COORDINATING GOVERNMENT SECTORS: A TYPOLOGY FOR PRODUCTION OF INTEGRATED POLICIES FROM BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAM CASE (BRAZIL)

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1 COORDINATING GOVERNMENT SECTORS: A TYPOLOGY FOR PRODUCTION OF INTEGRATED POLICIES FROM BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAM CASE (BRAZIL) LUCAS AMBRÓZIO LOPES DA SILVA PHD student of Public Administration and Government Business Administration School of São Paulo, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (EAESP/FGV), Brazil lucasambrozio@yahoo.com.br Palavras-chave: Intersectoriality, Bolsa Família Program, SÃO PAULO

2 ABSTRACT: The recent social development policies made by governments of many developing countries are marked by great challenges and have strained the state structure to design new arrangements, requiring processes of institutional experimentation and new forms of coordination between government sectors. This context allows the hypothesis formation: the intersectoriality has been disseminated as a shared task between subnational governments and enabling new forms of government coordination, with the aim of co-production of public services. Offering policies that are able to tackle structural problems, as is the issue of poverty in Latin American countries. The objective of this paper is to develop a typology of governmental coordination to analyze efforts of coordination between government sectors for integrated policies production, which go beyond traditional forms of tight and fragmented production of public policies. The method used was a case study of Bolsa Família Program (policy of conditional income transfer). We mapped forms of intersectoriality developed from organizational and documental analysis, and qualitative interviews. The results point to presence of important mechanisms of political leadership (President and Ministers) and institutional leadership (role played by the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger and his team of civil servers). The typology developed considers options for support intersectoriality, which can be mobilized at different times and for different purposes. The types of mechanisms designed for the construction of intersectional analysis are: 1) Collegiate Agencies (which are good starters, but have low materiality); 2) Empowerment of bureaucracy and their networks (which have high efficacy and materiality, but it incurs risks oligarchization bureaucracy); 3) Creation of Intermediate Agencies of Coordination (enable greater agility to the joints, but can lead to conflicts between organizational structures). 1

3 1. INTRODUCTION Recent social development policies made by governments in several developing countries are marked by great challenges and have strained state structure to respond according to new arrangements, processes requiring institutional experimentation and new forms of coordination between government sectors. This context allows the formulation of the hypothesis: the intersectionality has been disseminated as a shared task between subnational governments and enabling new forms of government coordination, with the aim of co-production of public services.offering policies that successfully attack structural problems, as is the issue of poverty in Latin American countries. The objective of this paper is to develop a typology of government coordination to analyze the efforts of coordination between government sectors for the production of integrated policies that overcome traditional forms of production watertight and fragmented public policy. The method used was the case study of Brazil's Bolsa Família Program (national policy of conditional cash transfer). Mapped forms of intersectionality developed from organizational analysis and documentation, as well as qualitative interviews. In Brazil, with democracy and the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, and the fiscal crisis of the 90s, social policies began to answer new demands and operate according to a logic complex, which has brought new issues to the government agenda. Simon Schwartzman (Schwartzman, 2004) develops the idea of three generations of social policies. The first would be linked to the expansion and extension of social rights and benefits, and is initiated in Brazil in the 30s 1, consolidating itself only with the Constitution of 1988, when there was the consecration of a broad set of social rights. The second generation, which emerges from the agenda of the FHC and Lula, seek to rationalize and redistribute resources in social spending in order to balance social spending and financially correct its regressivity (RIBEIRO, 2010). Finally, the third generation of policies would be those beyond the concerns of the previous generation, had as its central objective the quality of services, seeking to respond fully to social problems, from the integration and coordination between the various public policies. This third generation, according to Schwartzman, would be the great challenge of social policies, 1 On the composition of social rights in Brazil occurred in the '30s, José Murilo de Carvalho (Carvalho, 2001) points out that this process occurred in authoritarian and exclusionary, since it would have been an imposition of Getúlio Vargas government and not an achievement of citizens. So José Murilo draws on the concept of widespread Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (SANTOS, 1970): "regulated citizenship" to characterize this process, since these social rights would also be restricted to unionized workers, thus excluding the majority of the population the time (farm workers, domestic workers, unemployed, etc.), and the relationship between trade unions and employers to be mediated by government agents, compounding pejoratively called scab unionism. The author also maintains that in Brazil the process of succession in the conquest of rights followed sequence distinct from that observed in developed countries, described by T. H. Marshall (Marshall, 1967), which began with the conquest of civil rights, then political rights and finally social rights, respectively in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 2

