios para esta tarea vital. Se advierte en el accionar del DAS, no de ahora sino de los últimos años, la desfiguración funcional y su extensión a misiones internas en un todo ajenas a lo que le es NERINT 75

76 propio. Servicio de escoltas, funciones de política interior, vigilancia de sospechosos de atentar contra el Estado de Derecho, lo único que consiguen es desviar la institución de su función primaria y llevarla a convertirse en organismo político partidista o a colocarse al servicio de intereses electorales, obsesión final de los aspirantes a cargos de elección popular. De semejantes mixturas y desviaciones, la resultante final es el desprestigio, el descrédito, la desconfianza pública, que lo tornan inoperante y corrupto. De estas premisas se puede partir hacia el examen desapasionado y objetivo de la situación actual del DAS. De este escrutinio no pueden omitirse elementos históricos de lo que ha sido el servicio de inteligencia en épocas recientes, tomando como base el inmediato antecesor del DAS, famoso, pero no exactamente por el acertado desempeño de su función natural, sino por el carácter represivo de su esfuerzo, centrado en el orden interno, afectado por la política sectaria. Nos referimos al SIC (Servicio de Inteligencia Colombiano). El presidente Alberto Lleras Camargo, al asumir el gobierno del Frente Nacional, reestructuró el organismo, comenzando por darle su nombre actual. Su primer director fue el coronel en retiro del Ejército, oficial de extraordinarias capacidades, profesional íntegro y un estudioso de las ciencias militares, entre estas la Inteligencia en sus diversas funciones y actividades. El DAS nació, pues, como órgano profesional sólido, cimentado en principios éticos, eficiente y confiable, dependiente en forma directa del Presidente. De este primer capítulo, que se perpetuó en forma de tradición, se deriva la primera y quizá más importante lección. El DAS no se les puede entregar a políticos impreparados, sino a personas capacitadas que cumplan sus delicadas funciones -y las hagan cumplir a sus subordinados- con los criterios y brillantez de su fundador. Segunda lección: no debe burocratizarse ni convertirse en fortín político porque pierde su eficiencia, equivoca sus funciones y termina por caer en los abismos que hoy producen -o pueden producir- su desintegración. No tanto por la ineficiencia y corrupción que lo invaden, sino por la pérdida del rumbo funcional y técnico que le es propio y la invasión de espacios ajenos a su quehacer, dolamas que no son de hoy y se originaron cuando esas dos grandes y fundamentales lecciones se olvidaron para caer en los vicios de la burocracia agigantada e ineficiente del Estado, invadido por politiquería y corrupción. Reducir la misión del DAS a un simple servicio de extranjería es prescindir de un instrumento vital para la seguridad nacional y cargarle a la Policía Nacional responsabilidades que no le corresponden y conducirán a complicar sus propias funciones, de suyo complejas en gracia -o desgracia- al conflicto armado que la exige al máximo y de ninguna manera conviene sobreextender. NERINT 76

77 D LEITURAS RECOMENDADAS BRUNEAU, Thomas C. & BORAZ, Steven C. Reforming intelligence: obtacles to democratic control and effecttiveness. Austin - TX: University of Texas Press, CEPIK, Marco. Espionagem e Democracia: agilidade e transparência como dilemas na institucionalização de serviços de Inteligência. Rio de Janeiro - RJ: Editora FGV, GILL, Peter & FARSON, Stuart & PHYTHIAN, Mark & SHPIRO Shlomo [editors]. Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches. Washington - D.C: Praeger, ISBN: [Two Volumes] RICHELSON, Jeffrey T. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press TREVERTON, Gregory & AGRELL, Wilhelm. National Intelligence Systems: current research and future prospects. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press, NERINT 77

78 E ANEXOS 1. CASOS NACIONAIS SEPARAÇÃO ORGANIZACIONAL DO SISTEMA DE INTELIGÊNCIA, REGIME POLÍTICO, GASTOS PÚBLICOS (% PIB) E PIB Country Organizational Political Regime Public Expenditure as a PIB Size (current US$) Separation % of GDP (2007) (trillions) Albania Low Semidemocratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Argentina Low Democratic Up to 25% Up to 1 Australia High Democratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Bosnia and Low Semidemocratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Herzegovina Brazil Low Democratic Up to 25% Between 2 and 3 trillions Bulgaria Low Semidemocratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Canada Low Democratic Up to 50% Between 2 and 3 trillions China Low Authoritarian Up to 25% Over 3 trillions Colombia Low Semidemocratic Up to 75% Up to 1 Cuba High Authoritarian Up to 25% Up to 1 France High Democratic Up to 75% Between 2 and 3 trillions Germany High Democratic Up to 50% Over 3 trillions Greece Low Democratic Up to 75% Up to 1 India High Democratic Up to 25% Between 2 and 3 trillions Indonesia Low Democratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Iran High Authoritarian Up to 50% Up to 1 Iraq High Semidemocratic Up to 25% Up to 1 Israel High Democratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Japan High Democratic Up to 50% Over 3 trillions Jordan Low Authoritarian Up to 50% Up to 1 Mexico Low Democratic Up to 50% Between 2 and 3 trillions Netherlands High Democratic Up to 75% Up to 1 New Zealand High Democratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Pakistan High Semidemocratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Poland High Democratic Up to 25% Up to 1 Romania High Democratic Up to 75% Up to 1 Russia High Semidemocratic Up to 25% Between 2 and 3 trillions South Africa High Democratic Up to 50% Up to 1 South Korea High Democratic Up to 50% Up to 1 Spain High Democratic Up to 50% Between 2 and 3 trillions Sweden Low Democratic Up to 75% Up to 1 Turkey Low Democratic Up to 50% Up to 1 United Kingdom High Democratic Up to 50% Between 2 and 3 trillions United States High Democratic Up to 25% Over 3 trillions Vietnam Low Authoritarian Up to 50% Up to 1 NERINT 78

79 2. DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE REGIMES POLÍTICOS ENTRE OS 35 CASOS NACIONAIS 3. SEPARAÇÃO ORGANIZACIONAL X REGIME POLÍTICO NERINT 79