4 since it does not state categorically that we are now witnessing, and not even the second generation has already been completed. Thus, it is visible in social policies and institutional changes in its central objectives, that changed: structures, divisions of responsibilities and intervention practices. From the analysis of some studies involving the theme of intersectionality, and government coordination (as Bakvis, 2004; Carneiro, 2010; Cunill Grau, 2005; Guirado, 2008; Martins, 2005; Peters, 1998; Repetto, 2009; Serra, 2004) and with the knowledge that "a finite set of concepts will never be able to capture what is, in principle, an infinite set of possible observations" (Davis, 2005: 29), we developed a new concept for the unpretentious term intersectionality: "set of formal drawings and practices that provide synergy and complementarity between different sectors responsible for public policies (such as administrative, the budget, the planning, human resources, etc..), but also their own specific areas of policy social, as social assistance, education, health, etc ". Thus, in our analysis intersectoriality not restricted to a merely administrative or territorial, but encompasses multidimensional approaches, comprehensive responses and overcoming sectoral interventions specialized and fragmented, with low level of dialogue in the search for solutions to common problems and / or inter -related, guided by some exercise of governmental coordination, especially intragovernmental. Which brings us to the need to think of an entire issue of governance and performance of public bureaucracies. With this order of conceptualization, Cunill Grau (2005) classifies existing studies on intersectoral based on the source of justification proposed by them (more political or more technical). The more political premise is that the integration between sectors enables the search for comprehensive solutions to social problems and translates into an assumption that all public policies that pursue global strategies of development, such as improving the quality of life of the population, must be planned and executed intersectorally. Already the premise more technical concentrates its focus on efficiency analysis, stating that the integration between sectors allows the differences between them can be used productively in addressing social problems by creating solutions that best sectoriality, as it allows to share resources (not only economic, but the most distinct orders) that are specific to each sector. Thus intersectoral gains prominence to overcome what Martins (2005) describes as the existence of a "theory of fragmentation" in relation to the formulation / implementation of public policies. The historical trajectory of social policy in Brazil shows that p hear little social policies began to be perceived values of universality since mechanisms for equity. The programs of conditional cash transfer began to gain highlights the government agenda in Brazil, while other Latin American government followed the same paths. And recently the development strategy has brought a new look, promoting a social agenda increasingly a 3

5 priority, integrated and positive, as a way to respond to old and old issues of Brazilian society (Smith, 2013). Recently social development policies in Brazil have emerged linking development strategies with social policies. Such guidance has brought strong challenges for the Brazilian State. The Bolsa Familia synthesize these trends and the ways that the state has acted to give more dynamism to public policies. Intersectoriality emerging principle would be given guidelines and recent political scenario fragmentation of state action and its institutions, leading to a disjointed set of public policies. Intersectoriality is therefore a principle as necessary as this emerging convergence of economic and social strategies (Silva, 2013). 2. The BOLSA FAMILIA PROGRAM AS A CONDITIONAL TRANSFER PROGRAM INCOME The Bolsa Família Program was created in 2003 from the unification of the Bolsa Escola Program, Bolsa Alimentação Program, Food Card and Gas Voucher as a way of implementing a body of highly redistributive social policies and targeted (Carneiro, 2010; NERI, 2008). It is a program of direct income transfer to conditionalities education, health and social care. The amounts transferred are defined based on the per capita monthly income of the family and also in the number of children and adolescents under 17 years. The single record was created as an instrument of program management. It manages a decentralized diverse socioeconomic information of families enrolled. The Bolsa Familia Program can be included in a series of programs with similar configurations, called Programs Conditional Cash Transfer, they are all characterized by mechanisms targeting of beneficiaries, transfers and demand / stimulus actions by parties by thereof. This range of programs today is widespread in Latin America (Kliksberg, 2006; Marquionni & Conconi, 2008) and elsewhere, especially in developing countries. Conditionalities being a key feature of the BFP, we highlight the following: Conditionalities health were established by a joint regulation of the Ministry of Health with the MDS (Ordinance joint MS / MDS 2509 November 2004), which consists of families with children under 7 years must commit to keep up the vaccination schedule and checks of height and weight (important items of policy to combat child malnutrition) and pregnant women must undergo medical and educational prior and subsequent to the birth of the child. The regulations define control functions and management of the health conditionality for the municipal and state of health, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Development. All this is important to transform the conditionality of a levy for families with a commitment by the minimum health conditions among federal entities and 4

6 society, trying to accomplish here, the three basic principles of program management: intersectionality, decentralization and social participation. With regard to education, the joint decree of the Ministry of Education with the Ministry of Social Development (Ordinance MEC / MDS 3789 November 2004) establishes a minimum attendance of 85% in all months for children between 6 and 15 years and 75% for children between 16 and 17 years. As with the regulation of health is defined assignment for all federal entities and is the recommended practices of social participation in the management of municipal education systems effectively in order to make that social participation in these instances is the school management fact and not just in law, the same happens with regard to health. The conditionality of social assistance involved in the BFP comes from its integration with the "Program for the Eradication of Child Labor" (PETI), established by Decree 666 of December 2005, for the PBF identifies the beneficiary families, those who are in a position of vulnerability child labor and establishes a special service to them, while maintaining the specialties and specific objectives of each program. Thus the conditionality of social assistance is that children and adolescents up to 15 years at risk or withdrawn from child labor by PETI should participate in the so-called Living Services and Strengthening Linkages with frequency of 85%. 3. ONE TYPE OF COORDINATION INTERSECTORAL: THE BOLSA FAMILIA PROGRAM CASE This chapter consists of the unfolding of recent research on mechanisms for intersectoral coordination involved in the Bolsa Família Program, program structuring and articulating the central axis of social development policy adopted by the Brazilian government (Silva, 2013). One of the hypotheses of this research is to analyze the program as an interesting laboratory to identify different forms and mechanisms of coordination among government sectors. Establishing itself as a valuable case study is to analyze possibilities and potential for horizontal articulation between public and public bodies of the Public Administration, as discussed below. Will group the coordination efforts of government in three different types of strategies, gleaned from the use of: 1) collegiate bodies, 2) empowering the bureaucracy and their networks, and 3) creation of intermediary bodies coordination Collegiate Agencies: initiating coordination The establishing the Bolsa Família Program law defines intersectionality as a basic principle, as well as community participation and social control. This definition provides a 5

7 very clear message to other federal government federal entities, particularly municipalities, which is the need to promote intersectoral and permeate every level of the federation. Accordingly, and provided an inductive role of subnational units, the federal government also established a "Interministerial Council Manager", as a product of institutional engineering necessary to promote the start of intersectionality. This would be a significant part of the apparatus "legal-organizational" to give support to this need for coordination of sectors within the federal government. This advice was also established by law creative PBF. The Council is composed of members representing each of s and te ministries or agencies of the Public Administration involved with the implementation of PBF. Below we describe how each agency is involved with the management of PBF. 1) "Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger" - MDS, which holds the presidency of the Council, is the body responsible for promoting the social welfare policies and strategies to combat poverty, this is why, the organization responsible for PBF. 2 ) "Ministry of Education" - MEC, which has the responsibility to develop a series of public programs that seek to improve the education and training of the beneficiaries. 3) "Ministry of Health" - MS, has the role of providing a service comprehensive health care to families by establishing a strategy of interaction with families in social vulnerability and poverty. 4) "Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management" - MPOG, whose mission is to allocate and plan the allocation of financial and human resources required to manage the PBF, as well as supporting the MDS in the development process management technologies and computerized management systems deem support him. 5) "Ministry of Finance" - MF, which should integrate the program with the strategy of economic development and growth of government, turning it into an important part of the economic policy of the country, since the decrease of regional economic inequalities and increase domestic consumption but on the other hand one can not forget that it also generates increased public spending and inflationary pressure, as side effects. 6) The House of the Presidency of the Republic - CC, which is the body responsible for making the coordination between ministries, is because the state agency most involved in intrathemed joint, so committed to the challenge of increasing intersectoral government policies, which is why the nearest Ministry of the Presidency. 7) "CEF" - CAIXA is a major state-owned banks in Brazil and also has an important role in various federal social programs, since as it is one of the few banks present in all Brazilian cities, plays the role of making public resources arrived citizens, eg the politics of social welfare, housing, microcredit and the action itself income transfer. In the case of Bolsa Família CAIXA is the agent program operator, offering all the necessary conditions for sustaining the system of registration of beneficiaries, called "Single Register" - CadÚnico, which is the registry system that centralizes manages all information of the population in poverty, performing 6

8 the functions of the organization, maintenance, systems development and preparation of reports for monitoring by the MDS, beyond CAIXA be the financial agent responsible for the payment of benefits. The following table shows how each of the structures that act: either in production program (planning and execution), is working together to guarantee the conditions. Table 1: Other agencies of the Federal Public Administration involved in the management of PBF Production Program MPOG MF CC Conditionalities Program MS MEC MDS CAIXA However the college referred to above ("Manager Ministerial Council") does not warrant or pro moves intersectionality. Through field research, consisting of a series of interviews with leaders and public servants involved in the construction of intersectionality, we identified the establishment of a council manager was just the beginning of a process of construction of intersectionality.'s quite reasonable to think that the generation of intersectoral not be built by one or two people from each agency, but by a series of work teams engaged in this purpose Empowerment bureaucracy and their networks The engagement of all agencies involved in activities with intersectoral coordination is essential to the success of cooperative relationships established. In public administration, the body politic is largely responsible for the prioritization of the issue and its spread throughout the government. It is an activity that requires political leadership and ability to perceive the importance of this topic. Given some characteristics inherent in the state bureaucracy, this action of engagement and politicization of work teams is not trivial activity and demand not only formal authority, requiring a great cohesion for both the commitment, as for the implementation of intersectoral activities. We see in the case of PBF an important role towards presidential dissemination of the importance of policies to combat poverty and hunger. Already in his 2002 presidential campaign, Lula insisted on calling public attention to the problem of hunger and poverty and the need to address it through state policies strong, articulated and 7

9 innovative. Why would you create in your first year in office the Zero Hunger program, which would later give rise to the set of objectives pursued by the Family Allowance. This ability to arouse the interest of society and disseminate the topic was important and was able to pass within the government and government bureaucracies. Increasingly, the theme has the ruling political elite for the other levels of the public administration. The ability to mobilize popular government became capacity politicization of the bureaucracy. Politicization this case means that "politicization may also mean que public servants begin to take on tasks que formerly (and formally) might have been Considered to be political." (Peters, Pierre, 2004: 3). This ability to politicization of bureaucracy would be crucial for the involvement of the social ministries and mission of intersectionality, especially in a context of arrival of the PT in government for the first time. In this context the bureaucracy would, in theory, an obstacle to new working guidelines and policies. The bureaucrats of commitment to the values and interests of the policy area is Generally seen to just another reason for the encounter ministers que Difficulties When Attempting to manage Their programs and Their Departments. Especially this is true for parties que come to office after some period in opposition and find que there are working relationships in place que They Do not please. (Peters, Pierre, 2004:3) Other studies have emphasized the importance of the leadership of President Lula for involvement d work teams that constituted the PBF (Monteiro, 2011). The action of creating a new organizational structure to work the theme of social development was an option that allowed the installation of a new bureaucracy, reducing therefore the possible cultural and business barriers to the implementation of PBF. In general, the bureaucracy that formed in MDS has a strong commitment to the theme, which is reflected on their performance and on their ability to intersectoral coordination. This involvement has been repeatedly stressed in interviews. Another important element for the involvement of civil servers is the appeal of the theme of social development, which appeared frequently in interviews suggested as a factor of motivation and engagement, is the esquipes MDS, whether the teams of other ministries, which favors the provision cooperation between sectors. This engagement of the bureaucracy is a parallel process and important to support the materialization of intersectionality. Under the program Bolsa Família, these relationships are established, mainly with respect to the joints between the Ministries of Health, Education and MDS itself. Although important, the collegiate bodies, as we have 8

10 seen, can not give materiality to intersectoral action. Shall try to describe and analyze the process of materialization mapped intersectionality in the BFP. Figure 1: The process of building in intersectoriality PBF Case The process mapped by this research highlights that the starting element would be the perception of the importance of intersectoral government (Step 1), it is very clear by the inclusion of the principle of intersectionality in the law itself creative PBF, beyond the establishment of a body collegiate to take it on. Step 2 would be the moment when the first 9

11 meetings and begin initial discussions that will unfold in the establishment of a series of commitments of the various organs, which will be carried forward in step 3, which will be built capabilities (allocation of human and financial resources, preparation of work teams and their work environments). Step 4 is the center of the array intersectoral created around the PBF, since the engagement of bureaucracies organs is what will make the intersectoral materialize daily. As important as the political will (involvement of the president and his ministers) is the engagement of their bureaucracies medium, which will be responsible for playing the role of agent and coordinator of relations between the sectors (further explore best this step). From this there is an intensification of the relationships between the bureaucracy and the arrival of the first performers to process administrative tasks (Step 5), which will generate a series of patterns of relationships, all grounded on informal and personal traits, given the low initial control. In step 6 would do the work of collective learning, which would be identified in which experiences are not working, correcting them, but mostly identified patterns of success described in step 7, in order to map the routine relationship and try to suppress Personal brands, standardizing them. Finally, in step 8 discussions would be made between areas to arrive at a consensus on what can be formalized, an important step for knowledge management and stability of horizontal cooperation. The perceived challenge intersetoriliadade is emerging from many fronts, as we mentioned earlier. Moreover, it is of particular importance to be an important feature of intra-governmental coordination in a federal government that has sought to develop a series of policies around social development as a way to give materiality to a whole process of public debate on the agenda of growth with reduction of social inequalities, which gained momentum during the 2002 presidential campaign, which elected President Lula government and led to the Labor Party. The second stage also has to do with the role of President and political group most strongly articulated it. Overall, the leadership of the president and his speech to combat poverty was reflected, to some degree, on the mobilization of the ministers, given that this valuation of the subject begin to generate a more favorable environment for cooperation and joint work. Perceives the presence of what Kingdon (1984) defines as the necessary convergence of the three streams that will generate a Policy Window for entry of an item on the government agenda: the flow problems(emergence of intersectionality as a key issue in the management of public policies [Silva, 2011]), Proposals (previous experiences and developments of the PBF management practices) andpolitics (political speech rallying the theme of social development and the fight against poverty). One of the striking features of intersectionality is that it does not seek to replace the sector, on the contrary, it strengthens the sectors, which can from her efforts and 10

12 maximize scarce resources and promote interventions more complex and specialized. This feature is observed in the PBF, as the Ministry of Social Development - MDS does not remove duties of the other, and do not compete for the same resource budget, since the budget resources allocated are independent, with the guarantee of non-impairment of another social program. This leverages the steps 2 and 3, reducing potential conflicts and maximizing scarce resources update. Another feature of step 3 to the case was the rapid appointment to leadership positions in a number of MDS servers Career Specialist in Public Policy and Government Management (Career Cross meritocratic recruitment and technical training to a select body of servers that, depending on their degree of politicization and alignment to the government of the day may occupy strategic positions of directorships, call the office at DAS - Management and Advisory Superior, constituting the high bureaucracy of the federal government). In general, members of this career have high levels of remuneration and training, in addition to having a high ability to articulate themselves to the implementation of public policies, which, starting from the fact that they are in different ministries, generates a great potential articulation between agencies and public policies. By "Empowerment Average Bureaucracy" we mean a process in which the bureaucracy will be recruited a group to coordinate actions, which happens to be the link between the high bureaucracy (ministerial offices), and operating bureaucracy. Given the fact that this bureaucracy average, in general, for our case, will be occupied by civil servers that will be placed on the basis of leadership, this process in the Public Administration follows a logic in different part of the logic of private management, even if this difference is tenuous, as so significant as the management capacity is the ability of political engagement to government strategy (politicization). Thus, this nomination process can also be a process of cooptation of the bureaucracy, which has different effects, but one of them is to give the organization greater cohesion therefore greater coordination capacity (Selznick, 1978). On the other hand, and ste empowerment process can also generate a bureaucratic elite in post middle management. This elite, like all others, have a high level of power (given to her by the empowerment process and the process of appointment / recruitment to the post of head), but it would be highly homogeneous and circulation very similar environments, which leads to greater internal cohesion. This elite set here is very similar to the profile of elite developed and analyzed by C. Wright Mills in his book "The Power Elite" (Mills, 1956), where the elite would be formed by a series of interlocking directorates, strongly marked by the presence of informal networks of movement and articulation, would come from a social class strongly homogeneous and dominate the ranks hierarchical. In 11

13 general, all these features, as pointed out by Mills in the 50s, there was the characterization of the elite in question, grounded in a very specific public career. The ministries involved in horizontal issues are the most likely to be affected by the phenomenon "swim upstream", ie, the vertical structure of the preparation and reporting requirements and vertical accountability, which tend to be the norm in all ministries and other organs (ET. Bakvis, 2002). The pressure tends to be felt not at the top of the hierarchy, but in the intermediate levels of operational management and corporate services. Moreover, among those actually involved in horizontal projects, one realizes that the bottlenecks are more pronounced in the intermediate levels of the ministries. It is noticed that, in most ministries, horizontality is not taken very seriously at the operational level. (Bakvis and Julliet, 2004: 78-79) As highlighted in the snippet, bureaucracies, especially medium-sized, can be an obstacle to horizontal actions. That is, there is nothing common to middle bureaucracy to be an ally of the intersectoral effort, however, most often it will not. Our case study seems to have conditions very close to those corresponding to a model of optimal conditions to lead to engagement: 1) the theme is appealing and social compliance, 2) strong political leadership is exercised; 3) the recruitment of political bureaucracies to ascend to management positions is done with major mechanisms of politicization; 4) the budgetary resources of the program are increased year by year, being one of the least affected by fiscal policy; 5) the ministries do not compete for funding within the framework of cooperation, 6) ministers recognize the importance of the program and its engagement; 7) bureaucracies have political autonomy; 8) bureaucracies benefit from careers horizontal and high technical strength; 9) is open to experimentation and innovation; 10 ) the intersectoral coordinating body activity is recent, not having a strong organizational culture as a barrier to change, etc.. On one hand incur the risk that the oligarchization bureaucracy will constitute as an area of bureaucratic insulation may present veto point for public policy, on the other empowerment average bureaucracy opens opportunities for innovation in the management and intersectoral pattern developed. The creativity of the body is stimulated servers, which is a rare value to be achieved in public bureaucracies, particularly in developing countries, like Brazil (OECD, 2010). The creativity of the bureaucracy, the aggregate capacity of networking, with the ability to circulate a large flow of information and knowledge, coupled with the transfer of autonomy with accountability mechanisms are critical for the conformation of step 5, where the servers themselves created through mutual adjustment, a set of practices and patterns of informal and intersectoral cooperation between the different sectors of the federal executive. 12

14 The steps 6 and 7 are associated with the presence of a culture of good practice to let emerge, they are valued, since they are directed to the idea of passing the spread and be formalized.quality management in public administration already draws our attention to the characteristic of standardization activity periodic and constant monitoring and analysis of what is being done.stimulate a public servant thinking about process standards, drawing therefore their personal characteristics, is no easy task. Above all practices that were happening in a context of great procedural informality and low rigidity from an incremental approach of trial and error. Thus, step 8, standardization, has the leadership of a very experienced server, is to know the general aspects of public policy, is well known in his own office, and it is therefore someone who has a pragmatic and general. This leader sets together with the servers the process of identification, selection and standardization of good practice, conveying the teams that have the expertise to master the laws also. All the processes described lead to the formation and formalization of inter-sector cooperation patterns with high standing (as formalization is ex-post and in order to set crystallization practice) and efficacy, once arises based on actual fact, since born with viability assured. And more importantly, the procedures and the people responsible for them are widely known. There is no doubt also that the standardization ensures greater stability to intersectionality formed, since it fails to bind to personal characteristics and organizational communication channels restricted. Anyway, intersectionality is built on a day-to-day, this dialog echelons mean and median. The chief authorities of the main ministries were only called to resolve a conflict or another, I think I never in the history of our relationship a minister had to be called to mediate any deadlock situation. The thing always did very well until the level of directors. But this requires that the other side (other ministries) also identifies the PBF something of their own interest. (Interview with the advisor of National Citizenship Income - SENARC, Bruno Chamber, held in May 2012 at the headquarters of MDS in Brasilia-DF) As we have seen and will see the leadership capacity of the body politic is crucial for the entry of the theme of intersectionality agenda and prioritization on the part of ministers is also essential. However, equally or even more important than the engagement of the body politic will be the engagement of bureaucracies and the formation of cohesion between them. The case of the BFP makes us think that such strong and frequent as the differences between the ministries may be differences intraministeriais. The government bureaucracy, which is not a uniform and cohesive body, also can not be at the ministerial level. In some interviews it became clear that the difficulties of communication between departments of the same ministry can be even larger than interministeria is. 13

15 In fact the politicization of the bureaucracy accompanied by a process of empowerment (appointment to senior positions) bureaucrats politically engaged with the program values and intersectoral approach has been a success for the differential construction and materialization of intersectionality in the BFP. Ie, the body politic has made an important role in identification of bureaucrats, who in addition to technical, managerial and political skills had to lead and control the process of articulation. This process involves a clear empowerment of bureaucracies, giving them some autonomy to experiment and to make the dialogues between folders. The formation of bureaucracy within the SENARC (the body responsible for PBF) can be explained by a feedback process. When building a qualified staff, politicize it, empower it, co-opt some of them and put them in managerial positions to lead the team wins performance. Little by little the team's performance begins to resonate in their own success and the success of the policy, which creates even more confidence and legitimacy of these teams work with the government and the entire public administration, leading to an increase in membership and ministry partners intersectoral engagement. Is formed as a structure materiality of intersectoral and shielding the possible variations of context and policy guidance Another important structural factor that strengthens and increases the potential for coordination of bureaucracy linked both to the Ministry regarding the BFP is that they are one of the federal agencies and programs that are used more Career Specialist in Public Policy and Government Management. Treat the is the composition of a body in a bureaucracy imbued with great technical mission (unification of transfer programs and land cover PBF) and a high political priority (poverty agenda), it would be evident that they could be used for another career that was not grounded in a strong technical background and extensive knowledge of the functioning of public administration and the process of public policy making. Thus for sustaining strongly in this career bureaucracy in question have high technical capacity of public policies. Besides this being one of the careers with the greatest potential for intersectoral coordination. Members of this race have an important informal network of liaison and dialogue between them (corporate network) and career is undoubtedly the one that distributes and dilutes among the various organs of the Federal Public Administration, as its members occupy positions in virtually all federal government ministries. By having an important informal network coordinating members of this career to bring their bodies important potential for building intersectoral public policies and coordinates between different areas of government The role of intermediary bodies set up coordination 14

16 (...) The ministries could perhaps consider the possibility of creating special units responsible for supporting horizontal initiatives undertaken by them - support in the form of training or assistance in the use of tools and horizontal mechanisms, best practices training or assistance in creating structure horizontal for the project in question - as well as creating climate or culture within them more favorable to the adoption of horizontal solutions. (Bakvis and Julliet, 2004: 79) President Dilma trying to make a statement in relation to the previous government established during the 2010 presidential campaign the mission of eradicating extreme poverty as one of its major goals of government. It was clear, therefore, that its strategy would be to increase the focus of social development policies and emphasize the activities of federal and horizontal coordination within the federal government. Upon his arrival to the presidency, to define management as its slogan: "Brazil: the country is a rich country without poverty," makes clear that the issue would continue to be a priority and it would not keep advancing efforts to step-up and policies develop new plans, programs and institutions through government attempted innovations. To differentiate itself from its predecessor and supporter, who was President Lula, President Dilma Rousseff creates the Brazil Without Poverty Plan (PBSM) 2 from June In the same period is created Special Secretariat for Super Action Extreme Poverty - SESEP, linked to MDS and basically committed to implement the plan (PBSM). The institutional structure of SESEP must act in order to coordinate the actions of implementation and execution of initiatives and programs, set goals, and cons olidar actions and monitor implementation of the goals of PBSM. Analyses of assignments SESEP allows us to connect it to a strategy of government actions particula r the management of President Dilma. When creating a Secretariat within a ministry and assign it functions for monitoring and tracking of various government programs of other ministries, as well as functions of articulation, mainly intra-(intersectoral), the presidency has created an unusual. The set of functions is the same SESEP the competence of the Civil House of the Presidency, which substantially is the body responsible for the activities accompanying ment ment and monitors programs of different ministries, especially the priority (as they would be related to the theme combating poverty) and makes coordination among the different ministerial portfolios. 2 The Plan Brazil Without Poverty (PBSM) aims to eradicate extreme poverty in Brazil. The Plan consists of a complex network of joint actions and programs in various sectors and government agencies. Understands that poverty is a structural phenomenon and multifaceted and therefore requires not only income distribution, but a series of social policies and public services that tackle the causal factors and Inter-generational poverty. The plan involves actions over eight ministries of the federal government and has great emphasis on coordination with federal state and local governments. 15

17 Apart from its inception to be unusual, the performance of SESEP also contradicts the logic of power of government. It is unusual to have a body for a specific ministry (Office) coordinating and monitoring the actions of other ministries, as this performance counter to the formal dynamic power of government. How could a body to monitor and coordinate programs of other agencies that are in the same hierarchical level as the body to which it is subordinate? The answer to this apparent inconsistency can be given from the following analysis. Just as the Civil receive a overlegitimacy that comes from your direct link to the Presidency, which gives greater powers in relation to other ministries, the SESEP receive a overlegitimacy, albeit informal own presidency. To mention that the other ministers have shown great propensity for intersectoral cooperation, is the recognition and volunteer engagement with the mission to fight poverty, is the science of close linkage toward presidential authority, Luciana Alves (coordinator SESEP) makes clear that for the topic in question SESEP has a power to act superior to most other Departments. The same till the mechanisms of action of SESEP are inspired by mechanisms developed and tested by the Civil House of the Presidency (CC). By delegating assignments that, in theory, would fit more to the Civil than one screen etaria s ministerial, the President made a significant difference in the form of promotion and management of intra-governmental coordination, mainly intersectoral policy Brazilian social development, in particular actions related to the plan to combat poverty in the PBSM. The president seems to draw on his long career as the Chief of Staff ( ) to disseminate models of coordination experiments by CC for the entire Federal Public Administration. It is also clear emphasis on the sectoral coordination mechanisms as well as their addition to the DC replication, as is the case of SESEP. The creation of a coordination structure and their empowerment by the P resident of the Republic would be a choice motivated by the priority of this issue and take care of one of their biggest challenges: building solutions articulated and integrated among government sectors. In fact, this type of mechanism tends to accelerate the engagement of intersectoral action, there is seen the power it holds on the accession of others. By linking the MDS SESEP the Presidency expresses its strategy to increase the powers of the MDS, which would be the ministry with greater technical capital to coordinate policy to combat poverty, and to have intersectoral. Thus it is clear that unlike what would be a reasonable alternative to foster greater coordination capacity to PBSM taking him to the Civil or directly to the Presidency, the strategy of assigning it to SESEP and link it to the MDS took into account recognition of the skills, expertise and conditions of this range to lead this policy. 16

18 I think when the President created the Brazil Without Poverty Plan, as she put the MDS central ministry and coordinator of this process, involving many other ministries, in addition to health and education (ministries traditionally involved the action of PBF). The SESEP was established here (in MDS) for this mission centrality given to the ministry and by the fact that only the cabinet minister would not account for this activity, in addition to being quite SENARC already overloaded with PBF and the Single Registry. (Interview with the advisor to the Special Secretariat for Overcoming Extreme Poverty - SESEP / MDS, Luciana Alves de Oliveira, held in May 2012 at the headquarters of MDS in Brasilia-DF). In other words, to be an intermediate structure SESEP coordination with the function of promoting the capabilities of articulation between folders without requiring the direct intervention of the Presidency. Such mechanisms would avoid the appearance of conflict, given the formation of a more arena for resolving them, preventing many issues overwhelm the work of the presidency. The SESEP therefore has very similar characteristics to the central organs coordinating the government (in the case of federal, Casa Civil). About ai MPORTANCE central organs as facilitators of sectoral action, the prevailing culture in the public service and the current accountability framework does not provide organizational environment conducive to extensive coordination and collaboration between ministries. Consequently, even when there is good will on the part of some leaders in key ministries, the active intervention of central agencies is generally perceived as essential. The central bodies should play the role they have to play in at least two levels. They have a key role to play in establishing horizontal initiatives and should also provide direct assistance to the process of collaboration and coordination. (Bakvis and Julliet, 2004: 62-63) The SESEP has played an important role to give greater flexibility to the horizontal relationships, as it has led to greater engagement of sector units. During the interviews highlighted the role of the Secretariat as an organ of support and strengthening of sectoral agencies since it was established as an agency with large capacities to provide technical advice and make use of its strong power to increase coping capacities ministerial several of his challenges. often lacking P or small things and issues specific to the problems and ministerial coordination and coordinating bodies may be important. The real impact of SESEP for intersectoral coordination of PBF and policies to combat poverty is still very difficult to measure, since its activity is fairly recent (from 2011) compared to the complex challenges which attempts to answer, in However the analysis presented here would be a major element to the beginning of this reflection on the strategic and institutional changes. 17

19 Conclusions This paper attempts to start the development of a typology, which has three basic patterns of intra-governmental coordination, beyond the most common type would be coordination exercised by the central organs coordinating in general ministerial coordination offices connected directly to the chief executive. This typology is not full, therefore, new types can be added in the future. It was just an opportunity and try to start the development of intra-governmental coordination studies in Brazil (efforts will continue in future research). Unlike the traditions of the international literature, we are not in the Brazilian political science a set of solid studies on the mechanisms and relationships developed within the executive branch. Table 2: Typology of intra-governmental coordination Types of Coordination (by :) Collegiate Agencies Incomes Positives: activity quick and simple, the important early instance of the coordination process Negatives: low materiality and difficulty of maintenance over time Empowerment of bureaucracy Positives: High materiality; potential be Increased by the Involvement of civil careers horizontal servers Negatives: oligarchization Risks bureaucracy Coordination of Intermediate Agencies Positives: instance support coordination; Prevents overloading of the coordinating role of the presidency of the republic Negative: Breaking the formal hierarchy of the Public Administration Central Agency of Coordination (central power) Positives: instance with improved settling disputes; greater Cohesion with the presidential directives Negatives: should only be used as a last necessity One of the simplest mechanisms used in executives to provide greater coordination are collegiate bodies. This mechanism is common in many types of organizations and would be the most basic form of integration of sectors and solving the problems of 18

20 excessive specialization, typical of the literature on organizational theory (Matus, 1994). Given its feature collegiate and participation of senior leaders (such as ministers, secretaries and executives) such a mechanism may be important for initial actions or coordination to define their strategies, but surely becomes ineffective for materialization of coordination, since that the agenda of senior management public has to realize many other subjects. The empowerment of bureaucracy can be an example of potentiating mechanism and implementer of coordination for cases requiring rapid coordination and permanent, in the management of intersectoral public policies, by a process of politicization of public bureaucracies. On one hand this mechanism enables the construction of physical facilities for government coordination, through the delegation of autonomy and provide greater discretion to the bureaucracy, it also opens the possibility for the gentrification of the bureaucracy and strengthening its potential corporatist, which as already highlighted by Weber can lead to suppression brakes political control over the same. There is also the possibility of creating the intermediate coordination. This was inclusive of the changes in the pattern of government coordination described in the master's research occurred when the succession by Lula and Dilma could be explained from the understanding of the importance of the presidential profile on coordination, as developed by Lewis (2003). These intermediary bodies could be interesting for the coordination around specific policies or plans, for instance mean more to conflict resolution and compromise before the issue comes to the presidency. However, as was also demonstrated, this mechanism breaks can mean formal hierarchies, as the agencies would have a "supra legitimacy" since it does not have the same level of power of the Presidency, which could lead to conflict with the organizational culture of the agencies coordinated. In turn, the very House of the Presidency of the Republic, the institutional framework of the Brazilian federal government assumes the role of coordinating agencies and sectors, often exerts its central authority and evokes other trading activity with folders and mediation conflict. By being able to implement vertical solutions (based on his presidential authority) its performance is extremely useful in resolving major disputes between folders. Mainly recover the thesis has previously described Peters (2012) that coordinate implies some degree of centralization. However, like any central authority, should not be constantly driven, and its performance, again and again, could lead to disincentives for voluntary cooperation between folders. Bibliography 19